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Abstract 
Recent census data and successive surveys within Northern Ireland have recorded 
that a significant minority of both Catholics and Protestants choose not to identify as 
lrish or British, opting instead to identify as Northern Irish. Using data from the 
Northern Ireland Social Attitudes (NISA) and Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) 
surveys, this study estimates connections between this trend and community relations 
initiatives that aim to increase contact between Catholics and Protestants. It is the first 
study to explore and compare systematically the relationships between five key 
indicators of cross-community contact-school integration, residential mixing, mixed 
religion friendship groups, mixed religion kinship ties, and mixed religion marriage-
and national identity preferences. 
Understanding these relationships is important, since the rationale for many 
community relations initiatives is that increasing intergroup contact will lead to a 
reduction in prejudicial attitudes and help foster the emergence of a shared society. The 
key findings are that individuals who have had regular contact with people across the 
communal divide are significantly more likely to identify themselves as Northern Irish 
and not as Irish or British. The strength of these relationships0 however, is found to vary 
against key socio-economic and socio-demographic dimensions and reasons are 
advanced for these variations. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This study investigates a range of community relations policies in Northern 
Ireland that seek to promote contact between members of the Protestant and Catholic 
communities. 1 Specifically, it explores the relationship between experiences of 
intergroup contact-a central component of community relations policies-and various 
forms of group identification that are evident in social survey data. As a means of 
analysis, the study compares group identification amongst those who have experience of 
intergroup contact with those who claim to have little or no contact outside their own 
community. It is thus a contribution to survey-based analysis of identity patterns in 
Northern Ireland. 
Social surveys provide evidence that increasing numbers of both Protestants and 
Catholics are moving away from traditional and divisive forms of identification-such 
as the British/Irish dichotomy- towards more inclusive forms that encompass both of 
these two main community groups. Since 1989, for example, survey data has recorded 
that a significant, and growing, minority of both Protestants and Catholics are 
identifying as Northern Irish and not as British or Irish. Using social survey data, I 
examine possible connections between this trend and initiat_ives that aim to increase 
intergroup contact between Protestants and Catholics. 
This is the first study to explore systematically the relationships between five key 
indicators of intergroup contact- school integration, residential mixing, mixed 
1 The tenns 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' serve as important boundary markers in Northern Ireland 
identifying individuals as belonging to one of two main ethno-national groups (see Whyte 1990; McGarry 
and O'Leary 1995; Hayes and McAllister 2009a). It should be noted that a minority of Protestants and 
Catholics refuse membership of either community (Nie Craith 2002; O'Dowd 2009). However, the terms 
Protestant and Catholic are regularly used to refer to other important political and national identities. 
Indeed, Doherty and Poole (2002: 75) have suggested that the divide within Northern Ireland can be 
understood as 'essentially ethnic notwithstanding the fact that it is denoted by the religious labels 
"Catholic" and "Protestant"'. I use the terms Protestant and Catholic throughout the thesis to refer to 
those who self-identify as such. 
3 
friendship groups, mixed kinship ties, and mixed marriage 2- and national ident ity 
preferences. Understanding these relationships is important, since the rationale 
advanced by government and non-government bod ies fo r promoting engagement 
between communi ties at the grass roots level is that prejudice wi ll decrease and, through 
mixing 3 , commonalities wi ll increase. This study is thus also a contribution to the 
eva luation of approaches that aim to transform conflict in deeply divided societies . 
Northern Ireland as a deeply divided society 
Relative to its size, Northern Irel and has been the site of one of the most 
entrenched and violent conflicts in modern European history (Hayes and McAllister 
2005). During the 30 year peri od from the beginning of the contemporary conflict to the 
signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 (hereafter referred to as the Agreement), over 
3,2004 people have lost their lives and over 40,000 have been injured due to sectarian-
related violence. As Table I. I illustrates, if proportionate numbers of people had been 
affected in Britain, 111 ,000 would have died and around 1.4 million would have been 
injured. Likewise, it is estimated that in the United States, over 500,000 would have 
died and over 6.6 million would have been injured. 
2 For the purposes of this research, I use the term mixed marriage pertaining to marriages between 
Catholics and Protestants. I provide a detailed explanation of this term, as well as other tern1s that are 
used to describe this phenomenon in chapter 7. 
3 The use of the terms ' mixed' and ' mixing' are used throughout the thesis. I use these terms for a few 
reasons. The term ' mixed' is commonly used within the literature to describe the phenomenon of a couple 
from two di ffere nt religious backgrounds entering into a ' mixed ' marriage. Simi larly, some schools in 
Northern Ireland are said to be ' mixed ' rather than integrated and, as I shall demonstrate, there is a 
di fference between these two types of schools that justifies the use of separate terminology . Finally I use 
the term ' mixed ' residential areas to describe areas in which there is a 'mix' of residents from both 
Protestant and Cathol ic background. It should be noted that most ' mixed ' areas have a rough 
demograph ic ratio of 70:30 and thus to use the term integrated here would be misleading. 
4 It should be noted that est imates of the numbers of deaths that have occurred in Northern Ire land due to 
political vio lence vary. 
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Table 1.1. The relative scale of political violence in Northern Ireland, 
1969-1998 
Deaths 
Injuries 
Nth Ireland 
3,289 
41 ,837 
Britain 
111 ,000 
1,406,000 
USA 
526 ,000 
6,673,000 
Source: Adapted from Hayes and McAl lister (200 1a). 
Darby has aptly described Northern Ireland as displaying a 'culture of violence' 
(Darby 1997: 11 8). This has eroded investment, employment and industry. Accordingly, 
in some localities, the dominant role model has become the paramilitary hero or the 
hunger striker. And whilst the violence (or at least heavily organised violence) may 
have significantly diminished in recent years, sectarian attacks, riots, prejudicial 
attitudes, and the continued physical and social separation of communities are enduring 
reminders of the fragi lity of peace that exists within Northern Ireland (Hayes and 
Dowds 2006). 
Northern Ireland therefore remains a deeply divided society. Following Lustick 
(1 979: 325) I understand deeply divided societies to be those in which ascriptive group 
ties have generated 'antagonistic segmentation of society' b_ased on divided identities 
with high political salience that are sustained over a substantial period of time and 
across a wide variety of issues. Divided societies are characterised by distinct social 
cleavages and these exist where social differentiation is particularly salient (Lijphart 
1977: 3) and may be based on religious, class, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural 
or ethnic di fferences. As a result, social and political life tends to be organised along 
segmented lines and these invariably overlap leading to mutual reinforcement in which 
all the politically relevant sources of division exist along parallel lines and where group 
loyalty is paramount (Duffy and Evans 1996: 123). Fundamental to the study of divided 
societies is thus an understanding of the nature of the social cleavages that create and 
separate groups. 
At the same time, research has found that so-called crosscutting cleavages within 
society tend to diminish the political salience of group identity and thus help to 
5 
moderate social con fli ct (see Almond 1956; Dahl 1956, 1982; Li pset and Rokkan 1967; 
Goodi n 1975; Lijphart 1977) . A crosscutting cleavage occurs when social groups that 
are homogenous with respect to one social cleavage are heterogeneous with respect to 
another. Andeweg (2000: 509) provides the following exampl e, ' ln his trade union a 
church member interacts with secul ar work ing-class comrades, and in his church he 
encounters upper- and middl e-class brethren. The individual is pulled in di ffe rent 
di rect ions.' 
The individual is pulled in various directions because multiple categories of 
identification are ava ilable that can undermine the salience of other cl eavages. Such 
individuals make more moderate demands because their interests pull them in di fferent 
directions. Northern Ireland is regularly described as a divided soci ety containing 
mutuall y reinfo rcing cleavages w ith a high degree of overlap in religious, political and 
national identification. 5 It is suggested, therefore , that there is littl e room in Northern 
Ireland fo r crosscutting cleavages to emerge. Writing during a period of heightened 
tensions between both communiti es in the mid-1990s, McGarry and O 'Leary ( 1995a: 
323) commented that whatever common allegiance the people in Northern Ireland may 
share does not sign ificantly cross-cut what separates them. They contend that a society-
wide loyalty is absent and, rather, ' national solidarities deepen other cleavages' . 
National identity and the Northern Ireland conflict 
There is widespread agreement amongst scholars that competing national 
identities both fue l and are a centra l feature of the Northern Ireland confli ct. 6 This study 
supports the contention that competing claims as to what constitutes the relevan t 
' nation ' lie at the heart of the confli ct and that these cl ai ms-expressed through 
competing national identities-are central to mainta in ing division. Thus, Dryzek (2005: 
5 There are many well-known commentators on the conflict in Northern Ireland who support thi s claim 
(see for example Rose 1971; Lijphart 1975; Whyte 1990; McGarry and O' Leary 1995a; Du ffy and Evans 
1996; Darby 1997; Hayes et al. 2007 ; Wolff2012). 
6 See for example Darby 1986; Maxon-Browne 1983, 1991; Whyte 1990; McGarry and O' Leary 1995a, 
2004; Dryzek 2005 , 2006; Wolff 2003 , 2012. 
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219) suggests that mutually contradictory assertions of identity can reinforce conflict 
because 'one identity can only be validated, or at worst, constituted by the suppression 
of another'. These competing identities are often constrained by group allegiance with 
little room for multiple and fluid forms of identification that can cut across these 
divisions. As such, much social life occurs within, rather than between, communal 
cleavages (Nagle and Clancy 2010: 1). 
Within Northern Ireland today most people can be broadly described as belonging 
to one of two main communal groups. On the one hand are those who view themselves 
first and foremost as belonging to the United Kingdom, and on the other hand are those 
who (while either accepting or actively rejecting the constitutional link with the United 
Kingdom) view themselves as belonging first and foremost to the Republic oflreland. 7 
While there are many states in which its citizens hold more than one national identity, 
or in which a number of national identities are acknowledged, the existence in Northern 
lreland of two national identities-British and lrish--overlaps with other significant 
cleavages including religious and political identity. Accordingly, many people in 
Northern Ireland tend to identify with one of two competing and multi-layered 
identities: Protestants who see themselves as British and who wish to remain part of the 
United Kingdom; and Catholics who see themselves as Irish and who aspire to 
reunification with the Republic of Ireland (Hayes and McAllister 2009a). 8 And while 
7 This is not to deny that people in Northern Ireland may hold more than one national allegiance and may 
hold several identities of varying strengths at any one time. Indeed, for some, Britishness and Irishness 
are not seen as mutually exclusive categories (see Fahey et al. 2005; Muldoon et al. 2008). Moreover, 
there is also varying degrees of heterogeneity within each of the main communal camps with regards to a 
range of identities including differences between nationalists and republicans (see Todd 1999); 
differences between Ulster loyalists and unionists within the Protestant community (see McGovern 1997; 
McAuley 2004); and differences between ethnic, national and state identities (see Hayes and McAllister 
1999a). 
8 I note, however, that the divisions are more complex. For instance, while Irish unity is an important goal 
for many Catholics, it is not the most pressing issue. As Ruane and Todd (1999: 17) explain, Catholic 
interests rest first and foremost on remedying inequality both material and cultural. They contend that 
even republicans, who are strong proponents of Irish unity, have noted that equality within Northern 
Ireland is the primary goal and the first step towards reunification with the Republic of Ireland. 
7 
the confli ct is often understood as one between the 'Protestant' and 'Cathol ic' 
comm uni ties, these are rea lly ' proxy words' (Maxon-Browne I 99 1) used to signify 
more salient po li tical and national identities. 
In contemporary Northern Ireland the ex istence of competing national allegiances 
are expressed territoria ll y. Thi s is evident to anyone that walks through a unioni st or 
nationalist area. In the former, one is likely to see flags of the Union Jack, whil e in the 
later, street signs are in Gaelic. These symbo lic and linguistic markers serve as a 
reminder to both insiders and outsiders that the area is loyal to either Britain or Ireland. 
More than this, however, these markers also serve as a form of commemoration and a 
rem inder of the past. In Northern Ireland, history assumes a great significance in 
communal discourse. Perceptions of the past, the sense of hi story and the popular 
historical narrative held by individuals and communities have been influential in 
shaping identities and hostilities. Commenting on Northern Ireland, Lijphart (I 975: 83) 
notes ' the extraordinary contemporary political significance of the events and symbols 
of the past'. 
The origins of the contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland can be traced back to 
the Ulster P lantation of the seventeenth century when religious identity assumed an 
importance as the boundary marker between the new settlers (predominantly English 
Protestant and Scottish Presbyterian) and the local Gaelic population (predominantly 
Roman Catholic) (Darby 1997). 9 During this period, these two groups became locked in 
a struggle over territorial and po litical control (Coakley 2007) . 
The construction of oppositional identities in present day Northern Ireland is 
rooted in thi s period of co lonization. For example, during thi s period the same territory 
became occup ied by two groups hostile to one another, one beli eving the land had been 
usurped and the other fearing that that they were constantly under threat from Catholic 
rebellion (Darby 1997: 21). Second, governance and control of th e area would 
9 Although it may be poss ibl e to trace the roots of the confl ict in Northern l reland back to the Norman 
invasions of Ireland in the twelfth century, it was during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that 
religion became a salient feature of pol itical li fe (Barritt and Carter 1972; Darby 1976). 
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ultimately reside with those Protestant landowners and indeed by 1703, less than 5 per 
cent of the land of Ulster was owned by the Catholic Irish (Darby 1997). Protestant 
landowners acquired tenure of the land and took over management from which the 
Catholic population was excluded. The result was the emergence of two distinct and 
hostile groups who occupied the same territory. Thus the lines of division were drawn 
and the two communities identified their differences by religious labels: 'To the 
Protestant, the fact that a man was a Catholic was prima facie evidence that he would be 
disaffected and disloyal to the state: to the Catholic the fact that a man was a Protestant 
suggested that he was an alien invader maintained by a foreign military power' (Barritt 
and Carter 1972: 12). 10 The Ulster Plantation thus provided fertile ground for competing 
interpretations of historical events that were employed by groups to legitimate their 
claims to the territory of Ulster. Yet it was not until the outbreak of violence following 
the civil rights campaign in 1968 that survey evidence began to capture these mutually 
reinforcing cleavages. 
More often than not, to say one is Protestant or Catholic is also to state one's 
political and national aspirations (Whyte 1990) or at least to provide a good indication 
of the political and national aspirations that one rejects. Empirical evidence supports 
this claim. Table 1.2 highlights the relationship between religion- as either Protestant 
or Catholic-and national and political identity through analysis of data collected from 
the 2010 Northern Ireland Life and Times (NlLT) survey. Beginning with national 
identity, a Protestant is more likely to identify as British (62 per cent) whereas a 
Catholic is more likely to identify as Irish (59 per cent). Most importantly, however, 
while almost one-third of both Protestants and Catholics opt for the Northern Irish 
identity, almost no Protestants or Catholics are wi lling to cross the traditional divide and 
'
0 While the events of the seventeenth century laid the foundations for contemporary boundaries that exist 
today, competing national identities were yet to take full form. Indeed, up until the early twentieth 
century many Protestants were conscious of their lrishness as well as their outward profession of loyalty 
to the British Crown. lt was not until the outbreak of violence following the civil rights campaign that 
survey evidence captures the polarisation of national identities along religious lines. 
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identify with the out-group national identity, namely Iri sh or British respectivel y. The 
same is true for political identity. A maj ority of Protestants identi fy as union ist (67 per 
cent) and a majority of Catholics identify as nationali st (54 per cent). Wh ile a 
substantial minority of both Protestants and Catholics chose to opt for 'other ', no 
Protestants identified as nationalist and only 1 per cent of Catho lics identified as 
unioni st. 
Table 1.2. Rel igion by political and national identity, 2010 
Protestant Catholic 
Political identity 
Unionist 67 
Nationalist 0 54 
Other 33 45 
Total 100 100 
(N) (5 11 ) (430) 
(Chi square 769 .042 , 6 df, p<.01) 
Protestant Cathol ic 
National identity 
British 62 8 
Irish 3 59 
Northern Irish 27 25 
Ulster 6 
Other 1 8 
Total 100 100 
(N) (514) (435) 
(Chi square 543.034, 12 df, p< .01 ) 
Source: NIL T survey 2010 . 
While mutually reinforcing cleavages do not of themselves necessari ly create 
conflict, they do serve to high light and exacerbate existing tensions between groups. It 
is possible to identify several societal problems that stem from this. Firstly, the pattern 
of mutually reinforcing cleavages exacerbates perceived differences between groups. In 
tum, these perceived differences manifest in less favourabl e out-group attitudes and less 
intergroup tolerance (Mu ldoon et al. 2007: I 00). Social identity theory, which is 
discussed in detail in chapter 2, has been widely applied to instances of intergroup 
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conflict (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Hewstone and Brown 1986; Hewtsone and Greenland 
2000; Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). This theory suggests that given a particular context-
for instance where one group identity is threatened by the existence of another-
individuals may seek reassurance within their in-group by comparing and contrasting 
favourably their own group (for instance their national or religious group) with the out-
group. Intergroup comparison establishes positive distinctiveness, or positive self-
esteem, for the members of the in-group (Turner et al. 1987; Hewstone and Greenland 
2000). While this is a common feature of all groups, distinctions made between the in-
group and the out-group become problematic in deeply divided societies where the 
demands of one group are generall y perceived to negatively affect the welfare of the 
other. 
Second, evidence suggests that the existence of mutually reinforcing cleavages 
can serve the interest of political elites who may play up perceived differences between 
groups in pursuit of intra-group power and representation thereby further exacerbating 
intergroup conflict. 11 This usually involves a heavy emphasis on identity through 
invoking shared myths and symbols that provoke group sentiments and justify group 
actions. Finally, in instances of violent intergroup conflict, the physical separation of 
conflicting communities may be viewed as the best possible way of protecting group 
interests and providing group security. Thus, many divided ~ocieties are characterised 
by high levels of physical separation between groups which in tum leads to the 
separation of important social institutions such as schools, shopping centres and leisure 
facilities. This creates a vicious cycle in whi ch fear of the 'other', fuell ed by negative 
stereotyping, creates the desire to deepen the separation . This is because the physical 
separation of communities limits the amount of contact between groups. 
A significant body of research finds that the separation of groups may increase the 
likelihood for negative stereotypes of the 'other' to be accepted, for mistrust to foster 
and subsequently for further intergroup tension to occur. 12 Any intergroup contact that 
11 See for instance Hadden 2005; Coakley 2008; Gormley-Heenan and Mac Ginty 2008. 
12 See for example, Whyte 1986, 1990; Frazer and Fitzduff 1994; Dixon 1997a; Darby and Cairns 1998; 
Pettigrew 1998; Horowitz 2001a; Taylor 2001, 2006, 2009; Darby and Mac Ginty 2003 ; Oberschall and 
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is experienced will most likely be of a negative nature and may lead to instances of 
violence, whi ch in tum may provide further justifi cation for continued separation of 
communities. 1n such ways, the separation of communities becomes self-reinforcing, 
leading to a society of ' high fences' . Within Northern Ireland, divis ion is expressed in 
high levels of separation in key areas of social li fe. Accordingly, it is not unusual for 
members of the two main communities to have had no contact with the 'other' until they 
enter the labour fo rce or attend university (Hayes et al. 2007: 455). 
Managing and transforming intergroup conflict 
The troubling features of intergroup conflict identified above make it a practi cal 
and theoretical concern across a wide range of disciplines. Attempts to understand and 
to ameliorate the effects of intergroup conflict have been the focus of important social 
scientific research. Several schools of thought have advanced a number of di ffe rent 
theories on intergroup conflict in divided societies. Two groups of approaches for 
managing or resolving intergroup conflict in divided societies are identified in the 
literature. The first regards intergroup conflict as based on structural problems and 
proposes that conflict management or conflict settlement be achieved through 
institutional engineering by elites . These approaches seek to manage conflict by 
reforming the social system through the enactment of laws and constitutionally 
embedded provisions. I refer to variants of this group throughout thi s study as 
institutional approaches. Some theorists advocate institutional approaches because they 
regard group identity as typically resi stant to change. The primary chall enge, on this 
account, is to design institutions that can harness competing identi ty group clai ms wh ile 
at the same time acknowledging the existence of such claims (see, fo r example, Lijphart 
1969, 1977; McGarry and O ' Leary 2004). Such institutional approaches include 
consociational ism which favou rs power-sharing by group elites and the maintenance of 
a 'separate but equal ' society. However, other advocates of institutional approaches 
regard the salience of identities to be contingent on institutional support and party 
politica l mobilization (Horowitz 1985, I 993; Reill y 2001). 
Kendall-Pal mer 2005; Hughes and Donnelly 2006; Cairns et al. 2007; Hayes et al. 2007; Hughes et al. 
2007; Oberschall 2007; Nagle and Clancy 2010. 
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The second group of approaches proposes instead that societal transformation may 
be achieved through identifying and tackling systemic sectarianism and inequality and 
by improving relationships between divided communities. There are two main avenues 
through which relationship building between communities may be promoted-either 
through deliberation in the public sphere (see Dryzek 2005; O 'Flynn 2007; Wilson 
2009; Luskin et al. forthcoming) or through initiatives that promote social mixing 
between communities .13 This approach emphasizes the value of conflict transformation 
through civil society arguing that this serves to address the causes and consequences of 
division (see Dixon 1997a, 2012; Taylor 2001 , 2009; O 'Flynn 2007, 2009; Farry 2009; 
Wilson 2009). Following Dixon (1997a, 2012) I refer to variants of this group 
throughout this study as civil society approaches. I focus specificall y on work that seeks 
to promote social mixing between divided identity groups.14 As will be demonstrated, 
both institutional and civil society approaches are being employed in Northern Ireland. 
While my focus is on civil society approaches, I also argue that one approach 
alone will be insufficient to resolve conflict. Rather, a mix of both institutional and civil 
society approaches is likely to be required. Focusing solely on civil society will result in 
failing to take the reality of constraints on political actors and the rol e of politicians in 
bringing about societal change adequately into account (Dixon 2012). Settlement at the 
elite level and support from the state will be required for niecessary political stability 
that can then provide space for initiatives that aim to improve relationships between 
communities. Since the implementation of the Agreement which highlighted the need to 
address division and segregation of communities, an agenda for promoting community 
relations has been made a priority within government with the aim of creating a 'shared 
13 There is an extensive literature on conflict resolution through intergroup contact and social integration. 
See for example Wilford 1992; Ruane and Todd 1996; Dixon 1997a; Pettigrew 1998; Taylor 200 1, 2006, 
2009; Hughes and Donnelly 2006; Shirlow 2006; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006; Cairns et al. 2007; 
Hewstone et al. 2008. 
14 The civi l society approach is also known as the social transformation approach (see Taylor 2001 , 2009; 
Nagle and Clancy 2010, 2012; Nagle 2012) . However, following Dixon (1997a, 2012) I refer to this as 
the civil society approach as civil society is seen as the vehicle through which society may be 
transformed. 
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society' (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) 2005, 
2010). In practice, this goal is being sought, in large part, through the development of 
specifi c policies designed to increase the level of mixing between Protestants and 
Catholics in a range of social arenas. 
This research is conducted during a critical phase in the ongoing development of 
peace in Northern lreland. This phase is critical for at least two reasons. First, nearly 15 
years have now passed since the adoption of the Agreement-a sufficient amount of 
time to evaluate the degree to which it has effectively addressed the conflict. Indeed, 
while the Agreement has been described as 'a means of regulating conflict, not 
transforming it' (Taylor 2001: 37), others have disagreed, stating that the consociational 
nature of the Agreement 'is more likely to transform identities in the long run ' 
(McGarry 2001: 124). And others have suggested that the Agreement 'can be expected 
to produce changes in attitudes, identities and even aspirations' (Ruane and Todd 1999: 
22). 
Second, it is a critical phase in the development of a whole of government 
community relations strategy. For example, the government's major community 
relations strategy A Shared Future: Policy and Strategic Framework for Good Relations 
in Northern Ireland released in 2005 was recently replaced in 20 10 by a new draft 
strategy for 'a shared and better future' entitled Programme for Cohesion, Sharing and 
Integration. At the level of government policy, articulation of, and a coherent position 
on, a 'shared society' remains ambiguous. Moreover, the implementation of a new 
community relations strategy is yet to take place due to disagreements among Northern 
lreland ' s political parties as to the best way to envisage a shared future. It is therefore 
timely to re-visit community relations policy in Northern Ireland and to assess whether 
particular initiatives have borne fru it. That is, is there evidence to suggest that 
communi ty relations initiatives are associated with increased sharing? I contend that one 
way to examine this is to measure the relative strength of traditional national identities 
within particular environments and to assess whether a shared public identity may be 
present within the population. 
Justification for this line of inquiry is based on survey evidence that suggests 
increasing numbers of both Catho lics and Protestants are choos ing not to identify with 
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either the Irish or British identity. Instead, an increasing number of people are 
identifying as Northern Irish, which is now the second most popular identity choice of 
both Catholics and Protestants. A preference for the Northern Irish identity over 
traditional identities among members of the Catholic and Protestant communities 
indicates that an alternative and potentially shared public identity is gaining adherence 
in Northern Ireland. 
In two recent and significant contributions to this literature, Hayes et al. (2007) 
and Hayes and McAllister (2009a) argue that those who adopt a Northern Irish identity 
may represent a population that occupies a growing middle ground within Northern 
Irish politics. They contend that such identification results from a growth in the number 
of people who wish to distance themselves from traditional dichotomous group 
allegiances. They suggest that insofar as the number of people who identify as Northern 
Irish increases, this may help to break down territorial allegiances and create a space for 
the development of a shared identity since it is the only identity currently shared by both 
Protestants and Catholics (Hayes et al. 2007; Hayes and McAllister 2009a). 
The present study continues this line of inquiry and argues that the importance of 
this particular identity is that those identifying as Northern Irish come from both sides 
of the communal divide. Irrespective of whether the Northern Irish label holds different 
meanings for different groups, Protestants and Catholics who choose to identify in this 
way are at the very least making a conscious choice not to identify with the traditional 
and divisive identities. Moreover, there is reason to believe that those choosing a 
Northern Irish identity are aware of the cross-community nature of this identity. If a 
Northern Irish identity is seen as having the potential to further the development of a 
more inclusive society, it is important to investigate whether, where, and why it is 
emerging. 
Accordingly, the aim of this study is to investigate the emergence of the Northern 
Irish identity and in particular to examine whether it can be associated with civil society 
approaches that have sought to promote intergroup contact between the Catholic and 
Protestant communities in the areas of education, housing and social networks. To this 
end, a number of research questions are developed which investigate the civil society 
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approach within community relations policy, and the extent to which cross-community 
contact is promoted as a specific policy objective. 
The study then turns to in-depth analyses of the nature and extent of intergroup 
contact within particular socia l arenas including in education, housing and through 
social networks and asks whether individuals (from either a Catholic or Protestant 
background) who have intergroup contact within these social arenas di ffer from the rest 
of the adult population in relation to their national identity preferences. I uncover 
evidence to suggest that individuals who have had regular contact with people across 
the communal divide are sign ificantly more likely to identify themselves as Northern 
Irish and not as Irish or British. I argue, however, that while intergroup contact is a 
predictor of identity other key socio-economic and socio-demographic factors are also 
related to identity preference and reasons are advanced for these variations. 
The concept of identity 
The concept of identity is therefore central to the theoretical framework and 
empirical investigation undertaken in this study. Here identiti es are operationalised as 
variables that define individuals as belonging to particular groups. Following Fearon 
and Laitin (2000: 848) these groups are distinguishable by two main features: the group 
has rules of membership that decide who is and is not a member; and they possess a set 
of characteristics (shared beliefs, commitments, or physical attributes) that are deemed 
to be typical of its members. 
There are many kinds of group identities. And for any one person, there may be 
many different groups with which they identify. For example, an ethnic Greek living in 
Melbourne could simultaneously identify themselves as Greek, European, Australian, 
Victorian, trade union member, labour party supporter and so on . Just which group 
identity is most sali ent may vary significantly across individual s and within particular 
contexts. 
National identity is a group identity, but it has several features that make it 
distinctive from other types of identity. Political theorist David Miller (1995), for 
example, notes several features that national identities are com monly considered to 
possess. First is the idea that national communities are constituted by belief. That is, its 
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members recognize one another as compatriots, and have a shared belief in and mutual 
commitment to the nation. 
A second feature, acknowledged widely among theorists of nationalism (see 
Smith 1986; Miller 1995; Connor 2001 ; Hutchinson 2001; Guibernau 2007), is that 
nationality is an identity that has historical continuity. Historical events, traditions and 
symbols are used to build and legitimate a sense of common allegiance (Gellner 1983; 
Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1983, 1990). Indeed, calls for self-determination and 
national sovereignty that are often asserted by groups often rest on claims about 
ancestral and territorial belonging (Coakley 2003). This leads to a third aspect of 
national identity-that it connects a group to a particular geographical place (Miller 
1995; Connor 2001; Guibernau 2007). That is, nations claim homelands (Connor 2001). 
Miller (1995) also plausibly contends that national identity is active- nations are 
communities that make collective decisions that affect its members. Finally, national 
identity requires that people who share it have distinguishable attributes in common 
such as race, ethnicity, language, customs, beliefs, moral codes or religion. 
British and Irish identity in Northern Ireland can be classified as national 
identities. Yet while Northern Irish identity is certainly a group identity, it is difficult to 
say precisely what sort of group identity it is. Northern Irish identity does not seem 
readily describable as a national identity. This is because it lacks some of the 
characteristic features of national identity mentioned above. Indeed, it lacks arguably all 
of these features save that the group is connected to a particular geographical place. But 
it is also not an identity that is tied up to any particular political agenda or ideology. 
There is no easy way of describing what Northern Irish identity is, other than that it is a 
tied to a particular region and to a shared sense of life with those who inhabit the region . 
While Northern Irish identity lacks some of the features of national identities, this 
does not make it insignificant. Indeed, given (as pointed out above) that any particular 
person can ordinarily ascribe multiple group identities to themselves, the fact that 
people are choosing this identity over British and Irish national identities is indicative of 
the salience that these identities have for that person. A Catholic who identifies 
themselves as Northern Irish is not necessarily thereby denying their national identity 
(as Irish), nor their political identity (as nationalist). However they do seem to be 
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signall ing that a group identity that is not tied up with either of these other identities 
(national and po li tical) is the one that they take to be important when defining 
themselves in a public way. Moreover, those identi fying as Northern Iri sh come from 
both sides of the communal divide. I wi ll therefore refer to the Northern Irish identity 
si mply as a shared public identity, distinguishing it from national identity, and noting 
that it may mean different things to different people. 15 
Thesis outline 
The thesis is presented in three secti ons. The first section is made up of chapters 2 
and 3. It is focussed on the theoretical framework and empirical background to the study 
as well as the methodological approach and research design employed. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of relevant theoretical issues and aims to situate 
the confl ict in Northern Ireland within debates over the best way to deal with problems 
inherent in deeply divided societies. 1n particular, I identify and explain institutional 
approaches and civil society approaches to conflict reso luti on .. I demonstrate that 
institutional approaches have been dominant and most widely utili sed, in both theory 
and practice. In particular, consociational theory and power-sharing as a type of 
institutional approach has heavily influenced the governance structures and the social 
system more generally in Northern Ireland. Yet it has also attracted considerable 
criticism, most notably for having allegedly entrenched divisive group identities. I argue 
that institutional approaches are limited in that they favour management of division at 
the eli te level, and tend to neglect some of the root causes of the conflict. 
The chapter then turns to an exploration of the utility of civil society approaches 
to tackling divisions that move beyond managing supposedl y fixed identities. 1n 
particular, I draw on theori es from social psychology that are widely considered within 
the social science li terature as having rea l-world potential in reducing intergroup 
15 The use of this terminology is not new. Indeed the potential for a shared pub li c identity to ga in strength 
in Northern Ireland has recently been the subject of a sma ll but growing debate within the soc ial sc ience 
literature (see Dixon 1997a, 2012; Farry 2009; Nagle and Clancy 2010, 2012a, 20 12b; Nagle 20 12). 
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conflict. These theories have been influential in formulating strategies that seek to 
transform intergroup relations in divided societies by promoting environments in which 
positive cross-community contact can occur with the aim of challenging the supposedly 
fixed nature of group identities 
Chapter 3 begins by providing data evidence for the existence of the Northern 
Irish identity and its relative salience among Catholics and Protestants in Northern 
Ireland. I then explain the research methodology that I shall employ in pursuing my 
investigation. This chapter describes the data used in the study and provides a 
description of all of the variables used in the analysis including the dependent, 
independent and control variables. Several limitations pertaining to the methodology are 
addressed and the benefits of this type of survey research are also discussed. Finally, I 
explain the structure of the empirical analysis to follow. 
The second section contains the main empirical analyses of the study. Within this 
section, chapter 4 conducts an evaluation of government policy aimed at tackling 
division between Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland. The specific 
objective of this chapter is to understand how division between communities has been 
dealt with at the policy level, and to explain the role that theories of intergroup relations 
have had in the development of community relations policy. This chapter is both 
descriptive and analytic. It charts the evolution of community relations initiatives that 
seek to promote positive contact between members of the Catholic and Protestant 
communities. I therefore detail the history of community relations policy in Northern 
Ireland and provide examples of initiatives devised to tackle division between 
communities. I then go on to important developments and shifts in the focus of such 
initiatives and highlight the centrality of cross-community contact (and later, 'sharing ') 
to this development. I also investigate the extent of funding for community relations by 
undertaking data collection from multiple sources. 
In chapter 5 I investigate residential mixing within Northern Ireland. I begin by 
providing an account of the history of residential segregation in Northern Ireland which 
highlights and explains the enduring nature of the physical separation between the 
Protestant and Catholic communities. This provides the background for an investigation 
of the extent and nature of residential mixing-as opposed to residential separation-
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that has become a focus point for some government initiatives that aim to tackle 
division. I exp lore the relationsh ip between separated and mixed living on national 
identity preferences by utilizing data from the Northern Ireland Social Attitudes (NISA) 
and NILT surveys. 
In chapter 6 I examine the impact of separate-religion and integrated education on 
national identity preferences in Northern Ireland by anal ys ing data from the NISA and 
NIL T surveys over the period 1989 to 20 I 0. The overall focus of this chapter is on the 
emergence of the integrated education sector and, in particular, the establishment of two 
types of integrated schools-planned integrated schools and transformed schools. The 
chapter starts by exploring the nature of integrated schools through the use of data 
analysis. Finally, I apply statistical tests of the effects of attending an integrated school 
on the national identity preferences of Catholic and Protestant respondents and discuss 
the relevance of the results to current practices and implications for the future of the 
integrated education sector in Northern Ireland. In chapter 7 I examine mixed social 
networks in Northern Ireland. I compare three arenas for social mixing: among friends, 
within fami lies, and between those in intimate partnerships, and examine the manner in 
which these social networks, as agents of socialization, are related to changes in identi ty 
among Catholics and Protestants. 
In the fina l section I present and evaluate the central findings of the research . 
Chapter 8 therefore draws together the find ings of the three main emp irical chapters and 
highl ights the commonaliti es and di fferences between them. I carry out logistic 
regression of all the main variables to highlight significant predictor variables of 
identity while hold ing the others constant. I then assess a range of proximate 
determinants of identity that emerged from the models in the empirical chapters and 
examine the extent to which these have a bearing on the likelihood of identifying as 
Northern Iri sh. In particular, I discuss the importance of generational effects on identity 
showing how political events have influenced identity patterns among particu lar 
generations . I then place the mai n fi ndings in the context of ex isting knowledge, theory 
and policy practice argu ing that intergroup contact is an important predictor of 
moderations in identity. In light of this, I discuss the implications of the findings within 
the broader context of peace-bu ilding in divided societies and conclude by making 
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several recommendations for future work to address the research limitations and to 
pursue questions that the research has raised . 
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Chapter 2 . Managing, settling and 
tra nsforming conflict in divided societies 
Over the course of the past two centuries, the spread of nationalism and popular 
support for the principle of self-determination has led to waves of political 
mobilizations, assertions of identity and the rise of independent nation states . More 
recently, the dissolution of a bi-polar global system in the aftermath of the Cold War 
has led to major ethnic and nationalist unrest and in some cases to protracted communal 
conflicts. The Minorities at Risk project fi nds that among 233 minority groups surveyed 
in 127 countries, more than 80 have supported secessioni st movements at some time 
between 1945-1990 and of those, around 30 have engaged in protracted civi l wars in the 
pursuit of autonomy (Gurr and Harff I 994: 153). Moreover, in a critique of Samuel 
Huntington 's (1993) The Clash a/Civilizations thesis, Fox (2002: 433) finds that in the 
post Cold War era, the vast majority of ethnic conflicts have occurred domestically-
between majority and minority groups- rather than between states or civi lizations. 
This chapter focuses on two broad approaches to dealing with conflict between 
groups in divided societies. The first approach seeks to manage or settle conflict by 
reforming the basic ground-rules of the social system through, for example, the 
enactment of laws and constitutiona lly embedded provisions (what I will call 
institutional approaches). The second are those which place an emphasis on social 
policy and civil society through the adoption of policies and activities within a 
particular set of ground-rules that seek to transfonn conflict (what I will call the civil 
society approach). These two approaches may employ one or more of the following 
three strategies: 
I) to create an environment that contains or limits the negati ve consequences 
of ongoing confli ct (confli ct management); 
2) to create an instituti onal framework which can accommodate the conflicting 
interests of different groups (conflict settlement); and/or; 
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3) to transform society into a well-ordered society in which polarised identities 
become less salient (conflict transformation) (Wolff2004). 
Using this framework, the chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first 
section, I examine a number of institutional approaches used to either manage or settle 
conflict at the elite level. I show how these approaches have been applied in Northern 
Ireland. I argue that whilst each of these approaches has some potential value for a 
sustainable peace, each falls short, on its own, from achieving this objective. I argue 
that the shortcomings of these methods are that they overstate the degree to which group 
identities are resistant to change. A consequence of this, I shall argue, is the 
institutionalization of competing identity claims. This institutionalization 1s 
unconstructive as it simply creates new mediums through which conflict is channelled 
within formal state structures, rather than dealing with the causes and consequences of 
intergroup conflict. 
While institutional approaches focus on changing the structures of government 
and institutions, civil society approaches generally focus on interventions at the 
grassroots level. These may include conflict resolution strategies, community 
development initiatives, fundraising and advocacy, targeting social need and inequality, 
as well as promoting cross-community engagement and contact. 
Accordingly, the second section explores the utility of civil society approaches in 
tackling divisions that move beyond managing supposedly fixed identities. Here I 
outline the theoretical framework utilised in this study, incorporating elements from 
intergroup contact theory and social identity and social categorization theory. These 
theories have been influential in formulating strategies that seek to transform intergroup 
relations in divided societies by promoting environments in which positive cross-
community contact can occur with the aim of challenging the supposedly fixed nature of 
group identities. In explaining this theoretical framework I shall stress that institutional 
and civil society approaches can be compatible and any approach to dealing with the 
problems inherent in divided societies are not likely to succeed without both changes to 
the political and institutional arrangement and changes to civil society. This chapter 
argues that in order to transform society and reach a sustainable peace a carefully 
crafted combination of both institutional and civil society approaches is needed. 
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Institutional approaches to managing conflict in divided societies 
As mutually reinforcing cleavages undermine stability in divided societies, 
several institutional approaches have been used to mitigate their effects. The approaches 
discussed in this section have al l been employed or suggested as potential strategies at 
some point during the contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland. For this reason, I will 
introduce each approach in the approximate chronological order in which it was 
employed. This section shal l consider hegemonic control, partition and secession, 
electoral engineering, and consociationalism. It should be noted that these approaches 
are not mutually exclusive. Efforts at electoral engineering, for example, may occur 
simultaneously with efforts to form a power sharing government. 
Partition and/or secession 
Successfu l partition and secession are forms of conflict settlement. Secessionist 
movements usua lly develop in response to the failure of a multinational state to 
recognise its national minorities (McGarry 1998a) and have alleged ly taken inspiration 
from the widespread doctrine of self-determination, promoted throughout the nineteenth 
century with the rise of nationalism and state building in Europe, in the twentieth 
century with the dismantling of colon ial Empires in Africa and Asia, and more recently 
since the col lapse of the Soviet Union (Horowitz 1981). Secessionist movements are 
based upon the denunciation of an unsatisfactory situation with regard to economic, 
social , political or security matters stemming from the relationship between the state 
and a national minority or minorities (Guibernau 1999: 33). The ultimate demand of 
those wishing to secede is sovereignty. Successful secession may be defined as the 
partition of a multi-ethn ic or bi-ethnic state but may also refer to those groups who seek 
to leave one state in order to unite or re-unite with another (McGarry and O'Leary 
1993). 
There are a number of exan1ples of relatively successfu l secession (for instance 
Ireland from Great Britain in 1921, Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, Slovenia from 
Yugoslavia in 199 1, and most recently South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 ). However, the 
fact that secession has occurred by no means guarantees an end to violence both within 
the newly seceded tenitory and the areas it borders. There are a number of explanations 
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for this. First, if there is a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity within the proposed 
seceding territory, further intergroup conflict may result. For example, difficulties may 
arise in the break-up of territory whereby the proposed seceding territorial area is made 
up of a mix of ethnic groups other than the community wishing to break away, 
including groups with different secessionist demands of their own (McGarry and 
O'Leary 1993; Addis 2009). The ongoing Georgian-Ossetian conflict (see Coppieters 
2001) and the Cyprus conflict (Richmond 2002) are examples of how such problems 
can manifest. 
A second explanation is that access to territory and natural resources are often an 
issue which further complicates the process of secession. The interests and opportunity 
structures of the various groups in relation to the territory in question are most likely to 
be different, and this can exacerbate conflict (Wolff 2004). Eritrea's secession from 
Ethiopia is an example of this phenomenon. Following the Eritrean war for 
independence in the 1970s and 1980s, a referendum in 1993 resulted in the formation of 
an independent Eritrean state. According to Joi rm en (2004: 181) this was the first major 
change in African colonial boundaries since the era of decolonization in the 1960s. 
After initial optimism for peace and development in the region, conflict between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia over territorial questions soon erupted. This led to violent conflict over 
land claims between local people in the border areas. This in _tum led to economic and 
trade disputes between the two countries and further violence (Joirmen 2004). 
The partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947 provides another 
example of the adverse consequences that can accompany division of a contested 
territory. Following partition, both India and Pakistan laid claim to Kashmir, an 
ethnically complex region nestled between the borders of India and Pakistan. India 
claims the state of Jammu and Kashmir while Pakistan claims the area of Azad 
Kashmir, also known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The struggle for control over the 
territory of Kashmir continues to this day and has been further complicated by calls for 
Kashmiri independence (Kennedy 2003). 
The historical roots of the contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland also illustrate 
problems associated with attempts to break up territory. By the early twentieth century, 
support within Ireland for the nationalist cause of self-determination grew, culminating 
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in the Irish War of Independence from l 919 to 192 l and the Government of Ireland Act 
1920 wh ich led to the partition of Ireland in 1921. While Irish nationalists sought an 
independent non-partitioned repub li c, they were forced to accept a compromise 
solution. Rather than being granted outright independence, Ireland was given the status 
of a dominion in the British Empire (this later changed under the Republic of Ireland 
Act 1948.) Significantly, however, to reach compromise Ireland agreed to give up six 
counties of Ulster, which together became Northern Ireland (Hechter 2000: 82). The 
partition of Ireland led to the establishment of a contested territory in which a 
significant Catholic Irish minority remained in Northern Ireland. Partition, argues 
Moxon-Brown (1983), created a legacy of bitterness for both religious groups. For 
Protestants living in the North, Irish identity became something to be rejected. For 
Catholics, on the other hand, rejecting British identity was associated with denying the 
legitimacy of partition. Since partition Irish nationalists have continuously sought to re-
unify with the Republic oflreland (Phoenix 1994) .16 
Hegemonic control 
One method for managing conflict is hegemonic control. Lustick (1979: 328) 
defines this system of control in divided societies as 'the maintenance of a relationship 
in which the superior power of one segment is mobilised to enforce stability by 
constraining the politica l actions and opportunities of another segment or segments'. 
Hegemonic control often requires the oppression of large numbers of people whose fate 
happens to fall within the 'sub-unit' population. Power is monopolised by the dominant 
group, wh ich serves to di ffuse potential challenges to state order (McGarry and O'Leary 
1993: 23). Shneckener (2004) identifies three variants of systems involving hegemonic 
contro l. The first is coercive domination in which the authoritarian elite uses force or 
te1Tor to obtain and retain power. Apa11heid South Africa under Afrikaner minority rule 
is one such example of coercive domination. Under the apartheid regime enforced 
segregation was enacted with millions forcibly removed from their homes and placed in 
settlement commun iti es . A pass system was enacted under which any person from the 
16 Repan i1ion. as a potentiall y viable option for settling the conflict, was first noted in Richard Rose' s 
( 1976) work Norrhern lreland: Time of Choice. 
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sub-unit populations found not carrying a pass were arrested and held, and in some 
cases violently beaten and killed. Other examples include Israel's occupation of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in which the Palestinian majority was tightly controlled 
by the Israeli military regime (Weingrod 2003). 
The second system of control is known as co-opted self-rule in which the 
dominant group rules by the principle of 'divide and rule' (Schneckener 2004: 22). 
While the subordinate groups may have access to certain high level positions within 
politics, these are mostly symbolic and involve no real power or influence. The British 
colonial system employed this strategy throughout its Empire, employing local elites at 
high-level positions in attempts to appease the local populations through giving them 
the perception that they enjoyed political representation. Finally, Schneckener outlines 
limited self-rule as a system of hegemonic control. This system allows for a limited 
amount of self-governance for subordinate groups while denying them any real political 
influence and power. 
The system of government enacted after the partition of Northern Ireland in 1921 
was arguably a case of limited self-rule (see for example O 'Leary and Arthur 1990). 
Northern Ireland was governed by a home-rule parliament that enabled a system of 
localised hegemonic rule over the Catholic minority. In the first elections of the new 
House of Commons, unionists took 40 seats and the remaining 12 seats were divided 
between nationalists and Sinn Fein (Budge and O'Leary 1973: 142). Between 1921 and 
1969, unionists monopolised the state apparatus, security force and judicial system, and 
practiced economic discrimination in employment and the allocation of housing 
(McGarry and O 'Leary 1994; Ruane and Todd 2003). Accordingly, the unionist 
majority was able to exercise political, cultural and economic domination over the 
Catholic population. For example, the official state education system was designed to 
teach from the Protestant faith. And while control over Catholic schools was transferred 
to the Catholic Church in the late 1920s, these schools relied heavily on financial 
support from the unionist majoritarian government (Gallagher 2004a). The Catholic 
population was also subject to discriminatory practices in the allocation of housing by 
Unionist local government. Moreover, the majority of senior public sector positions 
were held by Protestants and the same pattern of discrimination was found within local 
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government (Barritt and Carter 1972 : 96). O 'Leary and Arthur (1990) argue that the 
current conflict in Northern Ireland resulted from the breakdown of this system of 
hegemonic control in the wake of Catholic civil rights protests that occurred across 
Northern Ireland in 1968-69 in response to unioni st majoritarian rule and its attendant 
resulting inequalities. 
The domination over and oppression of one or more sub-groups within a given 
territory is hardly a desirable method for conflict management. It is clear that 
hegemonic control, far from creating and maintaining stability, very often tends to 
further intensify and prolong conflict. In South Africa the apartheid regime collapsed 
after years of international pressure and numerous internal uprisings and violence 
clashes with police forces. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission has since been 
established to deal with the legacy of the aparthei d regime under which countless people 
lost their lives, homes and possessions (Wilson 2001). Unionist majority rul e in 
Northern Ireland was brought to an end when civil rights protests erupted and many 
from the Cathol ic Irish community mobilised over economic and social grievances and 
allegations of discrimination by the state. This, in tum, sparked a number of riots that 
led to widespread violence and culminated in the beginning of a protracted conflict that 
continued for 30 years. 
Electoral engineering 
Electoral engineering for divided societies has also been put forward as a 
democratic method for managing and reducing conflict. As a major proponent of this 
approach, Benjamin Reilly (2001, 2002, 2006), has argued one reason that democracy is 
inherently problematic in conflict-prone societies is because of the pressures for 
politicization of identity issues. For example, in societies divided along ethnic lines, it is 
easier for political parties to attract voter support by appealing to ethnic allegiances 
rather than other cross-community commonalities such as class. As a result, politicians 
are incentivised to mob ilize followers along ethnic lines, since playing ' the ethnic card' 
can bring electoral success (Reilly 2006). Adding to the politicization of identity issues, 
a process of 'outb idding ' begins whereby rival intra-communal parties try to attract 
support. As a result of this , the locus of political competition moves towards the 
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extremes and emotive rhetoric is employed to play up differences between groups (see 
also Mitchell and Evans 2009). This has the effect of strengthening division. 
In order to counter these tendencies, proponents of institutional engineering call 
for the creation of incentives through the electoral system that serve to moderate 
political parties. One such method that has attracted significant attention is to make 
politicians reciprocally dependent on votes from groups other than their own through 
the use of vote-pooling 'preferential' electoral systems, thereby creating incentives to 
'make moderation pay' (Horowitz 1990; Reilly 2002). This method, known as 
'centripetalism' (see Horowitz 1985; Sisk 1995; Reilly 2001, 2002) aims to provide a 
'centripetal spin' (Sisk 1995: 19) to politics in divided societies through encouraging 
political leaders to moderate their platforms and by creating disincentives for extremist 
outbidding (Horowitz 1985; Sisk 1995). Two types of electoral systems for encouraging 
moderation in divided societies have dominated the academic literature. 
The first type of electoral system, most notably associated with the work of 
Donald Horowitz (1985 , 2008), is to design electoral rules that encourage vote-pooling, 
bargaining and accommodation between rival political parties. This, it is argued, creates 
incentives for alliances to form across cleavages. Horowitz (1985, 2008) advocates the 
use of voting systems that promote electoral integration and support 'catch all' political 
parties that oblige politicians to appeal across group divides. This model aims to 
promote majorities that actively seek support from more moderate sections of society, 
thus bolstering the middle ground. 17 Electoral incentives are given to those ethnically-
based parties that are willing to appeal to voters from groups other than their own 
(usually in coalition with another ethnic group). The underlying mechanism is that in 
17 While Horowitz supports electoral design for divided societies, he is also a strong proponent of civil 
society approaches to peace-building. Indeed, Horowitz (1991: 140-14 1) cautions against 
overemphasizing the role of elites in peace-building. He writes, 'there is no reason to think automatically 
that elites will use their leadership position to reduce rather than pursue conflict.' This line of argument is 
endorsed by others (see Dixon 1997a; Hechter 2000; Darby and Mac Ginty 2003; Hamber and Kelly 
2005 ; Hadden 2005 ; Coakley 2008), and is discussed in the section below on the critiques of 
consociationalism and in detail in chapter 8. 
29 
order to appeal to voters other than one 's own and to forn1 interethnic coalitions in a 
confli ct-prone society, ethnically based parties must demonstrate that they are moderate 
and willing to compromise on divisive issues (Horowitz 2008: 1216- 17). Variants of 
this type of system have been used in Lebanon, where ethnic proportions in each 
constituency are pre-assigned, and therefore incentivizing parties to present an 
ethnically mixed slate of candidates (Reilly 2002). 
The second type of electoral system, most notably associated with the work of 
Reilly (2001, 2002), although also endorsed by Horowitz (2004), is argued to be the 
most ' powerful ' system for encouraging accommodation. Through the use of a wel l-
crafted preferential voting system, electors indicate how they would vote among the 
remaining candidates if their preferred candidate were to lose (Reilly 2002). Preferential 
electoral systems include the use of the 'alternative vote' or the 'single transferable 
vote ' (STY) depending on whether the election is held in a single-member (using 
alternative vote) or multi-member (using STY) district. 18 As Reilly (2002: 15 8) 
explains, because alternative vote and STY both enable electors to rank cand idates in 
their order of preference, they can encourage politicians in divided societies to 
campaign not just fo r first-preference votes from their own community, but for second-
preference votes from other groups as wel l. In order to attract second-l evel support, 
candidates may need to appeal to groups other than their own. Adding to this, where a 
moderate or non-aligned 'middle' part of the electorate exists, candidates may need to 
move to the centre on policy issues to attract these voters . 
The STY voting system was used in the 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly 
elections held in the wake of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, resulting in the appointment 
of a First Minister and deputy First Minister for the new devolved power-sharing 
government in Northern Ireland. 19 Reilly (2002) contends that the use of the STY 
18 STY is also used in Ireland and Malta, and in Australia fo r upper house elections as wel l as fo r many 
elections at the state level (see Farrell and McAllister 2000). 
19 STY was fi rst used in Ireland in in 1919 when the Briti sh governm ent sought to protect minority groups 
by introducing STY into local elections and into the new par! iamentary institut ions. In 1932, the new 
30 
system was beneficial to the outcome of the elections because it encouraged those 
voting for the anti-agreement unionist party-namely the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) -to transfer their second-order votes to the pro-agreement Ulster Unionist Party 
(UUP). Moreover, Reilly (2002) argues that the STY system was also instrumental in 
encouraging Sinn Fein to adopt more moderate positions on certain policy issues in 
order to attract second-order votes from the more centrist nationalist party the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). STY is used in all elections in Northern Ireland, 
with the exception of the United Kingdom Parliamentary general elections.20 Indeed, the 
STY system has been championed by McGarry and O'Leary (2009) who contend that it 
has promoted moderation among Northern Ireland's main political parties. 
There is some evidence to suggest that such an electoral system may be producing 
dividends with political leaders of the more traditional parties making inter-communal 
appeals. A recent example was the announcement by First Minister Peter Robinson 
(DUP) at his party's annual conference in 2012 that the DUP would in future seek out 
Catholic votes. He was quoted in the Belfast Telegraph as stating, 'As the leader of a 
party that seeks to represent the whole community I'm not prepared to write off over 
40% of our population as being out of reach' .21 
Yet while STY has been the preferred method of vote counting in Northern 
Ireland, it has not led to an increase in the popularity of the more moderate parties. As 
elections since 1998 indicate, both Sinn Fein and the DUP have prospered, while the 
more moderate SDLP and UUP have been beset with difficulties and internal division 
(Tonge 2003: 39). Research by Hayes et al. (2005) finds that despite efforts to enhance 
the middle ground in politics, Northern Ireland has become more, not less, divided since 
Northern Ireland House of Commons used the STY system in electing the members of the Northern 
Ireland Senate (see Coakley 2009b ). 
20 See the Electoral Refonn Society of Northern Ireland at <www.electoral-reform.org.uk>. 
21 See 'DUP leader Peter Robinson makes bid to win Catholic vote' , 26 November 2012, Belfast 
Telegraph , accessed 3 January 2013 at <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/po1itics/dup-leader-
peter-robinson-makes-bid-to-win-catholic-vote-16242670.html#ixzz2HWNaZ2pJ>. 
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1998 with regards to electoral behaviour and party preferences. Indeed, at the 20 I I 
Northern Ireland Assembly elections the DUP secured 38 seats and Sinn Fein 29 seats, 
while the UUP and the SDLP secured on ly 16 and 14 seats respectively. 22 And while 
there is some evidence to suggest that political leaders are appealing to voters across the 
divide, in the Northern Ireland Assembly election in 201 I only 2 per cent of DUP 
transfer votes came from Catholic voters (Nolan 2012) . Indeed, while STY may provide 
incentives for the more hard-line parties to moderate their positions in order to attract 
more voters, it has not incentivised voters to vote for candidates across the communal 
divide. 
In a society with mutually reinforcing cleavages, it may be unduly optimistic to 
expect that such institutional engineering will have any significant impact (at least in the 
short to medium term) where divisive ideologies form the basis of politics and are 
reflected in other arenas of social life (Duffy and Evans 1997). 
Consociationalism or power-sharing 
The most influential of all institutional approaches prescribed to the conflict in 
Northern Ireland is consociationalism- defined by Arend Lijpahrt (1969: 216) as 
'government by el ite cartel designed to tum a democracy with a fragmented political 
culture into a stable democracy.' Lijphart (1969) first derived the theory of 
consociationalism as an explanation for the presence of stabi lity in societies in which 
there were high degrees of social heterogeneity- namely in Austria, Belgium, 
Switzerland and The Nether lands (McGarry and O'Leary 2009). 23 Lijphart (1969: 207) 
argued that stability in these societies cou ld be explained by the existence of a system 
whereby political elites were able to make 'deliberate efforts to counteract the 
immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation' (1969: 212). As the 
theory developed, so did its normative implications. For example, Lijphart ( I 977) 
argued that consociationali sm, as a theory for deeply divided societies, had to 
22 See Northern Ireland Assembl y elections at <http ://www.ark .ac.uk/elections/>. 
23 Andeweg (2008) argues that Austria, Belgium and The Netherlands are now ' post-consociational ' . 
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acknowledge the durability of mutually exclusive group cleavages and the strength of 
collective group identities. And rather than attempting to gives less credence to these 
divided identity groups (through majoritarian rule) or to dilute them (through an 
integrationist approach) they should be used as 'building blocks' through which a 
power-sharing arrangement incorporated into the governance structure and social 
institutions could provide stability (Lijphart 1977: 45). 
The overall assumption of consociationalism is that 'rival segments may coexist 
peacefully if there is little contact between them and consequently little occasion for 
conflict' (Lijphart 1977: 140). For consociational theorists, then, the key element for 
creating a sustainable peace is institutional engineering from above. The aim is to 
achieve stable settlement through elite negotiation. Indeed, for Lijphart (1977: 1) the 
role of elites for maintaining stability is paramount, since it is through their cooperation 
that 'the destructive forces inherent in a plural society will be mitigated ' . 
In its original formulation, consociational theory put forward four classic 
conditions. First, government by grand coalition made up ofrepresentatives from all the 
main rival segments. This coalition cooperates to govern the territory through political 
decision making in an executive body. Second, mutual group veto rights, whereby each 
community is able to prevent changes, by means of veto, that would put their vital 
interests at risk. Thi s is an important element in the consociational approach to 
institutional design, since it acts as a safeguard for minorities in a grand coal ition. Third, 
proportional representation for communities in the legislature and in the bureaucracy. 
This element provides a method for allocating civil service appointments and financial 
resources among the different segments in an equitable fashion. Fourth, cultural, or 
segmental, autonomy is provided so that communal groups can run their own internal 
affairs. This is mainly in the areas of education and culture (e.g. on matters that do not 
affect the common interests of the grand coalition). 
A closer look at the defining criteria of consociationalism, however, reveals some 
important qualifications. Coakley (2009a: 123), for example, suggests that the first and 
the third criteria can be collapsed into one as the third naturally incorporates the first. 
That is, the principle of proportionality necessarily implies grand coalition. 
Additionally, Coakley (2009a) argues that the notion of segmental autonomy is not a 
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natural fit within the consociatonal model. This is because whereas consociation refers 
to a form of sharing power, segmental autonomy refers to the di vision of power between 
groups and is thus part of a different category of conflict management approaches. 
Consociational structures have been applied to Lebanon, Malaysia, Cyprus, South 
Africa during the transition from apartheid ru le, and in Fiji- although this attempt at 
consociation was short lived ending in a military coup. Institutions elsewhere have been 
classified as semi-consociational when they have possessed some but not all of the 
features mentioned above, such as Canada and Israel (see Lijphart 1977). 
Consociationalism in Northern Ireland 
Consociational theory was first discussed in relation to Northern Ireland in 
Lijphart's (1 975) article on the 'Northern Ireland problem'. However, Lijphart (1975: 
105) argued that while power-sharing was theoretically possible it would be 
'unworkable in Northern Ireland'. It is interesting to note that th is statement came in the 
wake of the fai lure of the short-lived Sunningdale Agreement 1973- 74 which contained 
consociational principles and which was the first attempt at power-sharing in the 
province. The Sunningdale Agreement was crafted following escalations in violence 
between unioni st and nationalist paramilitaries in 1972 during which time the Briti sh 
government suspended the Northern Ireland parliament at Stonnont and implemented 
direct rule from Westminster. 24 Following the presentation of a Green Paper by the 
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) entitled The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for 
Discussion in October 1972, the NIO set out a series of proposals aimed at breaking 
unionist monopoly on power by introducing a power-sharing executive that would bring 
union ist and nationalist parties into a new political arrangement (Wolff 2001). In this 
context, in December I 973 the Sunningdale Agreement was negotiated between the 
Official Unionists, the SDLP and the Alliance Party. The settlement involved a British-
Irish dimension with the creation of a council of Ireland at the insistence of the SDLP 
(Dixon 2001). 
24 Di rect rule refers to the system of government through whi ch Northern Ireland is governed directly and 
so lely by the United Kingdom government at Westminster. 
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The Sunningdale Agreement would only last until May 1974 when it was brought 
down during the 14-day long strike by the Ulster Workers' Council, who disagreed with 
the inclusion into legislation of a council of Ireland. This highlighted the fact that 
institutional engineering requires not only the support of the elites, but also the support 
of the communities that they represent. Indeed, the pro-power sharing Official Unionists 
headed by Brian Faulkner only represented a minority of the unionist population (Dixon 
1997b). The DUP and Vanguard moved to form an anti-power-sharing alliance calling 
themselves the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) (O'Duffy 1999). And at the 
British general election held in February 1974, power-sharing unionists were 
'decimated' in the polls~winning only 13.1 per cent of the vote (Dixon 1997b: 6). 
Indeed, the anti-Sunningdale parties won a clear majority. The final blow to the 
S unningdale Agreement came about in May 197 4 during the 14-day long strike by 
Ulster Workers' Council. This strike, Dixon (1997b: 7) argues 'paralyzed Northern 
Ireland and brought the power-sharing executive to its knees '. 25 
In the years following the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement the British and 
Irish governments sought a settlement that would draw cross-community support. The 
signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 was an important step towards the 
realization of such a settlement (Guelke 2009; McGarry and O'Leary 2009). In the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement the Republic of Ireland was given a role in policy making in 
Northern Ireland which garnered positive support from nationalists and republicans. 
Importantly, reference was made to the prospect that at some point in the future a power 
sharing agreement on a devolved government could be reached between unionists and 
nationalists (see O'Leary 1987). A commitment by the United Kingdom government to 
finding a settlement was also outlined in the Downing Street Declaration in 1993 and 
the publication by the British and Irish governments of the Joint Framework Document 
in 1995. As Tonge (2000: 50) contends, 'The Framework Document provided the basis 
for the Good Friday Agreement'. However, support from unionists of a new agreement 
was reliant upon the restoration of an Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire. 
25 Tonge (2000: 43) also notes that even with greater unionist support for the Sunningdale Agreement, 
continued republican violence would have placed the working of the agreement under considerable strain. 
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Moreover, conditiona l upon the restorati on of a ceasefi re, it was asserted that a new 
agreement shou ld be the product of local negotiations that would all ow the input of 
representat ives from loyalist paramilitary groups, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP ) 
and the DUP as well as from republicans (Tonge 2000: 51 ). 
The Agreement was reached in the multi-party negotiations on 10 April 1998, 
providing a framework for the establishment of a new power sharing devolved 
government. The ro le of the poli tical eli tes, most notably Prime Mini ster Tony Blair, An 
Taoiseach Berti e Ahern and President Bill Clinton, was of particular importance 111 
sealing agreement. The leadership of Sinn Fein and the UUP were also crucial 111 
winni ng support for the Agreement among their supporters-as was the fi nal event of 
the campaign involving a concert by the music band U2 in which lead singer Bono 
appeared on stage with the soon-to-be First Minister David Trimble and leader of the 
SDLP John Hume (Ruane and Todd 1999). Finally, on 22 May referendum s in Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland secured the support of the majority of the peopl e 
with 71 per cent in Northern Ireland and 94 per cent in the Republi c of Ireland voting in 
favo ur of a power-sharing, devolved Northern Ireland Assembl y and Northern Ireland 
Executive. 
The Agreement is, as Ruane and Todd (I 999: 16) contend, ' a highly complex, 
well-crafted document ' . It contains strong egalitari an and liberal elements designed to 
correct the inequalities between Protestants and Catholics . These include the 
establishment of a human rights commission, the provision fo r the establishment of a 
civic fo rum to consult and report on social, economic and cultura l issues, an 
invest igation of current policing practices, and cross border links through a north-south 
council as well as a British-Irish council. 
The Agreement is also 'strongly consociational' (O'Flynn 2003). 26 For example, 
the institutional fram ework set up under the Agreement explicitly recognises the 
existence of mutua lly exclusive identity groups by stipul ating that both the British and 
'
6 A number of commentators agree that the Agreement is consociational. See, fo r example, Bew 2000; 
Horowitz 200 1a; Obershall and Kend all-Palmer 2005; Taylor 2006. 
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Irish governments 'recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to 
identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British or both, as they may choose' 
(NIO 1998: Annex A !(vi)). Furthermore, as part of the Agreement's consociational 
structure, it requires that all 108 members of the new devolved Northern Ireland 
Assembly state their communal affiliation as ' nationalist' , ' unionist' , or 'other' . This 
measure underpins the group veto powers as well as weighted majority provisions 
because it effectively designates members to the appropriate communal bloc. As a 
result, the Agreement and its institutions give legitimacy to the 'two traditions' model. 
As Little (2003 : 24) asserts, the 'two traditions ' model underpins the Agreement and 
this is particularly evident in the provisions for designation, parallel consent and 
weighted majority voting. 
A special report commissioned by the United States Institute for Peace contends 
that the Agreement is based on an assumption of continued conflict management. This 
assumption, it is argued, is influenced by the dominant view underlying the Agreement 
that Northern Ireland is divided into two distinct and irreconcilable communities: one 
Protestant/unionist/British and the other Catholic/nationalist/lrish (Farry 2006). 
Moreover, power is shared in the Northern Ireland Executive- a joint executive based 
on cross-community power sharing, with the First Minister and Deputy First Minister 
holding equal authority. At its inception these positions were beld by David Trimble of 
the UUP and Seamus Mallon of the SDLP respectively. 
The Agreement is not, however, representative of classic consociationalism. As 
Stephen Farry (2009: 167) points out, the traditional concept of consociationalism was 
designed for divided societies marked by religious, linguistic or ethnic divisions, rather 
than national differences. Yet, consociationalism does not make any fundamental 
distinction between polities that are linguistically, ethno-nationally, or religiously 
divided. Self-identified 'revisionist consociationalists ' McGarry and O'Leary (2009: 24) 
argue that a specific diagnosis of the Northern Irish conflict as bi-national in nature is 
crucial for an accurate explanation and compelling prescription. Accordingly, 
consociationalism as it is applied to Northern Ireland has been modified to take into 
account the bi-national nature of the conflict, and the need for external cross-border 
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institutions as well as institutions linking the sovereign governments of the United 
Kingdom and the Republic oflreland.27 
Adapting consociationalism to the Northern Ireland case, O'Leary ( 1999) 
describes the settlement as 'consociation plus ' . By this O'Leary is al luding to the added 
external institutional links including the establishment of cross-border links through 
North-South and British-Irish councils. Conversely, Coakley (2009a) has described the 
Agreement as ' consociation minus '. It is consociation minus because the condition of 
segmental autonomy in Lijphart's classic prescription of consociational democracy is 
not present in the Northern Irish case. The closest form of segmental autonomy is found 
within the de facto separate networks of Catholic and Protestant schools, but as Coakley 
(2009a: 124) points out this ' hardly amounts to a system of segmental autonomy'. The 
approach used in Northern Ireland can therefore be understood as a hybrid 
consociational model, incorporating many features of the classic prescription wh ile 
modifying others. 
The ongoing question regarding the future constitutional status of Northern 
Ireland adds yet another unique feature to the Agreement. That is, although the 
Agreement formally recognises the current constitutional status of Northern Ireland as 
part of the United Kingdom, its status remains conditional on the majority of people 
wishing to remain as such (NIO 1998: Annex A, !(iii)). If, at some point in the future, 
the majority of people are in favour of seceding from the United Kingdom to join the 
Republic of Ireland, then the Northern Ireland secretary of state is legally bound to call 
a referendum on the matter (NIO 1998: Annex A, ! (iv)). As such, the Agreement 
contains an acknowledgement on the part of both British unionists and Irish nationalists 
that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland could change. 
The Agreement, therefore, offers an interim settlement and also provides a 
fram ework within which the ongoing territorial dispute can be sett led in the long term 
(Ruane and Todd 2003). If literally interpreted, the Agreement sends mixed messages 
and false prom ises to both unionist and nationalist political aspirations- this is the so-
27 See fo r instance McGarry and O' Leary 2004, 2006a, 2009. 
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called 'terrible beauty' of the Agreement (Wilford and Wilson 2003). For unionists, the 
status quo is, at least for now, preserved. For nationalists, the Agreement gives hope to 
those who seek a united Ireland.28 
Consociational approaches have been vigorously criticised. 29 One of the most 
fundamental criticisms directed at consociationalism is that by freezing social cleavages 
and apparently accepting identity as fixed, consociational regimes may actually 
reinforce or even aggravate the kinds of conflict that they were designed to manage 
(Taylor 1994; Dixon 1996, 1997a; Wilford and Wilson 2003; Dryzek 2005; Horowitz 
2008). For instance, in the Northern Irish case, by obliging Assembly members to self-
designate as either 'nationalist', 'unionist' or 'other', the incentive for members will be 
to choose either main communal bloc in order to have some influence when political 
decisions require a weighted majority. 
In addition, the political and social communication and interaction of ordinary 
people tends to be directed into within-bloc channels in consociational regimes. This in 
tum creates obstacles to deliberative interactions across different blocs below the elite 
level. This may undermine the prospects for different groups to engage in constructive 
ways and live together through deliberative and democratic means (Dryzek 2005: 222-
238). Some commentators go as far as to claim that consociationalism 'conveys a rather 
bleak view of humanity' as 'the jealous regard for identity afforded by high 
fences ... betoken an endemic distrust between relevant peoples' (Wilford 1992: 31 -32). 
28 Note that while this apparent contradiction within the Agreement has been flagged as a potential source 
of further c_onflict, the hope of securing the constitutional status of Northern Ireland through majority rule 
was arguably the attraction for competing groups to engage in the negotiations which led to the signing of 
the Agreement. Moreover, Guelke (2009) notes that the constitutional question is not a point of anxiety 
for many unionists. This is because a nationalist majority in Northern Ireland may not eventuate for 
decades and even then, survey evidence suggests that a much higher proportion of Catholics favour 
maintaining the link with the United Kingdom when compared to Protestant support for a united Ireland. 
29 For some of the most notable and detailed criticisms see for example see for example Barry 1975; 
Horowitz 1985, 2002, 2001; Dixon 1996, 1997a; Taylor 1994, 2006, 2009; Hechter 2000; Dryzek 2005; 
Oberschall and Kendall-Palmer 2005; Farry 2009; Wilford 2009. 
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The consociational model is also criticised for overemphasizing the ro le of eli tes. 
For consociationa lists, the management of conflict in divided societies is best explained 
by the actions of the political elites rather than other societal variables (Dixon 1997a: 4). 
This is problematic in that this model of conflict resolution depends principally on the 
motivation of the elites. That is, it assumes that those in positions of power are in 
agreement (or can be brought into agreement) about how to fac ilitate the transition 
towards peace. This concern is given credence by the remarks of the then soon-to-be 
first minister of the Northern Ireland Assembly, Rev. Ian Pais ley, who at a DUP 
conference in 1998 stated, ' there is no such thing as a peace process ' ( quoted in Darby 
and Mac Ginty 2003: 6). Moreover, Darby and Mac Ginty note that Paisley was not the 
only politician in Northern Ireland at the time to suggest this. 
Individuals in positions of power in divi ded societies may try to undermine the 
system in order to gain maximum resources for themselves at the expense of gaining 
consensus and di ffus ing intergroup conflict (Hechter 2000: 137). Horowitz argues 
further that the presupposition that political leaders in severely divided societies are less 
ethnocentric than their fo llowers (and therefore willing to forego zero-sum outcomes for 
cooperative schemes) is not generally well supported (199 1, 2008). In some countries, 
he argues, leaders are more tolerant than followers but in other countries the opposite is 
true. Indeed, as Budge and O'Leary (1973: 373) argued more than 30 years ago, ' there 
was nothing in the basic nature of Irish religion to link it irreversibly with party conflict 
.. . The connection was fostered by po liti cians fo r their own advantage.' 
Also relevant to this critique of consociationalism is the significant body of 
research that finds that politica l elites may play up perceived differences between 
groups in the pursuit of intra-group power and representation, further exacerbating 
nationalist conflict, rather than regulating it effectively. 30 Party platforms become 
characterised by what Mitchell and Evans (2009 : 148) call 'ethnic outbidding' between 
rival parties within each communal bloc in which extremist and emotive rhetoric is used 
to mobilize their community (Mitchell and Evans 2009) . Indeed, while proponents of 
30 See for instance Hadden 2005; Gormley-Heenan and Mac Ginty 2008; Coakley 2008. 
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liberal consociations McGarry and O'Leary (2007 : 675) have advocated for a system 
that rewards 'whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections ' in 
practice this has meant the persistence and institutionalisation of divisive national 
identities. 
Within Northern Ireland, the main political parties, in particular the DUP and Sinn 
Fein, advocate the competing constitutional claims of their divided electorates and as 
such help to reinforce differences in national allegiance (Moxon-Browne 1983). An 
example of this is evident in the following excerpt from a speech by Rev. Ian Paisley, 
then Leader of the DUP delivered to the DUP Annual Conference in Belfast, 4 February 
2006: 
The Democratic Unionist Party was born in conflict, and 
unlike others, will never surrender to Ulster's enemies . .. We must 
go forward in strength. That strength must be imparted. We are 
weaklings in and of ourselves. Dependence on the power of God 
outside of ourselves [sic] is the ~mly strength . This comes by 
prayer. . . In the Battle of Britain our nation prayed and we were 
miraculously delivered from the threatened invasion. In the battle 
of Europe our nation prayed and the miracle of the Normandy 
landings took place. 
Here, Paisley is utilizing British historical memory from the Second World War 
and employs both theological and historical rhetoric to legitimate his party ' s claim to be 
the true defender of Ulster. Such rhetoric is not intended to be objective, but rather 
serves the purpose of justifying the group ' s present existence. Dryzek ' s (2010 : 328) 
notion of bonding rhetoric is a useful concept here. Bonding rhetoric is described as the 
kind ofrhetoric that is ' likely to deepen divisions with out-groups, to invoke dangerous 
emotions, to mobilize passions, to move groups to extremes '. By utilizing emotive 
language, Paisley is firmly situating himself, his party, and Ulster within the British 
state. 
Whilst the power sharing arrangement has significantly changed the political 
landscape in Northern Ireland to the extent that cooperation between the main political 
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parties is now possible, the real prospects for fruitful interaction between the two group 
blocs nevertheless remains limited. O'Leary (1999: 78) contends that consociational 
settlements shou ld be transitional, since ' by protecting and making secure the most 
presently dominant identities they may assist in diminishing their public salience, and 
permitting a deeper pluralism to flourish' . However, Northern Ireland remains, it seems, 
an ' arena of conflict' (Graham and Nash 2006: 276) between identities and the forma l 
procedures of consociational democracy. For example, as demonstrated above, hard-line 
rhetoric continues within Northern Ireland 's main political parties. And outbursts of 
violence, usually in the form of riots and bomb threats, continue within and between 
communities. It can be argued, then, that while the consociational model has provided 
conditions for conflict management, it cannot claim to have reached the longer term 
goal of conflict resolution. 
The civil society approach to peace-building 
The persistence of mutually reinforcing cleavages and collective group 
identities-expressed both at the grass-roots within communities and at the elite level 
within the structures of government-remains a central feature of life within Northern 
Ireland. Coupled with persisting high degrees of segregation in key areas of social life, 
Northern Ireland remains a divided society. As noted above, institutional approaches 
may in fact institutionalize mutually exclusive identities and leave little room for 
engagement across the divide. The heavy emphasis placed on structural and political 
engineering in divided societies makes such approaches much less effective in 
addressing grass roots issues, such as intergroup hostilities, reparation claims or 
processes of reconciliation. These are issues that can undermine the value and stability 
of institutional changes if they are not addressed . Peace that is achieved through 
institutional design alone may be short lived due to the existence of underlying group 
hostilities that erode the structural and political conditions for peace. 
A research report reviewing the comparative literature on public policies towards 
improving inter-community relations in divided societies concluded, ' many initiatives 
bring together people at the level of influential leaders and the elites but they do not 
increase the level of contact, communication and understanding at the level of the 
ordinary citi zen ' (McCartney 2003: 2). Yet, long tern1 stability is arguably dependent 
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upon whether institutions provide conditions that may lead to greater social cohesion 
(O'Flynn and Russell 2005). In practice, however, it is often the case that structural and 
institutional change is emphasised, while attempts to deal with the problems that persist 
at the grass roots level are neglected (Darby and Mac Ginty 2003 : 263). 
Whereas the institutional approach favours elite-level conflict management, the 
civil society approach challenges ethno-national group politics, arguing for a greater 
emphasis on transforming structures of division at the grass-roots (Taylor 2009: 327). 
Importantly, proponents of this approach regard identities as being malleable to change 
arguing that 'to think otherwise is to run the risk of trapping individuals within rigidly 
defined collective identities' and thereby 'strengthening the hands of those within each 
group who wish to impose on its members uniform beliefs and standards of conduct ' 
(O'Flynn 2007: 136). 
A number of different approaches for tackling intergroup conflict can be classified 
as a type of civil society approach. Taylor (2009) explains that this approach may entail 
promoting contact, reconciliation and desegregation through cross-community networks 
and initiatives and through the formulation of public policies that tackle enduring 
inequalities and encourage greater deliberative interaction. Here I distinguish between 
two main types that have been discussed within academic literature in relation to the 
Northern Irish case. First there are those that seek to encourage reconciliation through 
deliberative interaction within the public sphere. And while at present, they remain 
largely theoretical prescriptions for social transformation there is reason to believe that 
they may prove to have considerable practical utility in the future (see Dryzek 2005, 
2006; Addis 2009; Luskin et al. forthcoming). 31 
3 1 Northern Ireland's first deliberative poll was conducted in 2007 by the Centre for Deliberative 
Democracy at Stanford University in collaboration with Newcastle University and Queen ' s University 
Belfast. The research team consisted oflan O'Flynn, David Russell, James Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin. 
The sample consisted of parents from both main communities in Northern Ireland deliberating on the 
public policy issue of children' s educational future. Professor James Fishkin, Director of the Centre for 
Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University stated, ' we put a microcosm of the two communities in a 
room where they could think together about issues confronting their common future. They became more 
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Second, are those approaches that seek to promote contact between identity 
groups through, for example, the creation of publi c policies to encourage integration 
within schools or to tackle segregation in residential and urban areas. At their core, 
these approaches borrow from intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998; 
Brown et al. 1999; Brown and Hewstone 2005), which as Durrheim and Dixon (2005) 
argue is one of the most enduring and frequently applied approaches to the study of 
intergroup relations in divided societies. Intergroup contact theory originated in 
response to calls for the desegregation of schools in America and was influential in the 
United States Supreme Court's ruling in favour of desegregation in Brown vs. Board of 
Education (1954). And as I wi ll demonstrate, it also has a long history in empiri cal 
academic research in Northern Ireland.32 
Deliberation for divided societies 
For deliberative democratic theorists the challenge has been to identi fy and create 
avenues through which opposing groups with mutuall y contradictory assertions of 
identity can channel their competing discourses in the public sphere. These theorists are 
hopeful that such deliberati on can foster an environment of mutual understanding and 
cooperati on. Deliberative democratic theorist John Dryzek (2005 , 2006) argues, fo r 
instance, for a discursive democracy that can handle contentious group issues within a 
divided society. Dryzek argues that deliberative democracy 'can process contentious 
issues in a politics of engagement in the public sphere, even if it has problems doing so 
when it comes to deliberation within the institutions of the state' (2005: 223). Dryzek 
argues that as ' (c]ul turally, [for instance] there are few differences between Cathol ics 
and Protestants in Northern Ireland, and between Serbs, Croats, and the world 's most 
in fo rmed, they changed their views and they found a greater basis for mutual understanding' (S tanford 
University Press Release, 3 I January 2007 accessed at 
<http://cdd.stanford.edu/po ll s/nireland/2007/omagh-results.pdt>. See also the forthcoming article by 
Luski n et al. fo rthcoming. 
32 See fo r example Waddell and Cairns 1986, 1991 ; Darby and Cairns 1998; Pettigrew 1998; Trew 1998; 
Cairns and Hewstone 2000; Niens et al. 2003; Hewstone et al. 2006; Hayes et al. 2007; Hayes and 
McAll ister 2009a. 
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secular Muslim community in former Yugoslavia' it is a mistake to treat identity 
conflicts as merely a matter of multiculturalism. Rather, he contends, identities are 
bound up in discourses. As such, the promotion of a public sphere, at a distance from 
the state, can offer alternative forums in which discourses can be channelled and framed 
in less divisive ways (2005: 224). O'Flynn (2007: 744) backs up this claim arguing that 
the creation of a public space within which citizens of a divided society can engage with 
one another across group lines is crucial for social transformation. 
There are at least two types of institutions within the public sphere through which 
people .may engage in deliberation.33 The first consists of informal social networks of 
individuals from different class, religious or ethnic backgrounds. Such networks are 
created through a series of local actions in response to concerns or issues that may affect 
all citizens. For instance, local and global issue-based social networks have been formed 
in response to environmental, health care or welfare concerns. These networks cut 
across other cleavages to connect individuals with common concerns. 
The second type of institution consists of what Dryzek calls 'discursive designs ' . 
These are forums such as citizens' juries, deliberative polls, planning cells, policy 
dialogues and participatory problem-solving exercises. These forums may be supported 
by non-government organizations (NGOs), governments, academic bodies or 
foundations and may be small scale or attempt to link large groups in deliberation . 
Exercises sponsored by the AmericaSpeaks Foundation, for example, were established 
to facilitate and promote active deliberation among citizens and leaders on important 
policy issues (Dtyzek 2005: 230). Within Northern Ireland, a number of small-scale 
issue-focused community forums have been established at various points during the 
33 Note that while Dryzek (2005: 220) proposes that deliberation in divided societies should be held in the 
public sphere ' at a distance from the sovereign state', elsewhere deliberative democracy has also been 
proposed as an institutional approach for fostering political stability in divided societies (see O'Flynn 
2006, 2007). Indeed, O'Flynn (2007: 744) argues that without the right sorts of institutional conditions 
the influence of discourses will be significantly reduced. He contends, ' If deliberative democracy is to 
provide meaningful guidance for deeply divided societies, it must therefore take questions of institutional 
design extremely seriously, no matter how difficult these questions prove in practice.' 
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peace process. The most notable of these was the Derry Shared City Forum, wh ich was 
established to deal with local inter-com munal disputes fo llowing unrest in the city over 
the previous marching season. The forum met between May I 998 and June 1999 during 
wh ich time a range of individuals and organizations discussed the impact of parades in 
the ci ty. Unfortunately after onl y a year in operation, disunity and a perceived lack of 
organization and resources led to the breakdown of the forum (Kelly 2006) . 
Even if such fo rums are short lived or lack a direct influence on policy processes 
they may be important insofar as they provide a space in which exploration across 
differences can take place. In 200 I, for example, a deliberative poll was conducted in 
Australia among randomly selected citizens on issues with regards to relations between 
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. The poll was televised and as such the 
proceedings reached a wide audience. Whilst the results of the poll had no immediate 
impact on public policy, the fact that the poll took place constituted, what Dryzek 
(2005 : 23 1) calls ' one moment in a long process of reconciliation across a deep divide.' 
South Africa 's Truth and Reconciliation Commission whi ch was conducted in 
1995- 98 is another example of public deliberation where engagement and refl ection 
across racial and ethnic lines was promoted. The Commission was a deliberative 
inst itution whose terms of reference were the product of broad public debate (Dryzek 
2005: 235). The Commission offered a forum where perpetrators and victims of 
apartheid-era crimes told their stories and dealt with issues such as healing, apology, 
acknowledgement and, hopefully, fo rgiveness. The South African process also 
comprised mixed-race discussion groups, and efforts to rethink identity in the media, 
educational institutions, and elsewhere in the public sphere (Dryzek 2005: 235). 
Within Northern Ireland the issue of whether a Truth Commission for Northern 
Ireland should be established remains a matter of debate and indeed there are major 
religious divisions on thi s issue. Indeed, the management of emotions in the wake of 
conflict is rife with complications. As Brewer and Hayes (201 la: 7) note, '[p]art of the 
problem here is who constitute the victims of conflict and how they might be 
differentiated' . For example, the DUP has called for a re-definition of 'victim ' arguing 
that current understandings of a 'one fits all ' definition alienate many victims of 
(republican) terrorism (DUP 2003: 5). Conversely, for nationalists the inclusion of and 
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equality for victims of state-centred violence was found to be of particular importance 
in a study by Lundy and McGovern (2005). Brewer and Hayes (2011 b) argue that the 
ambiguity surrounding the categories 'victims' and 'perpetrators' in post-conflict 
societies creates serious policy dilemmas for societies emerging out of conflict. 
Adding to this complexity, research in Northern Ireland has found that attitudes 
towards truth and justice differed in significant ways between nationalists and unionists 
(Lundy and McGovern 2005). For example, in a localised attempt at truth telling 
organised by Lundy and McGovern (2005) the majority of unionist respondents were 
found to be wary of exercises in truth telling with many of those interviewed concerned 
that truth and justice issues were part of a ' republican agenda' to 'attack the state ' 
(Lundy and McGovern 2005: 76). In a later study, Lundy and McGovern (2008) noted a 
high level of community distrust of the idea of a formal truth commission. In particular 
they found scepticism that such a commission would be transparent and egalitarian in 
nature. However, the authors did note that survey research indicated that high numbers 
of people supported the idea of community-based initiati ves as a means to help people 
come to terms with the past. 
Proposals for the establishment of a civic forum have also been highlighted as a 
means through which members of civil society can engage with a range of issues 
affecting the people of Northern Ireland. Indeed, strand one, paragraph 34 of the 
Agreement provided for a civic forum to comprise of representatives from the business, 
trade union and voluntary sectors, to be consulted on social, economic and cultural 
issues. However, the establishment of such a body is yet to be realised. As Nolan (20 12: 
17 1) explains, when the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended in 2002 the idea of a 
civic forum was suspended along with it. And when the Assembly was restored in 2007 
the civic forum was not. Nolan argues that the forum 's return was not demanded by any 
of the political parties in the manifestos for the May 2011 election. 
Indeed, while the type of deliberation outlined by theorists may prove useful in 
the future for establ ishing constructive channels of communication, at present attempts 
at deliberation have usually ended in 'one-off attempts at cross-community 
engagement. Rather than acting as a catalyst for conflict transformation, this type of 
deliberation may only be sustainable once Northern Ireland has actually already reached 
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a phase where the conflict has been transformed . Moreover, given the frequent 'one-off 
nature of man y deliberative forums, empiricall y assessing the impact of such attempts to 
challenge conflict at the grass roots level is a difficult task. 
Improving community relations through intergroup contact 
The second type of civi l society approach consists of those that seek to improve 
community relations through promoting contact between groups. This type comprises of 
the central focus of my research in this dissertation. More specifica lly, I examine 
initiatives that promote micro-level interactions between groups of ordinary citizens 
from both Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland. The focus here is 
on people who engage in varying degrees of cross-community contact in a range of 
social environments. These environments include the education system, residential areas 
and informal networks such as social networks of fam ily and friends. 
Community relations initi atives have sought to encourage positive engagement 
across the divide. 34 These initiatives constitute an important component, in both 
government and voluntary sector strategies, of addressing conflict and di vision in 
Northern Ireland at the grass-roots level. Community relations initiatives in Northern 
Ireland have taken a variety of forms and target different audiences. They include, for 
example, neighbourhood renewal projects that target communities throughout Northern 
Ireland suffering from high levels of deprivation ;3 5 single identity work that aims to 
provide marginalised communities in Northern Ireland with economic and social 
support; and work which focuses on improving relations between the two main 
communities in Northern Ireland through creating and promoting opportunities to mix 
with individual s from the other main identity group. 36 It is work that fall s into this latter 
34 Several types of initiat ives wi ll be discussed in detail in chapters four, five, six and seven 
35 For more information on the Neighbourhood Renewal Program visit the Department for Social 
Development at <http://www. dsdn i.gov.uk>. 
36 A more in-depth discussion of comm unity relations work is provided in chapter 4. 
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category that is the focus of the remaining discussion in this chapter, since it serves as 
important background to the aims of the empirical chapters that follow. 
As I will demonstrate in chapter 4, this type of community relations work relies 
on some fundamental theoretical assumptions that are prevalent in a strand of social 
psychology, and more specifically in theories of intergroup relations. With this in mind, 
the following section situates such work within a broader theoretical framework. I first 
introduce the theories of social identity and social categorization. These theories 
highlight the importance of identity in every day social interactions and help to explain 
how and when identities become salient or when they may be subject to change. I then 
tum to discuss intergroup contact theory, and show how this theory has been utilised as 
a framework for conflict transformation in divided societies. Finally, I argue that the 
current political and social environment in Northern Ireland provides an excellent 
opportunity for examining the efficacy of the civil society approach. 
The social psychology of group identity 
A significant body of research has claimed that in Northern Ireland psychological 
processes of social categorization and social identification have served to structure 
identities in oppositional terms. 37 At the same time, however, research has suggested 
that it is an over-simplification to describe the Northern Ireland conflict as between two 
monolithic ethno-national cleavages. 38 Rather, patterns of identities are much more 
complex. Much of this work has drawn on the theories of social identity and social 
categorization. Social identity theory, initially advanced by Tajfel (1978) and later 
developed by Turner et al. (1987), offers a theory of intergroup relations, which has 
been used to help explain some of the underlying causes and consequences of 
37 For one of the initial accounts of the application of social identity theory to the Northern Ireland 
conflict see Cairns 1982. For further in-depth accounts of these processes as they relate to Northern 
Ireland see Waddell and Cairns 1986, 1991; Whyte 1990; Cassidy and Trew 1998; Trew 1996, 1998; 
Darby and Cairns 1998; Pettigrew 1998; Cairns and Hewstone 2000; Coakley 2002. 
38 See references in footnote 37. I will discuss the complexity of patterns of identity in Northern Ireland in 
detail in chapter 3. 
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intergroup conflict in Northern Ireland. Social identity theory defines a person 's social 
identity as ' that part of an individual 's self-concept which derives from his knowledge 
of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership' (Tajfel 1978: 63) . To have a social identity is 
to identify with a particular group or groups and when this social identity becomes 
salient it implies seeing things, first and foremost, from the group's perspective. For 
instance, a proposal to build a new airport near a residential area creates a backlash 
from local residents who form a group in order to block the proposal. The salience of 
their identities as residents in a threatened area increases. 
Given a particular context- for instance where one group identity is threatened by 
the existence of another-individuals may seek reassurance within their in-group by 
comparing and contrasting favourably their own group as superior from the threatening 
out-group, establishing positive distinctiveness, or positive self-esteem, for the members 
of the in-group. Wh ile this is a common feature of all groups, distinctions made 
between the in-group and the out-group may become problematic in situations of 
violent conflict where the ex istence and actions of one group is perceived to threaten the 
existence of another. 
Social categorization theory, developed after social identity theory, seeks to 
explain the process through wh ich individuals categorize themselves as belonging to 
certain groups (Turner et al. 1987; Hewstone and Greenland 2000). As individuals, we 
categorize the world around us in order to help us make sense of the infinite number of 
social interactions and daily encounters that impact upon our lives. When meeting 
others we tend to categorize them in terms of the groups to which they may belong. 
Social categorization theory argues that each individual belongs to severa l social 
categories, but that one of them is typically most salient at any given time. Self-
categorization may occur at different levels of abstraction: personal identity at the 
individual level, social identity at the intermediate group membership level, identity as a 
human being at the superordinate level (Turner et al. 1987). It is the intermediate level 
of an individual's social identity that is relevant to this current study. 
The level of group salience is detern1ined by the degree to wh ich that particular 
social identity may systematical ly affect the individual' s welfare. For instance, 
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identification as a member of a neighbourhood association may become more salient at 
times when the neighbourhood is threatened (for example by proposed development in 
the area, vandalism, or theft) . The salience of national identity may increase when there 
is a perceived threat to the nation and the people in it. Further examples of intermediate 
in-group/out-group categories may include, for instance, parent/teacher, trade union 
member/non trade union member, environmental activist/logger, republican/monarchist 
and so on. Through the process of social categorization, people often favour in-group 
members ('us') over out-group members (' them') in terms of evaluations, attributions, 
material resources, helping, and social support. 
Social identity theory and social categorization theory have been advocated as a 
fruitful means of studying intergroup relations in divided societies since they recognise 
the importance of social, historical, political and economic factors in shaping an 
individual 's identity. While processes of categorization exist in all societies, they can 
become problematic in cases of intergroup conflict in which group boundaries are 
perceived as mutually exclusive. Because of a history of conflict, people in divided 
societies often conceive of themselves in terms of mutually exclusive identities, whether 
they are national , religious or ethnic in form. In such societies people tend to favour in-
group members and differentiate themselves sharply from out-groups. This process can 
result in in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. In cop.texts where groups are 
under threat (whether the threat is real or perceived), these processes take on much 
greater importance since the survival of the group is viewed as of crucial significance. 
The challenge in such contexts, therefore, is to reduce the salience of hostile social 
identities by blurring or breaking down perceived group boundaries . 
Intergroup contact theory 
In many divided societies contact between conflicting groups is minimal, and 
group (or national) identities are defined in opposition to one another. As part of 
attempts to reduce and manage conflict, it may be prudent to keep contact between 
hostile groups to a minimum in order to help prevent potential flare-ups of hostility and 
violence. However, in the long run such segregation will tend to lead to mutual 
ignorance, misunderstanding and fear of the other (out-group). Once political 
compromise has been achieved, the challenge is to address division at the grass roots 
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level and create environments in which alternate and less hostile identities can take root. 
For this to occur, institutional support and the wi llingness of participants to engage in 
intergroup contact are necessary. 
The underl ying rationale of intergroup contact theory is that confl ict and prejudice 
arise between groups when there is a lack of positive interaction and information 
between groups and where opportuniti es for contact that would faci litate the acquisition 
of such information are lacking. Without contact, this theory maintains, it becomes 
impossible for individuals to realize their similarities and to accept their differences. 
As a framework for the analysis of social problems, intergroup contact theory has 
been applied to many social contexts, most notably in the desegregation of schooling in 
the United States, and more recently within both academic and practitioner ci rcles in 
Northern Ireland. Durrheim and Dixon (2005: 19) assert that the contact paradigm is 
arguably the ' most important framework fo r understanding the social psychology of 
desegregation. ' 
Intergroup contact theory proposes that simple contact between groups alone is 
not sufficient to reduce intergroup bias and prejudice (Allport 1954). Instead, the 
contact must have certain characteristics if it is to do so. In its initial formulation, this 
theory asserted that four conditions are necessary fo r contact to be beneficial fo r 
intergroup relations. First, all parties in the contact situation must perceive of 
themselves as having equal group status. Second, all participants must share common 
goals. Th ird, all participants must work towards these common goals through 
cooperative intergroup interaction. Finall y, intergroup contact must have institutional 
support with in and outside of the contact situation. Over the years the conditi ons have 
been refined and revised in response to important criticisms that have been levelled 
against the theory, and the claims made on its behalf have in some ways been 
weakened. 
As a method for reducing prejudice, some important limitations have been 
acknowledged and addressed in relation to contact theory. In its original formu lat ion 
th is view emphasised interpersonal as opposed to intergroup relations. Subsequent 
research has found, however, that in order to challenge group stereotypes an d for 
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contact to have broader, generalizable effects, it is necessary that it occur at the 
intergroup level. For instance, friendships forged at the interpersonal level may not 
present a challenge to existing group stereotypes, since individuals may treat each other 
as exceptions to the group norm (see for example Hewstone and Brown 1986; Pettigrew 
1998). Only when individuals are interacting at the intergroup level can contact serve as 
a potential mediating factor and lead to favourable attitude change. 
Others have warned of the risks involved in promoting intergroup contact. Indeed, 
empirical research indicates that other contributory factors including conflicts of 
interest, differential status positions and environmental or institutional factors can 
contribute to the formation of prejudicial attitudes (Stephan and Stephan 1985; Mac 
Ginty and du Toit 2007). Some groups may maintain that they have no problem with an 
out-group as long as they have access to the same services, and that equality in the 
provision of education, employment and housing is their primary concern. Indeed, this 
was the underlying premise of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland. With 
regards to status differentials, Tropp and Pettigrew's (2005) majority-minority thesis 
contends that the impact of contact may vary significantly not only in terms of the 
contact situation but also in terms of the social status of the groups involved. As such, 
what may appear as equal group status to majority group members may be perceived as 
potentially threatening and unequal to the minority. Indeed,_ the potential for status 
differentials to impact on political attitudes was uncovered in a recent study on political 
attitudes in the education system in Northern Ireland. Here Hayes et al. (2007) found 
that Catholics who had attended an integrated school (a school with both Protestant and 
Catholic pupils) were significantly more likely than those who had not to favour the 
dominant or majority view (retention of the link with Britain) (Hayes et al. 2007 : 476) . 
The authors argued that a plausible explanation for these differences was the fact that 
Catholic pupils were in the minority at these schools and therefore may have pressure to 
conform to the majority view. 
Moreover, mere contact between groups is insufficient to guarantee positive 
intergroup experiences. In fact, some studies (Stephan and Stephan 1985; Pettigrew 
1997, 1998; Christ et al. 2010) have found that in certain situations, intergroup contact 
can increase prejudice and reinforce negative stereotypes rather than reducing or 
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mitigating them. Stephan and Stephan ( 1985) reveal that heightened feelings of anxiety 
within a contact situation- feelings of threat and uncertainty in particular- can have 
negative consequences for intergroup relations. Feelings of this sort arise from concerns 
about how they should act and how they might be perceived in contact situations. 
Stephan and Stephan (1985) further emphasize the importance of the level of perceived 
threat to positive or negative contact. When the contact situation is perceived to benefit 
one group over another, or when an encounter is involuntary and not desired, this can 
engender negative consequences for intergroup relations. 
Indeed, there are instances in which intergroup contact may be detrimental for 
community relations. For people in marginalised, segregated communities, for example, 
relating to outsiders and structures of power may contribute to feelings of helplessness 
and resentment towards others. Those who are most firml y entrenched within thei r own 
tradition are the least likely to become involved in community relations activities and 
therefore rarely experience cross-community contact (Church et al. 2004: 283). These 
feelings can contribute in tum to community tensions. There are a number of deprived 
segregated working class estates in Northern Ireland, for example, that feel 
underrepresented and largely cut off from the rest of society. In such cases it will be 
necessary to alleviate feelings of marginalization through, for example, economic 
development and community representation. At a practical level , single identity work is 
generally espoused for communities who may not yet be psychologically equ ipped to 
positively engage at an intergroup level (see for example Knox 1994; Church et al. 
2004). 
In a similar vein, Cass Sunstein (2001: 16) di scusses the importance of 'enclave 
deliberation' defined as deliberation within groups of like-minded people. Sunstein 
(2001) argues that within a heterogeneous society less weight is usually given to the 
viewpoi nts of minority and marginalised groups. For this reason ' enclave deliberation 
might be the onl y way to ensure that those views are developed and eventually heard '. 
Such deliberation recognises the needs of specific groups to engage at an intra-group 
level through forum s, workshops or simil ar events in order to discuss, debate and refine 
issues that they may have before moving towards intergroup contact. 
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Intergroup contact must therefore be supported by institutional structures that both 
promote and protect environments in which individuals and groups choose to enter into 
a contact situation that is mutually agreeable. This can be hard to achieve in societies in 
which the duplication and separation of services such as schools, transport systems, 
health care services, and even real estate agencies make it possible to avoid contact with 
the out-group in large measure. The duplication and separation of a range of services 
has been a central feature of life in Northern Ireland. Indeed, one of the key findings of 
a report into the extent of the division in Belfast was that there was 'little opportunity 
for many Protestant and Catholic communities to routinely come together on a daily 
basis' (Deloitte 2008: iv). 
As such, intergroup contact must be considered within the wider social and 
political context. It must be structured in ways that takes account of external forces that 
may prevent positive intergroup contact from occurring (Pettigrew 1998). For example, 
divided societies in which physical and social separation of communities is the accepted 
norm may provide little opportunity for positive intergroup contact to occur because 
individuals from different groups only come into contact at random and against their 
will. To address these potentially adverse consequences of contact, it is crucial to ensure 
that intergroup contact is entered into voluntarily and in a neutral environment, and that 
the form and nature of the contact is agreeable to all of the groups involved. 
There are several environments in which positive intergroup contact may occur. 
Within Northern Ireland, these may be found within mixed residential areas (as 
discussed in detail in chapter 5), within integrated schools (as discussed in detail in 
chapter 6) and within less structured settings such as between friends or family (as 
discussed in chapter 7). Positive intergroup contact may also occur in settings that have 
been purposefully constructed to accommodate intergroup interaction such as within 
cross-community holiday programmes or sporting events that are run throughout 
Northern Ireland targeting young people from the Catholic and Protestant communities. 
For example, the Ulster Project, one of Northern Ireland's longest running cross-
community projects, offers a mixed Catholic-Protestant group of 15-16 year olds the 
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opportunity to travel to America. During their time overseas the participants take part in 
workshops in which commun ity relations issues are directly addressed.39 
There are few examples of divided societies in which the institutional structures 
and the socia l and political context provide favourable conditions for positi ve contact to 
occur. Since the mid-1980s, however, an important component of government social 
poli cy in Northern Ireland has been to manage and attempt to improve relations between 
the two main communities. Thi s focus emerged in response to deteriorating relations 
between Protestants and Catholi cs in Northern Ire land throughout the 1970s. For 
examp le, the events and aftermath of Bloody Sunday in 1972 and, three years later, the 
collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement 1973-74 have been described by Dixon (1997b: 
4) as ' landmarks of polarisation ' between the Protestant and Catholic communities. 
Adding to a sense of urgency in finding a way forward amidst the vio lence were the 
increased currency of arguments which maintained that the duplication and separation 
of services was perpetuating division by fuelling prejudice, ignorance and mistrust of 
the 'other' community. 
Central to a range of schemes attached to this agenda has been the assumption that 
an increase in cross-community contact would be beneficial. Many of these schemes-
mixed housing, integrated education and cross-community regeneration projects- fall 
under the broader theme of 'community relations'. The tenn 'community relations ' can 
refer to both relations within and relations between communities. I will use ' community 
relations' here to refer specifically to relations between Catholics and Protestants in 
Northern Ireland. I shall employ the labels 'Catholic ' and 'Protestant ' to refer to people 
who identify as belonging to the Catholic or Protestant communities in Northern 
Ireland, respectively. Simi lar schemes have al so been adopted within the non-
government sector with funding and fac ilitation of cross-community projects a central 
focus of independent funding bodies and international and regional organizations. 
39 See the Ul ster Proj ect at <http: //www.ulsterproject.org/>. 
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A substantial body of research on contact in Northern Ireland has found that 
positive cross-community contact is related to a reduction in prejudice, bias and 
negative stereotypes of the out-group. 40 Intergroup contact theory has consequently 
gained renewed currency in studies examining attitudinal change within segregated and 
integrated environments in Northern Ireland. A review of the social psychological 
literature on the effects of intergroup contact in Northern Ireland conducted by Cairns 
and Hewstone (2000) concluded that while previous studies of cross-community contact 
have confirmed the limited extent of contact between Catholics and Protestants in the 
province, they also suggest a positive association between contact and attitudes towards 
the religious out-group. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has had several objectives. It has presented and analysed a number of 
dominant theoretical approaches that have had practical application in Northern Ireland, 
and elsewhere, as a means of managing or settling conflict. I argued that none of these 
approaches, on their own, can generally provide sustainable peace. For example, a focus 
on institutional and political settlement fails to address the ongoing tensions between 
groups at the grass roots level. Indeed, as I argued, partition and hegemonic control 
created more problems than they solved. For example, the partition of Ireland in 1921 
led to the establishment of a contested territory in which a- sizeable Catholic Irish 
minority remained in Northern Ireland. The oppression and control over this minority in 
Northern Ireland led to deep-seated resentment and rebellion against the state. 
Moreover, while there is merit in approaches that seek to incentivise political parties to 
adopt moderate platforms through the electoral benefits that this can confer, in Northern 
Ireland it has not led voters to vote for candidates across the communal divide. 
The most influential of all institutional approaches has been the adoption of 
power-sharing institutions that have brought together traditionally feuding political 
40 While the list is extensive see for example McClenahan et al. 1996; Cassidy and Trew 2004; Cairns and 
Niens 2005; Niens and Cairns 2005; Cairns et al. 2008; Cairns et al. 2009; Hughes et al. 2007; Christ et 
al. 20 IO; Stringer et al. 2009. 
57 
elites in Northern Ireland. However, communities on the ground remain highly 
segregated. I argued that long-term stability also depends upon whether institutions can 
provide opportun ities for positive intergroup interaction which can lead to societal 
cohesion. With this in mind, the second section of the chapter shi fted the focus from 
institutional to civil society approaches for dealing with intergroup confli ct. Here I 
explored theories from social psychology that have been influential in conceptualizing 
some of the problems associated with segregation in divided societies . I demonstrated 
that a significant body of literature has explored patterns and processes of identification 
in Northern Ireland in attempts to understand the conflict. This research has heavily 
drawn on social identity theory and intergroup contact theory. The basic premise of this 
body of literature is that segregation in Northern Ireland highlights and exacerbates the 
salience of group identity, whereas opportunities for intergroup contact may encourage 
the format ion of new and more inclusive identities. 
Northern Ireland provides a good test case for many of these theoretical 
approaches outlined in the chapter. For example, to date, little research has examined 
the potential that positive intergroup contact may have on transforming social identities, 
yet we know that there is a long history of theoretical and practical application of civi l 
society approaches to peace-building in Northern Ireland. In light of the material and 
argument presented in this chapter, we can raise a number of important questions . First, 
what is being done by both government and non-government bodies to promote cross-
community contact in Northern Ireland? Second, given the relative stability that 
Northern Ireland is now experiencing, is there any evidence to suggest the emergence of 
a shared identity to which both Protestants and Catholics ascribe? In the following 
chapter I explain the methodology that I shall use to address these questions and related 
issues. 
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Chapter 3. Examining identity: a research 
strategy 
Divergent and competing national aspirations have characterised the 
contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland. This has led some scholars to argue that 
'nationality is one of, if not the, central issue in the Northern Ireland conflict' (Waddell 
and Cairns 1991: 205). Significantly, however, survey evidence suggests the emergence 
of a 'Northern Irish' identity that is shared by both Protestants and Catholics. While a 
number of possible explanations for this have been offered they remain quite 
speculative and further research is needed to evaluate them. This chapter therefore sets 
out the research questions and methodology employed to conduct in-depth quantitative 
analysis that can contribute to the explanation of the emergence of this identity. 
Large-scale sample surveys have frequently been used to measure a range of 
social and political attitudes in Northern Ireland. My analysis draws heavily on the 
NISA and NlLT surveys over the period 1989 to 2010 in order to examine the 
relationship between cross-community contact and national identity preferences. 
Justification for this focus on national identity as the primary dependent variable for 
analysis relates to the distinct patterns of national identity preferences among members 
of the Protestant and Catholic communities 
In section one I document the rise in the Northern Irish identity as captured in 
social surveys, and provide tentative explanations for its increasing popularity. Section 
two outlines several key research questions that focus on particular environments 
targeted by community relations policy. The research questions seek to determine 
whether there is a relationship between cross-community contact in these environments 
and a preference for the Northern Irish identity among individuals who have 
experienced this type of contact. I then explain the range of data that I shall use in the 
analysis and profiles the sample of respondents. This describes the main dependent and 
independent variables and introduces a set of relevant descriptive statistics regarding 
social and economic background that will be used to motivate the analysis. I conclude 
by discussing the strengths and limitations of this survey-based research. 
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The Northern Irish identity 
Patterns of identity have long been a focal point within social science research in 
Northern Ireland. Richard Rose (1971) first docwnented national identity preferences 
among Catholics and Protestants in his seminal survey conducted in 1968 of political 
and social trends in Northern Ireland. Since then, subsequent surveys have provided 
evidence of an increase in the polari sation of national identities (see Moxon-Browne 
1983; ARK 1989- 2010). Yet, previous research uti lizing survey data suggests that 
patterns of allegiance are more complex (see Hayes and McAll ister 1999a, 2009a; 
Coakley 2002, 2007; Devine and Schubotz 2004; Fahey et al. 2005. Indeed, while the 
majority of Protestants and Catholics see themselves as British and Irish respectively, 
the NISA and NILT surveys have also highl ighted that increasing numbers of 
respondents are choosing not to identify with either the Briti sh or Irish identity, and are 
instead opting for a third identity preference. This is the Northern Irish identity, which 
is now the second most popular identity choice of both Catholics and Protestants after 
the two more traditional identities of Irish and British, respectively. The rise of this 
identity suggests that a new and potentially shared alternative identity is forming in 
Northern Ireland. Figures 3 .1 and 3 .2 show the trends in identity choice among 
Protestants and Catholics between 1968 and 2010. 
The dramatic rise in sectarian violence and segregation following the outbreak of 
the contemporary conflict mirrored the polarisation of divided national identities. 
Maxon-Browne' s 1978 survey (see Moxon-Browne 1983) documented a significant 
increase in the number of Protestants identi fying as British, which had doubled to 67 
per cent since 1968 . And since this time the incidence of Protestant respondents 
identifying as British has increased, peaking in 2002 at just below 80 per cent. 41 
Significantly, at any time between 1989 and 2010, less than 10 per cent of Protestants 
have identified as Irish suggesti ng that national identity patterns have polarised since 
the beginning of the conflict. Significantl y, the data reveal an upward trend among 
Protestants identifyi ng as Northern Irish. Indeed, the rate of those identi fy ing as such 
41 It should be noted that less than 2 per cent of Protestants chose to identi fy as 'Other' at any point 
between 1989 and 20 I 0. 
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has almost doubled, from 17 per cent in 1989, to 30 per cent in 2009, overtaking the 
Ulster identity. Indeed, since 1996 more respondents opted for this identity than for 
Ulster identification, making Northern Irish the second most preferred identity. And 
since 2005 the rate of Protestants identifying as British has slowly declined, while those 
identifying as Northern Irish has risen. In 2010, while two-thirds of Protestants 
identified as British, almost one-third identified as Northern Irish. 
Figure 3.1. Trends in national identity preferences among Protestants, 
1968-2010 
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Sources: Northern Ireland Loyalty survey 1968; Northern Ireland Attitudes survey 1978; NISA 
surveys and NIL T surveys , pooled file , 1989-2010. 
Conversely, among Catholics, early surveys captured a large degree of consensus 
in national identity. In Rose ' s 1968 survey, an overwhelming majority (76 per cent) 
identified themselves as Irish, 15 per cent identified as British and only 5 per cent opted 
for the Ulster identity (Rose 1971 ). The rate of Catholics identifying as Irish has 
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declined since thi s time levelling out to around 60 per cent with slight annual variation. 
One possible exp lanation for this decline could be that some Catholic respondents 
preferred to avoid revealing their identity due to the outbreak of political violence and 
the notoriety of the IRA. Respondents may have preferred to avoid being labelled and 
therefore chose to identify with the more neutra l Northern Irish identity. 
Since the Northern Irish identity was introduced as an option in 1989, close to 
one-thi rd of all respondents identify as such and this remained relatively stable over 
time. 1n I 989, for example, 25 per cent of Catholics chose to identify as Northern Irish 
instead of opting for a traditional Irish identity. The percentage of Catholics identi fy ing 
as Northern Irish peaked in 2005 at 30 per cent, but unlike their Protestant counterparts 
this figure has not increased substantially since. As of 2010, 25 per cent of Catholic 
respondents identified as Northern Irish while 59 per cent identified as Irish, making the 
Northern Irish identity the second most preferred identity. 
Whereas almost no Protestants identify as Irish, a minority of Catholics have 
identified and continue to identify as British. This figure has slightly declined since 
I 968 to around 10 per cent in 20 I 0. Scholars have offered several possible explanations 
for Catholic identification as British. Waddell and Cairns (1991: 206) suggest that it 
could reflect an acceptance of the status quo with regards to Northern Ireland's position 
within the United Kingdom. Another possible explanation is that it may be the result of 
a desire to disassociate from extremist and violent republican elements. This desire to 
disassociate themselves from particular groups may also explain why almost no 
Catholics choose the Ulster identity (at less than 2 per cent at any point over the 20 year 
period examined). For examp le, the adoption of an Ulster identi ty by many loyali st 
groups claiming the territory to be theirs by ancient heritage has meant that the Ulster 
identity became synonymous with loyali sm. Moreover, Waddell and Cairns ( 199 1: 206-
2 I 0) argue that the clear rejection of an Ulster identity is part of a Catholic reaction to 
partition, through which six of the nine counties of Ulster came to constitute Northern 
Ireland. Thus, for Catholics identity patterns appear to be complex and influenced by a 
range of contextual factors. 
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Figure 3.2. Trends in national identity preferences among Catholics, 
1968-2010 
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While the data suggest that national identities in Northern Ireland generally 
continue to be structured in oppositional terms, this by no means implies that identities 
that fall outside of the traditional cleavages are insignificant. Importantly, almost one-
third of Catholics identify as Northern Irish and an increasing number of Protestants 
identify as such as well. In a recent study, Muldoon et al. (2007) have argued that 
elements of Northern Irish society may be moving away from traditional and divisive 
forms of identity and embracing new and inclusive ways of identifying. The increase in 
both Protestants and Catholics identifying as Northern Irish may be evidence of this (see 
also Hayes et al. 2007). As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate, for both Protestants and 
Catholics the Northern Irish identi ty is currently the second most preferred identity, 
after the traditional Protestant British and Catholic Irish identities. The potential 
significance of the Northern Irish identity is also revealed in data from the 2011 census. 
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As shown in Table 3. I nearly 21 per cent of the population in Northern lre land identify 
exclusively as Northern Irish . And it is the third most popular identity choice (out of 
eight) among the Northern Ireland popu lation. Moreover, it is by far the more preferred 
identity than any other combination of identities including Briti sh/Irish (0.66 per cent) 
and British/Irish/Northern lri sh ( 1.02 per cent). 
Table 3.1. National identity preferences, census 2011 
Identification 
British only 
Irish only 
Northern Irish only 
British and Irish only 
British and Northern Irish only 
Irish and Northern Irish only 
British , Irish and Northern Irish only 
Other 
All usual residents (n) 
Percentage 
39.89 
25.26 
20 .94 
0.66 
6.17 
1.06 
1.02 
5.00 
1, 810 ,863 
Source: 201 1 census, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) 2011 . 
Explanations for the growing popularity of Northern lrish identity and its possible 
meanings for community relations in Northern Ireland remain tentative. Moxon -Browne 
( 199 1: 28) wri tes, ' the attractiveness of the Northern lrish identity li es in its ambigu ity; 
for Catholics, it avoids any legitimation of the border, which is imp lied in either British 
or Ulster; for Protestants , it is seen as having a natura l association with "Northern 
Ireland"'. ln an earlier publication Moxon-Browne (1983) suggested that the Northern 
lrish identity was being purposefull y used by groups such as 'The Peace People' to 
invoke uni ty because they viewed the Ulster label as too divisive. Indeed, as 
demonstrated in chapter I , the Ulster identity is most readi ly associated with extremist 
elements w ith in unionism that assert a territorial claim on the land of Ulster, invoking 
historical myths as proof of an ancient lineage and vali d title. Thus, whi le at certain 
points in the history of Northern Ireland promoting an Ulster identity as a means of 
uni ting communities has largely been abandoned given its sectarian associations. Trew 
( 1998) notes that there are no obvious institutions that cou ld be viewed as explicitl y 
promoting this new identity. 
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In their qualitative study, Todd et al. (2008) explore the meaning of identity 
change in Northern Ireland, as well as the importance of national narratives in identity 
formation. Results from the interviews that they conducted showed evidence of 
'substantive shifts in national identity, both in category and in content', although they 
conceded that the reasons for such a change required further analysis (Todd et al. 2008: 
26). Indeed, when discussing the increasing numbers of people who now identify as 
Northern Irish they hedge, writing that explanations for this 'have only begun to be 
tapped' (Todd et al. 2008: 12). 
Others have argued that those who adopt a Northern Irish identity may represent a 
population that occupies a growing middle ground within Northern Irish politics (Hayes 
and McAllister 2009a). On this view, such identification results from the growth in the 
number of people wishing to distance themselves from traditional dichotomous national 
and religious group allegiances (see also Muldoon et al. 2008). Insofar as the number of 
people who identify as Northern Irish increases, this may help to break down territorial 
allegiances and create space for the development of a shared cross-communal identity, 
since it is the only identity currently shared by both Protestants and Catholics. 
I propose that the importance of this particular identity is that those identifying as 
Northern Irish come from both sides of the religious and political divide: Catholics and 
nationalists, Protestants and unionists. Irrespective of whether the Northern Irish label 
holds different meanings for different groups, what is most important is that Protestants 
and Catholics who choose to identify in this way are making a conscious choice not to 
identify with the traditional and divisive identities. As Trew (1998: 67) has argued, the 
potential strength of the Northern Irish identity could be its ability to offer a basis for 
shared identification for Catholics and Protestants while at the same not threatening 
important ideological commitments of either group. Moreover, those choosing a 
Northern Irish identity are most likely aware of the cross-community nature of this 
identity. 
With the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2 in mind, I suggest that one 
plausible explanation for the rise in Northern Irish identity is that those who have had 
experience of positive intergroup contact are more likely to perceive of themselves as 
members of a superordinate group, one that it is inclusive of both the Protestant and 
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Catholic communities. I argue that the Northern Irish identity may be one such 
superordinate identity to which some members of the Protestant and Catholic 
communities ascribe. According to Pettigrew (1998), through a number of interrelated 
and sequential processes intergroup contact may not only lead to positive attitudinal 
change, it may also result in the development of an overarch ing identity. If a Northern 
lrish identity is seen as having the potential to further the development of a more 
inclusive society, it is important to investigate where and why it is emerging, and 
whether it is likely to become sign ificant fo r the promotion of improved community 
relations in Northern Ireland. 
Methodology and research questions 
The aim of this study is to investigate the emergence of the Northern Irish identity 
and whether this can be associated with community relations initiatives that have sought 
to promote intergroup contact between the Catholic and Protestant communities in the 
areas of education, housing and social networks. 
With this in mind, I explore the follov,1ing research questions in the empirical 
investigation that follows: 
1) How has community relations policy dealt with the problems associated 
with division in Northern Ireland? 
2) How much of this is aimed at promoting contact between Protestant and 
Catholic communities? 
3) Do individuals (from either a Catholic or Protestant background) who have 
intergroup contact differ from the rest of the adult population in relation to 
their national identity preferences? 
4) What other factors are associated with identifying as Northern Irish? 
5) Has the peace process impacted on patterns of identity? 
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To address these questions the central methodology that I employ is secondary 
analysis of representative survey data from the NISA (1989-1996) and NILT (1998-
2010) surveys. I supplement this analysis by drawing on census and government 
statistics in the public domain from various government departments and public bodies 
in Northern Ireland. I also conduct content analysis of government and non-government 
policy documentation. In the section below, I explain the use of each of the measures 
from the NISA and NILT surveys that I employ. 
The data 
The main empirical investigation employs data from the NISA and NILT surveys 
from 1989 to 2010. Here I analyse data from individual survey years and from two 
pooled data sets collated by Dr Paula Devine at the Northern Ireland Social and Political 
Archive Access Research Knowledge (ARK). The first pooled dataset (NISA/NILT 
1989-2010) contains data for all survey years between 1989 and 2010. The second 
dataset (NILT 1998-2005) contains data from the NIL T surveys conducted between 
1998 and 2005.42 
The present study uses a measure found within the survey as an indicator of 
national identity and of community/religious background and employs several measures 
as indicators of levels and types of cross-community contact. -The study also includes 
several important socio-economic and demographic variables. I draw on this data to 
examine the strength of relationships between different types of contact and national 
identity preferences both within individual survey years and within aggregate periods of 
time. 
42 See Appendix I for further details on the NISA and NILT surveys. 
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The dependent variable 
The dependent variable fo r this study is nati onal identity. 43 It is coded from 
responses to an indicator fo r measuring national identity preferences that has been 
standardised and included in surveys since 1968. In order to take into account the range 
of response options and to maintain continuity across the surveys, the measure for 
national identi ty within the surveys uses a cl ose-ended fo rmat presenting the respondent 
wi th five options . Since 1989, survey parti cipants are asked the question ' Which of 
these best describes the way you think of yourself? ' given the options 'British ', ' Irish', 
'Ulster', 'Northern Iri sh ', 'Other', 'Don' t Know ' . 44 
National identity is used as the dependent variable for several reasons. First, based 
on the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2, this thesis seeks to uncover wheth er 
a superordinate identity may be emerging to which members of both the Protestant and 
Catholic communities may ascribe. Second, given the weight of academi c literature 
which suggests that intergroup contact may effect attitudes and behaviour, it also seems 
pl ausible that intergroup contact may effect identity prefe rences. Finally, while the 
NISA and NILT surveys contain other measures of identity, such as political identity, 
the indi cator fo r nati onal identity includes several identi ty options that fa ll outside 
43 See Append ix 2 Table 2A for specific wording, response categories and the survey years in wh ich the 
measure was included. 
" Importantly, people who are given these options are presented with the choi ce of two national identities 
and two non-national public identities (namely Ulster and Northern Irish). If the survey question had been 
worded di fferent- the actual survey quest ion does not ask them to state their national identity but to 
' describe the way you think of yourself-then it seems reasonable to expect that we mi ght get quite 
different results given that Northern Iri sh and Ulster identiti es might to be perceived as truly national 
identities . Moreover, the wording of the variable withi n the surveys (NTNATID) implies that it is a 
measure of respondents' national identity. This is problematic in that it necessarily groups together 
national within non-national identities. However, I wi ll use the term inology ' national identity' because it 
is the way in which the survey data has been di scussed and the way in whi ch the measure has been 
defined. 
68 
traditional categories that are generally regarded as being representative of either a 
Protestant or Catholic background. 
Community/religious background 
Respondents' religious/community background is used to select cases for 
analysis. As will be demonstrated, religious/community background has been and 
continues to be an important determinant of national identity (see Coakley 2007). As 
this study is concerned with relations between Catholics and Protestants, only those 
respondents who state their religion as either Catholic or Protestant are included in the 
analysis. The use of respondents ' religious background for selecting cases is 
appropriate, since correlations between religion and national identity reveal a strong 
positive relationship across each of the surveys. The variable religion45 is coded from 
the question in the survey that asks respondents ' Do you regard yourself as belonging to 
any particular religion? If yes, which?' Responses to this question have been coded in 
the study to fall into one of four categories, 'Catholic ', 'Protestant', 'Other' or 'No 
Religion ' . 
While I only select cases in which a respondent states his or her community 
background as Catholic or Protestant, it is important to note the growing proportion of 
the population who do not claim a religious affiliation. This trend was evident in the 
1971 census with 9.3 per cent of the population choosing to leave the religious 
affiliation question unanswered. Since this time, surveys have consistently found that 
around 10 per cent of the adult population is not religiously affiliated (see Moxon-
Browne 1983; Hayes and McAllister 1995; NISRA 2001; Fahey et al. 2005) . 
A plausible explanation for this trend is that, due to the onset of violence, many 
census respondents refused to identify their religion (Coakley 2007). In 2001, however, 
a new variable was added to the census in an effort to capture those who did not wish to 
indicate a denomination. The supplementary question asked respondents to identity in 
45 See Appendix 2 Table 2B for specific working, response categories and the survey years in which the 
measure was included. 
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which religion they had been brought up. This variable was named community 
background and in the 200 1 census the breakdown by communi ty background was 43.9 
per cent Catho lic, 53 .1 per cent Protestant and Other Chri st ian, 0.4 per cent Other, and 
2.7 per cent No Religion (Coakley 2007). 
It is also possible to measure religious background (otherwise known as 
community background) using another indicator used in the NISA and NILT surveys . 
Using a similar question to the 2001 census, respondents are asked, ' In what re ligion 
were you brought up?' The respondent is then classified as belonging to one of the 
fo llowing categories: ' Protestant', 'Catho lic ', 'Other ', and 'None'. This question has 
been included in the surveys in order to mitigate the effects of respondents refusing to 
identify their religion. While this is a perfectly suitable measure fo r 
religious/community background, I employ the first measure for religious background 
in this study. I do so fo r two reasons. First, response rates in the pooled dataset to the 
question 'Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?' remain high 
throughout the survey years, with around 1 in 10 stating that they do not belong to any 
religion (see Table 3 .1 ). Second, thi s measure also more accurately captures the 
respondent 's current position as part of a particular community within Northern Irish 
society. It is therefore appropriate to use this measure in the study as I am particularly 
interested in analys ing those people who currently identify as either Catholic or 
Protestant, as opposed to those who were brought up in a parti cular religion but who 
may no longer identi fy with that community. This vari ab le I employ wi ll be referred to 
throughout the thesis as either religious or community background . 
The independent variables 
The independent variables consist of five indi cators of intergroup contact. Niens 
et al. (2003) di stinguish between two types of measurement of intergroup contact. The 
first is the quantity of contact, referring to how frequent ly or how much opportunity 
individuals have to meet w ith members of the out-group. This contact may occur 
through meeting with neighbours, fri ends and family, work colleagues, leisure acti vities 
or at school. General ly, quantity of contact is measured by asking about the frequency 
with which an individual meets with members of the other communi ty. The second is 
by measuring the quality of intergroup interactions, referring to how positi ve or 
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negative the contact experience is to the individual and how meaningful it is to them. 
Quality of contact may be measured by asking individuals about their experience of an 
intergroup situation and whether the contact experience was of an intimate (as between 
good friends) or casual ( as between strangers of acquaintances) nature. 
Due to the nature of the measurements available, I focus primarily on an 
investigation of quantity of contact. Several indicators are used to measure the quantity 
and type of intergroup contact an individual has. These are the five main independent 
variables used in the study and each of these will be described in turn. 
The independent variable type of education 46 is coded from responses to two 
questions : 'Did you ever attend a mixed or integrated school in Northern Ireland, that is , 
a school with fairly large numbers of both Catholics and Protestants?' And since 1998, 
a follow-up question to this was included in the surveys that sought to distinguish those 
who went to formally integrated school and those who attended a relatively mixed 
school. This has been operationalised by the question, ' Was this a formally integrated 
school or was it a school that was just fairly mixed? ' (emphasis in original). From these 
two questions, three types of schools can be distinguished: formally integrated, mixed 
and separate-religion. 
The independent variable residential area 47 was created- from a question in the 
surveys that asks respondents to state the approximate number of co-religionists who 
live within the same area as the respondent. The question asks, 'What about your 
neighbours? About how many are the same religion as you?' Responses to this may 
include, 'All', 'Most', 'Half , 'Less than half , or 'None' . Responses to this question 
have been grouped in to two categories with those in areas consisting of all or most co-
religionists classified as living in a segregated area and all other respondents classified 
as living in a mixed area. 
46 See Appendix 2 Table 2C and Table 2D for specific wording, response categories and tbe survey years 
in which the measures were included. 
47 See Appendix 2 Table 2E for specific wording, response categories and the survey years in which the 
measure was included. 
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The variab le friendship network 48 is coded fro m responses to the question, 
' Among your persona l friends how many wou ld be of the same re ligion as yourse lf?' to 
which the response categories include 'All or most', 'Half, and ' Less than half and 
'None ' . Responses to this question have been grouped in to two categories- those who 
state that all or most of their friends are the same reli gion (corresponding to 
homogenous fr iendship networks) and those who state that half or less of their frien ds 
are of the same religion (corresponding to mixed friendship networks) . It was 
appropriate to create a variab le w ith only two categories as only I per cent of 
respondents indicated to have no relatives of the same religion. 
The variable kinship ties49 is coded from responses to the question, 'How many of 
your relatives are the same religion as you?' The response categories are 'All/Most' , 
' Half, 'Less than half , 'None ' . As with the response rate for the fri endship network 
questions , on ly I per cent of respondents indicated no relatives of the same religion and 
so, aga in, this measure is coded into two categories for the present analysis- those who 
state that a ll or most of their relatives are the same reli gion (corresponding to 
homogenous kinship networks) and those who state that half or less of their relatives are 
of the same religion (corresponding to mixed kinship networks). 
From 1998 to 2005, the N ILT survey asked respondents to state the religion of 
their partner. This measure was operationali sed by the question, 'Is your 
husband/wife/partner the same religion as you? ' The response categories were: 'Yes, 
same religion' , 'No, not the same religion ' , and 'No religion at a ll ' . For the purposes of 
this study re ligious intermarriage is thought of as a dichotomous variable; that is, a 
marriage is either intra- or inter-depending on whether or not the spouses belong to the 
same group-Catholic or Protestant (Lehrer 1998: 247). Accordingly, the variable 
48 See Appendix 2 Table 2F for specific wording, response categories and the survey years in whi ch the 
measure was included. 
'
9 See Appendix 2 Table 2G for specific wordi ng, response categories and the survey years in which the 
measure was included. 
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marriage50 is coded into two categories; those who state that their partner is from the 
same religion (corresponding to endogamous relations) and those who state that their 
partner is from a different religion (corresponding to a mixed marriage). 
Within this study I regard the independent variables (residential area, education, 
friendship networks, kinship ties and mixed marriage) as being largely independent of 
one another. However, it could also be argued that these variables may be too closely 
related to one another to render analysis of any one variable meaningful. Within the 
literature there is some indication of a degree of overlap in intergroup contact in 
different social arenas. For example, it might be argued that who attend an integrated 
school are also most likely to live in a mixed residential area. Indeed, as I will discuss in 
chapter 5 some mixed residential areas have links with local integrated schools 
(Murtagh et al. 2006). A certain degree of inter-dependence between variables is to be 
expected and is not a problem so long as they are not highly correlated. To check for 
th is, multicollinearity tests have been run on all of the regression models reported and 
multicollinearity was not found to be a problem in any of the regression models that 
follow. 
Socio-economic and demographic variables 
A number of measures are used as control variables in the bivariate and 
multivariate models. In the bivariate models they are used to examine and compare 
social characteristics of Catholics and Protestants who had experienced intergroup 
contact with those who had not. In the multivariate analyses the measures are used as 
control variables given their significant association with patterns of identity as found in 
previous research (see for example Fahey et al. 2005). These variables include gender, 
age, marital status, church attendance, education, employment and occupation. Within 
the NILT (1998-2005) dataset, an extra control variable was available which measured 
whether the respondent had lived outside of Northern Ireland for more than six months. 
50 See Appendix 2 Table 2H for specific wording, response categories and the survey years in which the 
measure was included. 
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The socio-economic and demographi c variables for the N JSA/NILT ( I 989- 20 l 0) 
dataset are described in Table 3.2 . It should be noted here that this dataset does not 
inc lude all the years from 1989 to 2010 and explanation fo r this is prov ided in the 
section below on the strengths and limitations of survey research. Overall, the 
characteristics of Protestant and Catholic respondents are very similar although some 
variation is evident. For example, Protestants are generally older (51.4 years) than 
Catholics ( 46.4 years), a difference most likely explained by the higher fertility rate 
among Catholics. 
Catholic respondents are slightly more likely to be female than Protestant 
respondents, although there are generall y more females amongst both Catholic and 
Protestant respondents represented in the survey. Thi s reflects broader trends found in 
the 200 I census whi ch showed the Northern Ireland population to be 51 per cent fem ale 
and 49 per cent male. Table 3.2 shows that Protestants are more likely than Catholics to 
hold a non-manual occupation, representing the hi storically better socio-economic 
position of Protestants within Northern Ireland. Supporting previous research, Catholics 
are more likely than Protestants to attend church. 51 It is worth pointing out, however, 
that self-reported data on church attendance may not be reliabl e (see Fahey et al. 2005: 
40). This is due to the social desirability bias referring to the tendency fo r respondents 
to give answers based on what they think the interviewer would like to hear. But as 
Fahey et al. (2005 : 41) explain, the uncertainty in levels of church attendance does not 
undermine the data since people ' s sense of how they ought to behave is a significant 
observation in its own right and indicate a continuing positive ori entation towards 
forma l observance. 
51 Church attendance uses a seven-point scale ranging from 'attend church weekly ' through to ' do not 
attend church' . I have grouped attendance into two categories : 1 = those who attend church fro m once a 
week to once a month (regular attenders) and O = those who attend less often to do not attend at all 
(irregular attenders). I had originally grouped attendance into three categori es - ' regular attendance ', 
' irregular attendance ' and ' no attendance'- but this did not make a significant difference in the analyses. 
To simplify, I therefore chose to code the measure into two categories-'attend ' and ' no attend ' . 
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Table 3.2. Description of independent variables, NISA/NIL T 1989-2010 
pooled sample 
Protestant Catholic Total 
(N=5, 157) (N=4, 103) (N=9, 260) 
- - ---·- --
Variable Coding Mean Mean Mean 
Gender (female) 1=Female, .56 .59 .57 
Church attendance 1 =Attend, .40 .65 .54 
Age (years) From 18 to 96 51.40 46.40 49.20 
Education: Coded 1 or 0 
Tertiary .12 .13 .12 
Secondary .48 .46 .47 
No qualification .40 .41 .40 
Occupation 1 =Non manual, .54 .46 .51 
Employment 1=In labour .48 .48 .48 
Source: NISA surveys and NIL T surveys, pooled file, 1989- 2010. 
The variables for the NILT 1998- 2005 pooled dataset are described in Table 3.3 . 
Once again Protestant respondents are found to be older (5 l.2 years) than Catholic 
respondents (46.8 years) . There are also more females than males represented in the 
-
sample. Once again, Catholics are more likely than Protestants to attend church. They 
are also more likely to have lived outside of Northern Ireland, perhaps having lived 
previously in the Republic of Ireland or elsewhere in Europe. Again, Protestant 
respondents are more likely to have a non-manual occupation. 
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Table 3.3. Description of independent variables , NIL T 1998- 2005 
pooled sample 
------- --
Protestant Catholic Total 
(N=6,601) (N=S,083) (N=11 ,684) 
Variable Coding Mean Mean Mean 
Gender (fema le) 1 =Female , 0=Male .58 .59 .59 
Church atte ndance 1 =Attend , 0=No .53 .76 .63 
Age (years) From18to96 51.20 46 .80 49.30 
Education : Coded 1 or 0 
Tertiary 
.1 1 .12 .12 
Secondary 
.33 .31 .32 
No qualification 
.56 .56 .56 
Occupation 1 =Non manual , .54 .46 .51 
Employment 1 =In labour force , .47 .50 .49 
Lived outs ide 1 =Lived outside , .20 .23 .21 
Source: NIL T surveys, pooled file 1998-2005. 
Analysing the data 
For the main component of the empirical investigation, the data analysis proceeds 
in a number of stages. First, I conduct bivariate analyses of the relationship between the 
dependent variable [national identity] and the independent variables [ experience of 
intergroup contact in education]; [experience of intergroup contact in residential area]; 
[experience of intergroup contact through mixed friendship networks]; [experience of 
intergroup contact through mixed kinship nel\¥orks]; [experience of intergroup contact 
through mixed-marriage]. I test the significance of these associations using chi-square 
tests and t-tests . 
Second. I conduct multivariate analyses through the use of a series of binary 
logistic regression models. l used logistic regression rather than linear regression 
because the dependent variable [national identity] is a dichotomous categorical variable 
\\'ith onl y l\vo possible outcomes 1 =Northern Irish, 0=British ( or Irish). Logistic 
regression measures the relationship bel\veen the dependent "ariable and predictor 
(independent variables) through the use of probability scores. The scores represent 
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probabilities that are bounded between 1 and 0. The probability is measured using the 
estimated odds ratio or exponent (B) score. This indicates the change in the predicted 
odds of the dependent variable for every unit increase in the independent variable net of 
other predictors in the model. Thus, if the exponent (B) score exceeds 1 then the odds of 
an outcome increase; if the figure is less than 1, any unit increase in the independent 
variable leads to a drop in the odds of an outcome occurring (see Bums and Bums 2008: 
582). Accordingly, the odds of identifying as Northern Irish as opposed to British (or 
Irish) for every unit increase in the independent variable [experience of intergroup 
contact] and will either increase or decrease depending on whether the value exceeds or 
is less than 1. In each model I present the logistic coefficients, the standard errors (in 
parentheses), and the exponent (B) scores. I interpret the logistic coefficients using the 
exponent (B) score as this provides the most straightforward way of interpreting 
coefficients in a nonlinear model (see Lattes et al. 1996; Gow 2009). 
Given the major political developments that have occurred in Northern Ireland it 
was important to factor the potential effects of these developments into the analysis. In 
order to consider whether the broader political climate had background effects on 
national identity patterns I run two separate models for each analysis which are 
aggregated into two time periods: before the implementation of the Agreement and 
devolution to the Northern Ireland assembly (1989-1998), and_after devolution (1999-
2010).52 While it is true that the survey year 1998 was the year in which the Agreement 
was adopted, it was not until December 1999 that the Agreement was implemented and 
devolution to the Northern Irish Assembly enacted. Accordingly, for the purposes of 
this study I group the survey year 1998 with the earlier 'pre-devolution ' period. 
52 The models presented in this study do not control for individual year of survey for a number ofreasons. 
First, given the inconsistency in the-survey questions (to be discussed in the 'strengths and limitations' 
section below) I have only included those survey years in which all measures are present- this represents 
a total of 10 years. Given that the models are then aggregated into two time periods (pre-devolution and 
post-devolution), the individual effects of the individual years are negligible. I tested for this by initially 
including year of survey as a control in the models. As individual year of survey was not found to make 
any difference in the outcome of the models, I decided not to include it as a measure in the multivariate 
analyses. 
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The period from 1989 to 1999 represents a 10 year period under direct rule from 
Westminster. During this time the official peace process began and eventually 
culminated in the signing of the Agreement in 1998. The fo llowing period from 1999 to 
20 IO represents the imp lementation of the Belfast Agreement and the devo lution of 
powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly. This 11 year period also witnessed the 
suspension of devolution and a decline in Protestant support for the Agreement. 
However, it was also the period during which the first comprehensive whole of 
government community relations policy (to be discussed in detail in chapter 4) was 
enacted and, since 2007, powers have been returned to the Northern Ireland assembly. 
Strengths and limitations of survey-based research 
The use of survey data to conduct analyses of social and poli tical phenomenon has 
a number of strengths and limitations. The particular strength of the data used here lies 
in their large size and the representativeness of their samples. It is therefore possible to 
make inferences wh ich are more readily generalised to the broader population. Another 
strength of this type of quantitative analys is is that survey research in Northern Ireland 
has since 1968 fo llowed a relatively consistent path with regards to measuring identity 
patterns. This enables researcher access to long time-series data. The ability to analyse 
consistent time series data over such an extended period of time (from 1968 to 2010) 
makes it possible to identify and generalise trends in national identi ty patterns. 
Of particular importance to thi s study is the abi lity to establish relationships 
between measures, and more specifi cally between select measures of cross-community 
contact and national identity preferences. Moreover, using quantitative data analys is it is 
possible to assess whether relationsh ips exist between these variables holding other 
important and potentially influential variables constant. For instance, we can explore 
whether living in a mi xed neighbourhood renders one more likely to identi fy as 
Northern Iri sh. In order to assess the signifi cance of this relationship, however, it is 
necessary to cancel out the effect of other factors that mi ght also be influencing it, such 
as an indi vidual 's level of education or occupation. Th is type of in-depth anal ysis is not 
possible usi ng qualitative data. 
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Of course, there are also a number of limitations to using quantitative methods 
and survey data in particular. One significant limitation that is particularly challenging 
when conducting research on divided societies is response reliability (see Coakley 
2007). For example, it has been acknowledged that politically extreme views tend to be 
understated in surveys (Whyte 1990). Citing Mitchell et al. (2001) Coakley (2007) 
suggests that if the public were anywhere near as moderate as they represented 
themselves in surveys, there would be no Northern Ireland problem. The reliability of 
surveys is also somewhat compromised by the misreporting of respondents due to social 
desirability. This has been discussed with reference to the over-reporting of voting (see 
Bernstein et al. 2001). A related problem is that certain views may be overestimated in 
surveys because those who are more inclined to follow current affairs are more prone to 
answer surveys. Respondents may also be less likely to answer questions truthfully out 
of fear for their security, wishing to disassociate themselves with a particular view or 
political position to avoid the risk of being targeted or type-cast. 
Another limitation involves the adequacy of interpretation of survey 
questionnaires. For example, as Coakley (2007 : 575) points out, simple questions 
designed to document complex patterns of identity cannot accurately capture the 
subtlety of meaning attached to identities that may be reached through qualitative 
means. As such, it is not possible to interpret the content of sp_ecific identities through 
simple survey questions. 
A further limitation of the study is the issue of causality. That is , given the cross-
sectional nature of the data employed, it is not possible to accurately discern the 
direction of the relationship between social mixing and national identity. For instance, it 
could be argued that those who hold more moderate views may choose to live in mixed 
areas or send their children to integrated schools and that more prejudiced people may 
avoid contact with out-groups. What has been termed 'the causal sequence problem ' 
(Pettigrew 1998) remains a challenge for those undertaking such research. Indeed, only 
by employing longitudinal data can definitive conclusions be reached as to the direction 
of the relationship between mixing and identity. In the absence of such data, however, 
inferences can still be drawn as to the importance of such environments for more 
moderate identities. Added to this, a strong theoretical and empirical literature ( as 
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discussed in chapter 2) suggests that positive intergroup contact can lead to attitude 
change. Indeed, the weight of this academic literature was neatly summarised in 
Pettigrew and Tropp ' s (2006) meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory which 
found overwhelming support for the contention that intergroup contact can reduce group 
prejudice. 
But the most significant challenge to drawing inferences from the data used in this 
study results from the inconsistency over time in the use of certain survey questions. 
For example, while some important measures such as the variable for religion, the 
dependent variable national identity and the independent variables for type of education 
remain consistent through the survey years, others measures have not. In particular, the 
measures used to create the independent variables for residential area, friendship 
networks and kinship ties were not included in the survey years 1994 through to 2004 
and the measure used to create the independent variable for marriage was only included 
from 1998 to 2005. 
The lack of continuity across the survey years poses a problem for the 
development of consistent time series. To address this problem and to ensure 
consistency throughout the analysis, I have therefore only included those years in which 
all measures are present. This leaves the survey years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 for use in the main empirical chapters. The pooled 
sample (1989- 2010) that I utilize in this study is therefore comprised of these years. 
For analyses of the relationship between mixed religion marriages and national 
identity preferences in chapter 6, a different pooled dataset of the NILT surveys ( 1998-
2005) is applied. This is because the measure for mixed marriage was not included in 
the NISAINILT 1989- 20 IO pooled dataset. A separate pooled dataset (NILT 1998-
2005) is therefore developed for the purpose of measuring mixed marriage. 
Unfortunately, this does not include measures for the rest of the independent variables 
under analysis and because of the different survey years included in the two datasets 
used, it is not possible to draw direct comparisons with the rest of the independent 
variab les. 
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Despite these limitations, the datasets utilised are the most in-depth and 
sophisticated datasets available to measure social attitudes in Northern Ireland. And 
even after omitting particular survey years, the number of respondents for the datasets 
and the individual variables remains large enough for useful analyses and comparisons. 
Furthermore, the pooled datasets that I employ here have demonstrated to be of 
significant utility in previous research which has investigated a range of social and 
political attitudes in Northern Ireland (see for example Hughes and Donnelly 2001; 
Hayes et al. 2007; Hayes and McAllister 2009a; Devine et al. 2011; Lloyd and 
Robinson 2011). Through the use of the pooled data sets this research has made 
significant contributions to ongoing debates on the state of community relations and the 
impact of community relations projects in Northern Ireland. 
Conclusion 
This chapter identified the presence of the Northern Irish identity, prevalent 
among a significant minority of both Catholic and Protestant respondents within the 
NISA and NILT surveys. I showed that this Northern Irish identity has also been 
captured in the latest census (2011) of the Northern Irish population that found a total of 
21 per cent of the population claim a Northern Irish identity only. I argued that this 
identity is significant as it is the only identity currently shared by both members of the 
Catholic and Protestant community. Furthermore, those who choose to identify as 
Northern Irish are making a conscious choice not to identify with the traditional and 
divisive identities. Given its potential significance, I developed a research strategy to 
explore potential connections between Northern Irish identity and government and non-
government initiatives that aim to increase intergroup contact between Catholics and 
Protestants. 
I proposed a quantitative research strategy that would make use of a number of 
measures found in the NISA and NILT surveys which record the attitudes, values and 
beliefs of the people of Northern Ireland on a range of social and political issues. I 
supplement this quantitative approach by drawing on census and government statistics 
in the public domain and conduct content analysis of government and non-government 
policy documentation. 
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Accordingly, in the chapter to fo llow I examine government community relations 
policy crafted to promote and provide opportunities for intergroup contact in Northern 
Ireland. I wi ll demonstrate that theories from social psychology have been adopted and 
adapted in successive governments' community relations policy in Northern Ireland 
over the past two decades, and reveal some of the tensions that can exist between efforts 
to increase cross-community contact and the political pressures of managing (as 
different to resolving) issues within a divided society. 
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Chapter 4. Contact theory and community 
relations policy 
While Northern Ireland remains a divided society, promoting positive community 
relations has been a central component of government social policy as well as a main 
focus of voluntary sector organizations and external funding body initiatives since the 
mid-1980s. This chapter charts the evolution of community relations initiatives that 
seek to promote positive contact between members of the Catholic and Protestant 
communities. It identifies important developments and shifts in the focus of such 
initiatives, and highlights the centrality of cross-community contact and later ' sharing' 
to this development. 
Accordingly, I develop two main arguments. First, I advance the claim that 
fundamental assumptions of contact theory as developed by Allport (1954, 1979) and 
Pettigrew (1998)-in particular, that increasing intergroup contact between members of 
different groups can lead to a reduction of prejudice and an increase in more favourable 
attitudes towards the out-group-has informed a number of community relations 
policies and initiatives in Northern Ireland. According to thi_~ rationale, if people from 
Catholic and Protestant backgrounds live in the same neighbourhood, these residents 
will, over time, come to realize the similarities between them-that they share common 
concerns and aspirations for their neighbourhood-and that thi s will lead to feelings of 
similarity rather than of difference. 
I shall show that many initiatives are based upon a simplistic understanding of 
contact theory that does not take into account the complexities associated with 
intergroup contact explained in chapter 2. While initiatives have been influenced by 
some of the claims of intergroup contact theory, it is not possible to attribute the success 
or failure of initiatives solely to soundness of its premises. Rather, the political context 
has influenced the direction and focus of community relations policy. I show how the 
competing aspirations of political parties have been particularly influential. I argue, 
however, that the contact approach remains central to community relations initiatives 
and has become more influential over time. 
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The chapter is divided into four sections . In the first section, I trace the 
development of community relations policy under the regime of direct rule from 
Westminster, a period that lasted from 1972 until the devolution of power to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly in December 1999. In particular, I focus on policies that 
were designed on the basis of some fundamental assumptions of contact theory. 
The second section exam ines community relations policy in its present fo rm with 
a particular focus on the government's community relations policy document A Shared 
Future: Policy and Strategic Framework for Good Relations in Northern Ireland 
(OFMDFM 2005) (hereafter referred to as A Shared Future) and more recently the 
consultation document entitled Programme for Cohesion, Sharing and Integration 
Consultation Document (OFMDFM 2010) (hereafter referred to as Cohesion, Sharing 
and Integration). I provide a close reading and analysis of these documents paying 
particular attention to their core aims, strategies and underlying principles. The third 
section consists in an overview of external funding bodies that have contributed 
resources and funding for community relations initiatives. Notable here are the activities 
of the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and the European Union (EU) Peace 
Programmes. Finally, I discuss existing research concerning the effectiveness of 
initiatives on community relations in Northern Ireland. 
The main contribution of this chapter is to highlight the centrality of the ' contact ' 
approach to the development of community relations policy. This chapter, therefore, 
sets the scene for the empirical chapters that fo llow in which I examine the efficacy of 
such initiatives by measuring patterns of identity among Catholics and Protestants. 
Promoting 'community relations' in government policy 
Deep divisions between communities, whether symbolic or spatial, have acted as 
barriers to overcoming conflict in Northern Ireland.53 Since the 1960s, various attempts 
have been made to manage and transfonn conflict through the creation of community 
53 This view is widely held by scholars of the Northern Ire land conflict. See for instance Darby 1986; 
1997; Whyte 1990; Hayes et al. 2007; Hayes and McAllister 2009b. 
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relations policies but it was the period of direct rule from 1972 to 1999 that saw a 
flourishing of such initiatives in Northern Ireland (Darby 1997: 71). This section details 
the emergence of a community relations agenda within government policy. It then 
demonstrates how intergroup contact has been a key component of this agenda. 
The term 'community relations' originated in the United Kingdom in the early 
1960s in response to increasing levels of immigration, mainly from African and Asian 
countries, to the United Kingdom. Initially government policy sought to assimilate new 
migrants, but later turned towards a focus on promoting awareness and respect for 
cultural diversity between groups. Government policy therefore referred to the need to 
promote 'community relations' (Frazer and Fitzduff 1994; Harbison 2002).54 
During the same period, in response to deteriorating relations between Catholic 
and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland, British home secretary James 
Callaghan announced the establishment of the Community Relations Act (Northern 
Ireland) in 1969. The Act was to 'provide for the appointment and functions of a 
Commission to foster harmonious relations throughout the community and for the 
purposes conducted therewith' (Community Relations Act (Northern Ireland) 1969). As 
a result a Ministry for Community Relations and a Community Relations Commission 
were established. The Commission was broadly modelled on the United Kingdom ' s 
Race Relations Board (Harbison 2002) and both the Ministry and the Commission were 
charged with promoting policies and activities to improve community relations. 
However, their existence was short-lived with the Commission being abolished in 1974 
by the newly formed Assembly for Northern Ireland and the Ministry being disbanded a 
year later following the collapse of the attempted power-sharing government (Frazer 
and Fitzduff 1994).55 
54!! is beyond the scope of this study to examine the effectiveness of this 'community relations ' approach 
in the 1960s. For the present purposes reference is made to this approach to pin point the first use of the 
term. 
55 This was the Sunningdale Agreement (1973-74), discussed in detail in chapter 2. The Sunningdale 
Agreement lasted three months and attempted to operate a power-sharing government. It was opposed by 
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What Morrow (20 13: 67) calls the ' long absence' refers to the period of relative 
neglect by the government of community re lations between the years 1975-1986. After 
the abolishment of the Commission in 1974, management of community relations fell 
under the auspices of the Department of Education and whi le the department continued 
to provide financia l support to the few existing voluntary agencies involved in 
community relations work, argues Frazer and Fitzduff(1994), it failed to come up with 
any policies or strategies to ensure the continuance or effectiveness of community 
relations work. The hiatus in community relations work was influenced to a large extent 
by the increase in vio lence throughout Northern Ireland and the subsequent breakdown 
in relations between the two communities. As Morrow (20 13: 11 ) explains, ' the 
inevitable trend within community development under conditions of extreme 
polarisation was to reflect the priorities of communities under siege.' As such, the 
sensitive nature of cross-community relations work in li ght of heightened sectarian 
tensions rendered efforts to promote a community relations agenda difficult. 
By the mid-I 980s, however, there was renewed interest in community relations 
and signs that the government was again considering the role that community relations 
work could play within Northern Ireland. A number of key political developments were 
arguably influential in this renewed focus. First, in 1985 the Anglo-Iri sh Agreement was 
signed establish ing formal cross-border links between the British and Irish governments 
in matters related to policy formulation in Northern Ireland (Morrow 2013). Both 
governments sought to re-establish the goal of cross-community engagement. For 
example, in 1986 the International Fund for Ireland (JFI) was established as an 
independent organ ization under an agreement by the British and Irish government to 
' promote economic and social advance and to encourage contact, di alogue and 
reconciliation between unionists and nationali sts throughout Ireland ' (quoted in Morrow 
2013: 13). 
Second, British government rhetoric alluded to the need for a fresh approach in 
dealing with the Northern Ireland conflict. For example, Thomas King, Conservative 
the UUP and DUP and in May 1974 it was brought down by the Ulster Workers ' Council strike who 
disagreed with the inclusion into legislation ofa Council of Ireland. 
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Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 1985- 89 spoke of the need to address problems 
between communities as he stated, 'You can have all the written constitutions or the 
new political plans you like, but if there is basic distrust between the two communities, 
if there is this defensive attitude ... that is not the sort of climate in which you get any 
generosity or outgoing approach' (quoted in Dixon 1997b: 16-17). Following this, in 
1987 Thomas King announced that community relations would become a priority area 
of government policy, calling for a radical realignment of existing institutional 
structures to accommodate this priority (Harbison 2002: 16). An outcome of this was 
the establishment of the Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU) in 1987 as part of 
the Northern Ireland Civil Service. The rationale for the creation of the Unit was the 
belief that division perpetuates violence and instability. This is evident in the following 
statement by the CCRU: 
Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided society, within 
which exist two separate groups with different political aspirations, 
religious beliefs, cultural traditions and social values. It is from this 
essential division that violence flares and political instability 
persists ... Reducing these divisions is therefore a major part of 
government policy ( quoted in Knox and Hughes 1996: 90). 
Funded through the Northern Ireland Civil Service, the CCRU was charged with 
three main functions : to provide a challenge mechanism within Government by vetting 
all policy for its influence on community relations; to undertake a review role of policy; 
and to undertake a role in developing new programmes that would promote cross-
community contact, mutual understanding56 and respect for cultural diversity (Harbison 
2002; Kelly 2006). In 2000, the CCRU was renamed the Community Relations Unit 
(CRU) as part of the new devolved government in Northern Ireland. The Unit now 
receives funding directly from the OFMDFM of Northern Ireland, estimated at £5.Sm 
per annum (Harbison 2002). The functions and funding roles of the CRU will be 
discussed in detail later in the chapter. 
56 Mutual understanding refers to greater understanding of communities' culture and traditions. 
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A typology of community relations work 
Community relations work, as it is understood here, refers to work focused on 
divisions between the Catholic and Protestant communities. Following Kelly (2006: 11 ) 
community relations work can be broadly defined as work that aims to ' develop contact 
and co-operation, promote greater understanding and increase respect for cultural 
divers ity.' A number of different typologies (see Fitzduff 199 1; Hughes and Knox 
1997) have been developed to capture the broad range of practices implemented by 
government and non-government bodies that may be described as community relations 
work. Adapting and adding to the typologies created by Fitzduff (1991) and Knox and 
Hughes ( I 997) I have created a typology of community relations work as shown in 
Table 4.1. Here, I summarise four types of community relations work: cross-community 
relations work, mutual understanding and cultural traditions work, community 
development work and justice and rights/reconciliation work. Table 4.1 provides 
definitions and examples of each type of community relations work as well as examples 
of organizations that support such work. 
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Table 4.1. A typology of community relations work 
Type Definition Examples Supporting 
Organisations 
Cross- Projects aimed to The development of Derry peace and 
community address the mixed residential reconciliation work; 
contact work segregation and areas; mixed leisure CRC; Department of 
separation of centres; shared Education; NIHE; 
communities due to spaces; integrated NICIE; IFI; EU 
the belief that schools; holiday Peace Prog rammes; 
segregation creates programmes for Atlantic 
fear and prejudice Catholic and Philanthropies 
between Protestant children; 
communities Shared Space 
Initiative 
Mutual Designed to Education for Mutual Community 
understanding/ decrease ignorance Understanding; Relations Council; 
cultural and prejudice cultural traditions Department of 
traditions work between groups; Irish Education for 
communities and to language training; Northern Ireland; 
develop Ulster-Scots Protestant and 
understanding and education Catholic Encounter 
acceptance of (PACE) 
cultural diversity 
Community Designed to Belfast Interface Community 
development enhance the Project; economic Relations Council; 
work capacity of regeneration; Belfast Interface 
communities to implementation of Project; Derry 
engage in anti-discrimination Peace and 
community relations legislation ; Targeting Reconciliation; 
work through Social Need (TSN). Group; EU Peace 
community Programmes; IFI; 
regeneration and the Atlantic 
development of Philanthropies 
structures and 
networks that assist 
in the efficacy of 
community relations 
projects 
Justice and Development of PACE public 
rights work/ collectively agreed discussions; ongoing 
Reconciliation upon principles of discussions over the 
work justice and rights to establishment of a 
be implemented into truth commission; 
political frameworks group discussions 
on civil liberties 
education; use of 
external bodies 
including Amnesty 
International 
Sources: Adapted from Fitzduff 1991; Knox and Hughes 1997. 
It is important to note that each of these four types is not mutually exclusive, such 
that some projects and their supporting organizations may fit in to more than one 
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category. For example, the Derry Peace and Reconciliation Group run a variety of 
projects both wi thin and between communities including single identity work within 
marginali sed communities, cross-border and cross-community proj ects for primary 
school children as well as faci litating public political debates fo r secondary students on 
current events and issues relevant to young people.57 The !FI, the EU Peace Programme 
for Northern Ireland, the Community Relations Council (CRC), the CRU and various 
government departments all provide funding and support for several types of 
community relations work. Each of these organizations, their roles and functions wi ll be 
discussed in detail in the sections below. 
Contact theory and community relations policy 
Mutual understanding and cross-community contact work are two inter-connected 
types of community relations work that have attracted significant attention in policy 
circles. As Niens et al. (2003: 138) note, governmental and non-governmental schemes 
in Northern Ireland have a long-standing tradition of promoting cross-community 
contact. Indeed, important elements of community relations policy has been predicated 
on the belief that intergroup contact would improve relationships between communities 
(CCRU I 992; Harbison 2002; Kelly 2006). For example, a central objective of CCRU 
was to promote mutual understanding between communities through education and 
through cross-community contact schemes between segregated schools. 
The belief in the benefits of increasing contact has filtered through to other 
government departments. For example, as educational reform in Northern Ireland was 
one of the major priorities of the Conservative Government during the 1980s and I 990s 
(Morgan and Fraser 1999) the education system as a potential avenue through which 
improved community relations could be promoted. As part of thi s, the 1989 Education 
Reform (Northern Ireland) Order was in troduced. Subsequently, the Department of 
Education established a voluntary Cross Commun ity Contact Scheme between 
57 See the Peace and Reconciliation Group al <http ://www.peaceprg.co.uk>. 
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religiously segregated schools. Government resources were made available to support 
joint activities between schools. Concurrently, under the 1989 Education Reform 
(Northern Ireland) Order, a new common curriculum for all schools was established. 
This curriculum included the units 'Education for Mutual Understanding' (EMU) and 
'Cultural Heritage' (CH). The new themes to be taught through EMU and CH were 
designed to address the history and traditions of the two main communities in order to 
increase mutual understanding between them (Dunn and Morgan 1999). 
Assessment of the effectiveness of such schemes has been limited by a number of 
factors. Firstly, although the teaching of EMU became mandatory in all. schools, there 
was no formal requirement for joint contact initiatives between segregated schools. This 
meant that schools could, if they wished, teach the themes set out in EMU without ever 
establishing links with schools across the divide. Consequently, while some schools 
were active in promoting cross-community contact schemes, others avoided doing so 
(Smith and Dunn 1990; Dunn and Morgan 1999). 
The lack of a formal requirement for contact between schools may have been 
partly due to the controversial nature of the scheme in its early years. As an early report 
by Smith and Robinson (1996) highlighted, the emphasis placed on contact between 
Protestants and Catholics gave rise to concerns that there was a political agenda 
underlying and motivating the scheme. For example, they noted how some members of 
the unionist community argued that such schemes (especially when they involved 
activities related to Irish culture or links with the Republic) were tactics to encourage 
Protestants to soften their stance on constitutional issues. Conversely, some nationalists 
were suspicious of EMU activities, viewing them as covert assimilation tactics. 
Secondly, the interpretation and implementation of the various themes attached to 
EMU has varied greatly across schools (Dunn and Morgan 1999). This is in part due to 
a lack of adequate training for teachers that would equip them with the skills necessary 
for teaching and dealing with controversial issues in a classroom setting. Accounts from 
teachers suggested that they did not feel comfortable addressing certain contentious 
issues, and consequently chose to avoid them (Johnson 2001). The teaching of EMU 
themes has also been affected by the lack of an agreed and uniform approach to 
implementing the themes of EMU across the education system. As a result, EMU has 
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been regarded as a limited pri ority in many schools (Dunn and Morgan 1999; McG lynn 
et al. 2004). 
Alongside changes to the curriculum, the 1989 Education Reform (Northern 
Ireland) Order also called fo r the promotion of integrated schooling in Northern Ireland 
in whi ch children from both the Protestant and Catholic traditions would be educated 
together. The Department of Education was given responsibility to ' encourage and 
fac ilitate' the development of integrated schoo ls where there was parental demand for 
them. Integration in education was defined as ' the education together at school of 
Protestant and Roman Catholic pupils ' (Harbison 2002: 2). In the initial years, however, 
progress towards formally promoting integrated schools was slow. Once again, state 
sponsored cross-community contact was generally met with hostility and suspicion. 
Opposition came both from politicians representing their local electorates and from 
members of the Catholic clergy (Dunn and Morgan 1999). While the 1989 Education 
Reform (Northern Ireland) Order was formally in place, the task of creating space for 
an integrated education system was left to determined parent groups, including, for 
example, ' All Children Together ', with financial support from charities, foundations 
and individuals. 58 
The CCRU was also charged with promoting community relations at the council 
level, and it introduced the District Council Community Relations Programme 
(DCCRP). The DCCRP was designed to encourage local district councils to promote 
communi ty relations themes consonant with CCRU objectives and many of the proj ect 
developed had the aim of encouraging cross-communi ty contact (Knox and Hughes 
1996; Kell y 2006). The CCRU provided funding for community relations programmes 
on the understanding that councils would agree on a cross-party basis to participate in 
58 I wi ll provide more detai led analysis of the hi story and nature of integrated schools in chapter 6. For 
present purposes it is important to note that the promotion of intergroup contact has received mixed 
responses within the wider com muni ty, and indeed within political circles. To thi s day only 5 per cent of 
schools quali fy as having a mi x of pupil s from both Protestant and Catholi c background s. Whil e the 
number of schoo ls participati ng in cross-community activities has increased over the years, integration 
withi n schools has remained relat ively minimal. 
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the programme; that community relations officers would be appointed; and that all 
projects designed through the programme would be required to include cross-
community contact, mutual understanding or cultural diversity (Knox 1994). 
As within the education sector, however, suspicion from community leaders and 
political representatives over the motivations behind such programmes compromised 
the longevity and effectiveness of some programmes. As Knox and Hughes (1996) 
point out, the political make-up of the councils influenced significantly the effectiveness 
of these schemes. After conducting in-depth interviews with local authorities, they 
concluded, 'because the programme is located within the remit of local government, it 
has assumed a certain political aura and provoked, among some councillors, a degree of 
suspicion ' (Knox and Hughes 1996: 89). Interviews with community relations officers 
highlighted these political tensions. For example, one community relations officer 
described the reaction to the community relations programme within the council as 
eliciting suspicion from unionist members of the government's intentions. This was 
fuelled in particular by concerns arising in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 
that gave the Republic of Ireland a greater say in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland. 
Sinn Fein members were also described as wary of the Stormont government's 
intentions. They were particularly concerned that the programme was designed to draw 
attention away from the pressing issue of inequality (Knox an.c\ Hughes 1996: 89). 
Other party members on both sides of the divide have expressed concern that the 
programme has involved a waste of public monies (Burgess 2002). As a result of these 
competing pressures, some community relations projects (especially those involving 
cross-community contact) became one-off events with little to no impact on community 
relations (Knox 1994; Knox and Hughes 1996). Indeed, Knox and Hughes (1996: 94) 
argued that there was ' little evidence of groups tackling superordinate goals or 
developing cross-cutting cleavages aimed at breaking the Catholic/Protestant mould'. 
While much community relations work can be classified as that which aims to 
either increase mutual understanding between groups or promote pluralist environments 
through increasing opportunities for intergroup contact, it is also clear that the 
implementation of these objectives has been met with some scepticism. There are 
several reasons for this. In this section, I demonstrated that one reason for scepticism 
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over the direction of community relations work is due to views over the causes of the 
conflict and therefore the type of work necessary to address the needs of the 
communities. For instance, Sinn Fein regards the conflict as one of persistent 
inequalities and discriminat ion against the nationalist community. While many within 
the union ist community were suspicious of what they saw regarded as community 
relations policy as social engineering. In the section below I examine these criticisms of 
community relations policy in more detail. I also demonstrate that while the contact 
approach has become a dominant theme of community relations policy, the language of 
'good relations' has now become salient within policy circles . 
Socio-economic disadvantage and 'good relations ' 
In recent years, the contact approach has become a central feature of much 
community relations work. But it is important to note that not all community relations 
policy and fund ing focuses on promoting cross-community contact. Indeed, the 
'contact' approach, as it is applied to Northern Ireland, has sometimes been criticised 
(see Hughes and Donnelly 2002; McVeigh 2002) as being 'symptom driven '---diverting 
attention away from tackling the so-called root causes of the confl ict. These so-called 
root causes refer to socio-economic inequalities experienced by particular sections of 
society. 
Thi s is a criticism echoed by Sinn Fein . As demonstrated above Sinn Fein views 
the conflict as one of persisting inequalities between Catholics and Protestants and 
argues that on ly through major structural change (including progress of justice issues 
and changes to the current constitutional status of Northern Ireland) and the elimination 
of inequality will real progress be made towards an end to conflict. Indeed, Foley and 
Robinson (2004: 28) detected this scepticism of the 'contact' approach in community 
relations work in an in terview with a senior member of Sinn Fein. The Sinn Fein 
Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) expressed concern that community 
relations pol icy 'ignore[s] the wider political issues. They are as far apart at the end of 
the day as they were at the start' (quoted in Foley and Robinson 2004: 32). While the 
development of Fair Employment Legisl ation and initiatives such as Targeting Social 
Need and Fair Treatment Guidelines for government departments has sought to address 
these inequalities, the Sinn Fein MLA called for the continuing need to deal with the 
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reality of different and sometimes clashing single identity communities (Foley and 
Robinson 2004: 28). Concerns over the focus on contact were also echoed by a UUP 
MLA who expressed concern that contact projects encourage tokenism and are a waste 
of government resources. The MLA stated, 'it could be that you improve the 
relationships between the communities ... by not bringing them together ' ( quoted in 
Foley and Robinson 2004: 29). 
Socio-economic disadvantage and discrimination remain pressing problems and 
are present in both highly segregated loyalist and republican wards. In 2011 youth 
unemployment in Northern Ireland was at 19.1 per cent (Nolan 2012) and by the second 
quarter of 2012 it had reached 23.5 per cent according to the Northern Ireland Labour 
Force Survey. 59 Moreover, violence within these areas, and especially in so-called 
interface areas, is more acute than in other urban areas. Studies show that such 
communities feel marginalised from society, and that this has led to feelings of 
resentment and mistrust of government and its ability and willingness to deal with 
endemic problems in these communities (Bairner and Shirlow 2003; Jannan 2005a). 
In conjunction with the persistence of socio-economic disadvantage prejudice, 
discrimination, and hate crime directed towards minority groups (including migrant 
workers)6° have become salient social issues (Jannan and Monaghan 2004; Gilligan 
2008). The Derry City Council's 2011-2014 Good Relations Strategy reported, 'a 
worrying increasing trend in the number of racist and sectarian incidences ' and 
'prejudice against Irish Travellers and Migrant workers are particularly significant' 
(Derry City Council 2011: I 00- 102). Against this background of ongoing 
marginalization, prejudice and discrimination policy practice is influenced as much by a 
59 Youth unemployment rate based on 18-24 year old age group. See Northern Ireland Labour Force 
Survey, NISRA, at <http://www.detini.gov.uk/deti-stats-index/stats-labour-market/stats-labour-market-
unemployment.htm>. 
60 See for example, 'Romanians leave Belfast after racist attacks', The Guardian, 23 June 2009. 
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need to promote what is called ' good relations' and equality6' as by a need to foster 
cross-community contact (Hughes 2009). 
With this in mind, it is important to make a distinction between 'good re lations ' 
and 'community relations'. Since it first appeared in the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the 
use of the concept ' good relations' has gained increased currency in policy circles. 
Foley and Robinson (2004) argue that the prominent use of this idea reflects the need to 
move beyond the binary model of Catholic- Protestant relations. This concept was first 
introduced in Section 75(2) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Section 75 (2) states that: 
Without prejudice to its obligations under subsection (1), a 
public authority shall in carrying out its functions relating to 
Northern Ireland have regard to the desirability of promoting good 
relations between persons of different religious belief, political 
opinion or racial group (Section 75 (2) Northern Ireland Act 1998). 
What ' good relations ' actually means, however, is not further specified or 
interpreted in the Act itself. Th is is somewhat confusing. As Foley and Robinson (2004: 
13) note ' [t]here are different views on what the terms "community relations" and 
"good relations" denote and how they relate to each other ' . While Section 75 (2) speaks 
of the need to promote ' good relations ' , this particular Section has formed the basis of 
much ' community relations' policy to date. Moreover, the term 'good relations' is not 
defined in legislation. The Equality Commission of Northern Ireland has developed a 
working definition of 'good relations' as follows: 'The growth of relationships and 
structures for Northern Ireland that acknowledge the religious, political and racial 
61 The current equality agenda is based on a seri es of anti-di scrimination laws dating back to the 1970s 
including fair employment legislation designed to address di scri mination in the workfo rce on religious 
grounds. More recently, Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 places a statutory obligati on on 
publ ic authorities to promote equality between 'persons of different re li gious beli ef, pol iti cal opinion, 
racial group, age, mari tal status or sexual orientat ion; between men and wo men generally; betwee n 
persons with a disability and persons without; and between persons with dependants and persons 
without'. 
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context of this society, and that seek to promote respect, equity and trust, and embrace 
diversity in all its forms' (Equality Commission of Northern Ireland 2008). 
The increasing use of the concept of good relations is probably reflective of the 
growing numbers of ethnic migrants living in Northern Ireland and the subsequent need 
to develop policy that is representative of these groups. However, given the scope of the 
present study I focus on and refer to the term 'community relations' and I take 
'community relations' to refer to the relations between members of the Protestant and 
Catholic communities in Northern Ireland. 
So far I have charted the development of community relations in Northern Ireland 
since the early trial phase in the 1970s through to the establishment of a strong CRU 
within government. In the following section I tum to documenting and analysing the 
development of a new community relations agenda within government that broadens 
responsibility for promoting community relations to include all government 
departments. 
An agenda for 'sharing': community relations in post-Agreement Northern 
Ireland 
The period since the implementation of the Agreement_ ~as been characterised by 
a series of major political, structural and legislative changes. These changes have 
influenced the scope and delivery of community relations policy. This has included 
further clarification of the difference between 'good relations ' and 'community 
relations' and a renewed focus on the idea that promoting cross-community contact may 
lead to more positive community relations. In this section I analyse community relations 
policy and show how this has been influenced by the political restructuring that has 
occurred since 1999. 
A false start 
The Agreement came into force in December 1999 and effected a transfer of 
powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly and a joint power-sharing Northern Ireland 
Executive. Under the tenns of the Agreement (and as a result of political negotiations) 
the six existing direct rule departments were replaced by 10 new departments together 
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with an Office for the fo rmally co-equal First Minister and Deputy First Minister. 
Keeping in line with the consociational prescription of power-sharing and equal 
representation, the Northern Ireland Executive would consist of six unionist and six 
nationali st ministers, with IO heading departments and two sharing power in OFMDFM 
(Wilford 2009). 
Under the terms of the new Agreement, responsibili ty for community re lations 
was transferred to the OFMDFM. In 2000 the CCRU became known as the CRU, 
forming part of the Equa lity Unit of the OFMDFM. The CRU's broad policy objectives 
mirror those of the CCRU. These are to increase cross-community contact and co-
operation, and to encourage mutual respect, understanding and appreciation of cultural 
diversity. In an attempt to meet these objectives, CRU activities involve formulating 
policy, providing advice to government, undertaking research , allocating funding, and 
providing support for community relations initiatives. 62 
While the new devolved structures and responsibilities with in departments were 
formally in place, political tensions rendered the proper functioning of the new 
government impossible. As a consequence there was little progress in the realm of 
community relations policy during the first phase of devolution (Farry 2009). Conflict 
between unionists and nationalists attempting to share power are argued to have been 
the cause of the fai lure of the new Northern Ireland Executive. For example, tensions 
emerged within the unionist camp over claims that an IRA ' spy ring' was operating 
inside the Assembly and unionists called for the suspension of Sinn Fein 's participation 
in government in light of their suspicions (McAuley 2004). In addition, Wilford (2009) 
highlighted growing tensions between First Minister David Trimble (UUP) and Deputy 
First Mini ster Seamus Mallon (SDLP) over competing aspirations and preoccupations 
with how the Executive should be run. Mallon was concerned with making sure that the 
co-equal status of his position was fu lly respected and Trimble later reflected that ' the 
co-equal status of the First Mini ster and Deputy First Mini ster was a real necessity ... but 
62 See the CRU website at <http ://www.ofindfmni.gov.ukJindex/equality/co mmunity-relat ions. htm>. 
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we immediately reflected that by going to opposite ends of Parliament Buildings' 
(quoted in Wilson 2009: 188). 
It had been hoped that the relatively moderate UUP and SDLP would provide 
stability and act as a counterweight against the more traditional DUP and Sinn Fein 
(Farry 2009). However, these parties proved incapable of preventing traditional political 
antagonisms from creating obstacles to reform. As a result of the political impasse in the 
Executive the initial power-sharing government and Northern Ireland Assembly was 
suspended in October 2002, and a direct rule caretaker government was installed. 63 
A Shared Future 
The community relations policy document A Shared Future was crafted during 
the period of direct rule between 2002 and 2005. It is important to emphasise that while 
the main political parties in Northern Ireland took part in the consultation process, the 
document was ultimately prepared by officials answerable to the British government, 
rather than by Northern Ireland's political parties. Released by the CRU of the 
OFMDFM in 2005, it has been the most in-depth and influential community relations 
policy to date. This document was formulated in response to the report entitled Review 
of Community Relations Policy (Harbison 2002), and emphasizes the importance of 
tackling segregation in Northern Ireland. It is significant for those within the community 
who advocate for a more focused and coordinated effort to promote sharing over 
separation. 
In 2002, former Deputy Secretary at the Department of Social Development, Dr 
Jeremy Harbison, was commissioned by the OFMDFM to assist with a review of 
community relations policy in Northern Ireland. The review was to examine 'current 
policy and associated policy instruments ' that had been established at a particular period 
in the history of Northern Ireland (between 1987 and 1990). The policy under review 
63 It was not until May 2007, following significant concessions and institutional reform embodied in the 
St Andrew's Agreement (2006), that the devolved political institutions in Northern Ireland were restored 
with Rev. Ian Paisley of the DUP and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein becoming First Minister and 
Deputy First Minister respectively. 
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had the objective 'to improve relations between the two main traditions in Northern 
Ireland through the encouragement of greater contact and the development of mutual 
understanding and respect for different cultural traditions' (Harbison 2002: 4). The 
report cited evidence that despite attempts to improve community relations, there had 
been 'progressively higher levels of residential segregation over the last 20 years with a 
majority of people choosing to live in polarised districts' (Harbison 2002: 25). Related 
to this, the report claimed that community relations policy had been inadequately 
monitored and evaluated (Harbison 2002: 64) and concluded that, ' the evidence does 
not suggest that significant progress has been made towards a more tolerant or inclusive 
society' and that there are 'significant areas of Northern Ireland society where 
increasing separation and polarisation of communities is taking place' (Harbison 2002: 
25, 49). 
On the basis of the central findings of the Harbison Report, the CRU embarked on 
an extended public consultation process entitled A Shared Future: A Consultation 
Paper on Improving Relations in Northern Ireland (Darby and Knox 2004). This 
consultation aimed to promote the widest possible debate concerning the appropriate 
aims and objectives of future community relations policies. There were 504 written 
responses gathered through workshops, focus groups, and public advertisement 
campaigns. These responses came from a wide range of stakeholders including 
voluntary and community organizations, ethnic minority groups, schools, individuals, 
political parties and elected representatives, trade unions and church groups. In addition, 
an Omnibus Survey was commissioned by the OFMDFM to gauge the public 's view on 
the future of community relations policy. 
One of the central questions to emerge during this consultation process concerned 
how best to deal with existing divisions within society (Darby and Knox 2004: 3). Two 
contrasting approaches were the focus of much debate. One approach maintained that 
that the pragmatic sol ution was to accept that existing patterns of segregation and 
division were likely to remain, at least in the short to medium term. Accordingly, efforts 
should be focused on stabilising and managing the consequences of such divis ions. An 
alternative view proposed that instead of accepting division , efforts should focus on 
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promoting rapid progress towards a more integrated and shared society (Darby and 
Knox 2004: 3). 
The first proposal is clearly reminiscent of some of the central arguments made by 
consociational theorists. Consociational theory stresses the durability of division and 
argues for the management of division through institutional structures, as discussed in 
chapter 1. However, the consociational institutions of government were, at the time of 
the consultation, suspended due to a lack of trust and compromise between the political 
parties. Indeed, the consultation process also brought to light a generalised public 
sentiment that deep mistrust between (and of) politicians was blocking progress towards 
a sustainable peace. The role of elected representatives had earlier been called into 
question with regards to the effectiveness of community relations initiatives as part of 
DCCRP. Arguably this mistrust of politicians' motives encouraged many in the 
consultation process to argue that continued management of division was a far less than 
satisfactory option for the future of community relations policy.64 
The result of the consultation process was the OFMDFM's 2005 policy document, 
A Shared Future. A number of important developments and changes to the community 
relations agenda are apparent in this document. First, A Shared Future makes a clear 
distinction between 'community relations' and 'good relations'. Here 'community 
relations' is defined as referring specifically to communal divisions between Catholics 
and Protestants. 'Good relations' is defined as referring to Section 75(2) of the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998 which includes relations between 'persons of different religious belief, 
political opinion or racial group ' (OFMDFM 2005: 63). Second, the language of ' cross-
community contact', apparent in earlier policy documents, was replaced by the language 
64 For example, successive social surveys have continuously shown low levels of trust in government and 
in politicians in Northern Ireland. In 1998 results from the NILT survey question, 'Do those we elect lose 
touch with the people pretty quickly? resulted in 72 per cent of respondents having 'agreed ' or 'strongly 
agreed' with the statement. Results from this question asked in 2003 showed that 75 per cent of 
respondents 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' . 
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of 'sharing ' . A Shared Future calls for the promotion of ' sharing' across the whole of 
government Indeed, all newly appointed Ministers to the Northern Ireland Assembly are 
now held to a new ministerial code under which they must pledge to ' promote the 
interests of the whole community represented in the Northern Ireland Assembly towards 
the goal of a shared future' . 65 However, as wi ll be discussed in detail later in this 
chapter, nowhere within the A Shared Future document is the concept of 'sharing' 
defined. 
Third, the central focus of A Shared Future is tackling persistent segregation. For 
example, the overall vision for A Shared Future is to establish ' [a] society where there 
is equity, respect for diversity and recognition of our interdependence ' (OFMDFM 
2005: 7) and the document identifies the high levels of segregation that persist within 
society as a major obstacle to achieving this goal. The document regards parallel living 
and the duplication of services as ' unsustainable, morally and economically' 
(OFMDFM 2005: 15) and calls attention to the costs of a divided society: 
[S]egregated housing and education, security costs, less than 
efficient public service provision, and deep-rooted intolerance that 
has too often been used to justify violent sectarianism and racism. 
Policy that simply adapts to, but does not alter these challenges, 
results in inefficient resource allocations. These are not sustainable 
in the medium to long-term (OFMDFM 2005: 15). 
While acknowledging the importance of reducing social and economic 
inequalities, the document stresses that unless the underlying 'culture of intolerance ' is 
addressed, a more 'normal' society wi ll be unattainable (OFMDFM 2005: 8). Just what 
this document takes to be the causes of this 'cu lture of intolerance' , and how a ' normal' 
society is understood, is not made explicit. It maintains that, ' [m]oving from 
relationships based on mistrust and defense to relationships rooted in mutual 
recognition and trust is the essence of reconciliation ' (OFMDFM 2005: 14). Its central 
65 See Northern Ireland Assembly 2006 Statuto,y Ministerial Code, Section 1.4 (ca) 
<http:l/www.northern ireland.gov.uk/index/work-of-the-executive/ministeri al-code.htm>. 
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message is that to promote and achieve sustainable peace, Northern Ireland needs to 
undergo major transformations in the way in which relationships are structured. 
Relationships based on mutual recognition and trust, it asserts, can only come about 
through increased sharing across the traditional divide. 
Finally, the document affirms that identities should be regarded as susceptible to 
change. Indeed, A Shared Future regards identity as 'something that also evolves over 
time, as we go through life experiences and relate to others- not something unchanging 
which seals us off from those who are "different"' (OFMDFM 2005: 7). This statement 
reveals an anti-essentialist view on identity in which identity is understood to be 
malleable and flexible, influenced by life experiences and changes in social context. 
This is not to say, however, that entrenched group identities will naturally evolve over 
time in a positive direction. Indeed, the document warns that in 'multi-ethnic societies 
that don't work' ... 'individuals are reduced to simple group stereotypes' (OFMDFM 
2005: 7). What this statement suggests is the need to create an environment that 
discourages the labelling of people according to group stereotypes and in which 
identities can evolve. 
A Shared Future envisages an environment that could achieve these aims- one 
which emphasizes 'sharing' over separation in all aspects of life, including the sharing 
of services, neighbourhoods, schools and parks and open spaces (OFMDFM 2006: 11 ). 
This has been, in various forms, the philosophy behind earlier community relations 
initiatives. Earlier initiatives spoke of the need to promote cross-community contact and 
mutual understanding across a wide range of environments. However, the emphasis 
placed within A Shared Future on the concept of 'sharing' is striking. Moreover, the 
'shared' environments are not merely physical environments, but are defined by a 
culture of tolerance and the achievement of reconciliation and mutual trust (OFMDFM 
2005 : 3). A Shared Future asserts that all public expenditure should promote and 
support ' sharing over separation' in order to 'facilitate the development of a shared 
community where people wish to live, learn, work and play together ' (OFMDFM 2005 : 
8). 
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Limitations of A Shared Future 
A Shared Future has many virtues. For one, it is acknowledged that a system 
premised on the idea of 'separate but equal ' will not provide stability in the long term. It 
affirms the need for a hol istic and integrated approach to dealing with segregation and 
views segregati on as a chall enge to be overcome, rather than merely managed. 
Moreover, the document ' s treatment of identity as something that can be transformed 
over time suggests a move away from a mind-set, evident in the consociational 
institutions of government, which regards identity as something that is fixed and to 
wh ich we must therefore resign ourselves. 
However, this policy document is conceptually problematic in a number of ways 
and each of these shall be dealt here in tum. First, it makes fundamental assumptions 
regarding cross-community contact, or what is called 'sharing ' , that are questionable 
and somewhat surprisingly the concept of 'sharing ' itself is not defined within the 
document. Over the past two decades there has been a proliferation in cross-community 
projects as well as a substantial amount of research material generated as a result of 
such projects that go completely unacknowledged. Some of the evidence from previous 
research has challenged the effectiveness of certain policy interventions. For instance, 
within the integrated education sector, previous studies (see Gallagher et al. 2003; 
Donnelly 2004a; Hughes and Donnelly 2006) have found large imbalances in the 
percentage of pupils and staff from the two main communities within supposedly 
'integrated' schools leading to significant underrepresentation of one community within 
the school. This can lead to group status differentials, in wh ich one group's culture, 
traditions and identity are given preference. This in tum undermines the supposed ly 
equal relationship that the two main traditions are to be afforded within integrated 
schools as stated by the Department of Education for Northern Ireland and the Northern 
Ireland Counci l for Integrated Education. 
Moreover, lack of a uniform definition across all schools of what integration 
means and how it should be implemented has led to very different teaching methods, 
with some schools employing norms of avoidance when dealing with difficult issues 
concerning the two main communities (see Johnson 2001 ; Montgomery et al. 2003 ; 
Hughes and Donnelly 2006). It is somewhat concerning that A Shared Future does not 
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take into consideration the findings of such studies. Increasing integration within 
schools is widely believed to be a positive development within a divided society. 
However, simple quantitative increases in intergroup contact that are not accompanied 
by intergroup contact of a particular kind may produce unintended and long-lasting 
problems for the integrated education sector. 
Social psychological research, as demonstrated in chapter 1, has acknowledged 
and even highlighted the negative consequences that contact can yield. A Shared Future 
does not specify how it will overcome or avoid these negative consequences. If policy is 
to draw on such theories, a close and critical reading of the theory is required, including 
acknowledgement of the negative effects that contact can have and the articulation of 
strategies for minimizing the risks of such effects. Hughes (2009: 30) concurs with this 
claim, arguing that A Shared Future fails to take research findings adequately into 
account, leaving the document 'riddled with uncritical assumptions about the potential 
of actions proposed to transform relationships of mistrust, fear and hostility' . The focus 
on allocating resources to increase 'sharing' must be matched by concerted efforts to 
produce interventions that have characteristics of ' quality' contact. 
Second, the responsibilities set out in the A Shared Future First Triennial Action 
Plan for departments to meet this aim appear broad and rather unspecific. Little detail is 
provided regarding how these responsibilities will be implemented. For example, the 
OFMDFM is to 'lead on all aspects and actions of a Shared Future objective ' 
(OFMDFM 2006: 22). Similarly, the Department of Education is required ' to promote 
and prioritise sharing in all levels of education ' (OFMDFM 2006: 26). It is unclear 
whether ' sharing' refers to integrating Catholics and Protestants within schools or to 
increased collaboration and contact between segregated schools. With regards to other 
departments, the document is more specific. For example, it calls for the Northern 
Ireland Housing Executive (NIBE) to develop two pilot schemes of 'Shared Future' 
housing -within 12 months (OFMDFM 2006: 29). 
Criticism over the direction of the government ' s policy community relations 
policy has also been voiced by political representatives . Indeed, it is clear that much of 
this criticism stems from a lack of clarity over just what are the aims of the 
government's plan for sharing. For example, research by Foley and Robinson (2004) 
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found a hi gh degree of scepticism among politicians over the objective of a more shared 
and integrated society. Indeed, they stated, 'most tend to regard such proposals as 
unreali stic, inappropriate and, in some cases, dangerous' (p. 25). Overall , many 
politicians interviewed expressed concerns over what they saw as a 'Big Brother' 
approach by making sharing a key principle of policy-making and creating artificial 
environments in which experiments at integration could be conducted (p. 22). 
The strong emphasis in A Shared Future on the need for sharing (as opposed to 
separation) may be explained by a number of contextual factors. For example, after the 
initial optimism following the implementation of the Agreement, tensions within the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and between rival political parties led to a steady 
breakdown of relations between those who were appointed to govern together. As 
discussed in detail earlier, political infighting and stalling within the Northern Ireland 
Executive led to the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly and a return to direct 
rule for a five-year period. The issue of trust was flagged in a joint statement by the 
Taois each and the British government, who stated that the devolved Government could 
not be made to work effectively in circumstances where there was a breakdown of trust 
between those appointed to govern.66 Moreover, mistrust of politicians was highlighted 
as a major concern in the consultation document (Darby and Knox 2004). 
Alongside these political events, researchers produced evidence that increasing 
numbers of people were choosing to live in segregated communities. Indeed, as 
previously demonstrated, the findings from the Harbison Review (2002) suggested that 
rather than an improvement in community relations since the implementation of the 
Agreement, there was evidence that deep divisions remained, and indeed had increased 
66 See Department of the Taoiseach Government Press Release 'Suspension of devolved government in 
Northern Ireland: joint statement by the Taoiseach and Prime Minister. ' 14 October 2002. Accessed 5th 
August 20 IO at 
<http ://www.taoiseach.gov. ie/eng/News/ Arc hi ves/2002/Governrnent_Press _Releases_ 2002/S uspension _ o 
f _Devolved_ Government_in _Northern_ Ireland _Joint_ Statement_ by_ Taoiseach _ and _Prime _Minister.him 
!>. 
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in some sections of society. 67 The problem of persisting divisions within society was 
also stressed in the consultation document (OFMDFM 2005). Clearly, then, sharing 
power at the level of government was not enough to encourage sharing between 
communities at the grassroots level. Rather, as the consultation document and A Shared 
Future demonstrated, a renewed and focused effort on promoting sharing across the 
divide was required at all levels of Northern Irish society. 
Cohesion, sharing and integration 
The reinstatement of devolved government to Northern Ireland commenced in 
May 2007 and with it the arrival of a new First Minister Peter Robinson (DUP) and 
Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness (Sinn Fein) in the Northern Ireland 
Executive. Since then significant changes have occurred regarding the future direction 
and emphasis on policy for improving community relations. 
The OFMDFM seek to replace the CRU's main community relations policy with 
the release in 2010 of the Government's draft program Cohesion, Sharing and 
Integration (OFMDFM 2010). Published in draft form on 27 July, the Cohesion, 
Sharing and Integration document is significant for being the first community relations 
strategy drawn up and agreed upon by a devolved power-sharing government. The draft 
programme is set to replace A Shared Future and will be the-key strategy for the new 
Executive in promoting community relations. Cohesion, Sharing and Integration sets 
out a number of priorities similar to those in A Shared Future that are considered to be 
matters requiring attention. These include the need to promote and develop shared 
spaces and shared neighbourhoods as well as to reduce and eventually eliminate 
segregated services (OFMDFM 2010). 
As a preliminary method to address the issues set out in Cohesion, Sharing and 
Integration, the document categorizes issues in terms of a timeframe that includes a 
67 A substantial body of research has argued that the Protestant community in particular felt that the 
Agreement unfairly benefited the Catholic community leading to high levels of disillusionment with the 
Agreement within the Protestant community (see for example Hayes et al. 2005b; McAuley and Tonge 
2007). 
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number of short, medium and long term aims. Short term aims include developing more 
efficient and effective act ion plans for dealing with eruptions of violence in interface 
areas. Within the medium term , suggestions for community relations policy include a 
new parades framework to ease tensions between groups. Proposals for 'sharing space' 
related to encouragi ng mixed neighbourhoods and reducing segregated services are 
deemed to be long term goals. Cohesion, Sharing and Integration does not go into 
further detail about the timing and sequencing of these short, medium and long term 
goals. 
While still in draft form, the consultation document has received significant 
criticism from a wide range of stakeholders. The Northern Ireland Business Specialist 
Magazine, AgendaNI (2010: 16) referred to the 77-page document as 'cautious, tending 
to speak of issues to address rather than problems to solve'. Within the Northern Ireland 
Executive the draft document received mixed responses. The Alliance Party of Northern 
Ireland, who had entered the Executive on the condition that real progress would be 
made towards promoting ' a shared future' , regarded Cohesion, Sharing and Integration 
as having a 'weak' vision. The Alliance Party (2010: 4) argue that the document does 
not contain any 'affi rmation of a shared society', and nor is there a ' rejection of the 
notion of "separate, but equal" or "benign apartheid"'. This concern was echoed by the 
UUP 's Danny Kennedy who warned that Cohesion, Sharing and Integration was 
unlikely to bring about a shared future as he remained unconvinced that the DUP and 
Sinn Fein had moved beyond a 'separate but equal' position (quoted in AgendaNI 
Magazine 2010: 19). 
A recent comparative analysis of the two policy documents conducted by Ruane 
and Todd (2010) reveals some significant conceptual shifts. For instance, they highlight 
that the concept of reconciliation has been replaced in Cohesion, Sharing and 
Integration by ' mutual respect ' and an ' acceptance of diversity' (OFMDFM 20 10: 41-
2) . The effect of this is to appear to be much less ambitious with regards to the 
outcomes of the new community relations agenda. Ruane and Todd (2010: 3) contend 
that it is imprudent to abandon the process of reconciliation in favour of mutual respect 
and tolerance of diversity, and warn that a government goal of mutual respect and 
tolerating diversity may not be enough to hold off the dangers of re-sectarianisation 
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especially among the young. The authors argue that currently the conditions in Northern 
Ireland are favourable for moving towards ' a shared future', but 'a sustained strategic 
effort on behalf of government is necessary to translate political change into better 
community relations'. In this regard they find the Cohesion, Sharing and Integration 
document lacking. Comparing the previous policy, A Shared Future, to the current 
proposals, they contend that Cohesion, Sharing and Integration 'may underestimate the 
difficulty of the task, both in its conceptualisation of its goals, and in its strategic 
orientation' (p.3). 
The document is also criticised for seemingly taking cultures and identities as 
given and stable (Ruane and Todd 2010: 3). Ruane and Todd draw attention to a sharp 
distinction between the manner in which the two documents conceive of communal 
identities, and consequently how they can and should be dealt with. Whereas A Shared 
Future called for projects which 'highlight the complexity and overlapping nature of 
identities' (OFMDFM 2005: 10), Cohesion, Sharing and Integration seeks to build a 
society in which cultural identities are celebrated with confidence and pride (OFMDFM 
2010: 7). This is problematic because, unlike A Shared Future, the document fails to 
recognise that identities can very easily become polarised and can act as labels for 
simple group stereotypes. A suggestion for promoting other, more inclusive identities is 
missing. 
The language of A Shared Future stresses that identity is a choice that an 
individual makes, albeit one that is influenced by the socio-political context. In contrast, 
the language of Cohesion, Sharing and integration seems to posit the autonomy of 
distinct cultures that can hopefully come into contact with one another in a respectful 
way. The strong assumption within the document, which focuses on the maintenance 
and celebration of group identities, suggests that the latest government strategy for 
community relations is to manage polarised identities rather than attempt to transform 
them. A Shared Future stands out as envisioning a transformed, shared society. 
Cohesion, Sharing and Integration appears less ambitious in this way and more 
concerned with maintaining community identity and managing tensions that may arise 
from this. This conceptual shift becomes even more problematic by the fact that 
Cohesion, Sharing and Integration fails to adequately acknowledge how the segregated 
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nature of society affects social re lationships with in Northern Ire land. This may have 
important implications for the way in which community relations policy is 
conceptualised and formu lated in the future. 
It is importan t to view Cohesion, Sharing and Integration in the context in which 
it was crafted . The new power-sharing Executi ve is governed by the two traditional 
parties in Northern Ireland, namely the DUP and Sinn Fein. As I demonstrated earli er, 
these parties have traditionally held very different views on the causes of the conflict 
and the persi stence of communal division. Thi s may be why Cohesion, Sharing and 
Integration places emphasis on addressing inequality, which reflects Sinn Fein's views 
concerning persisting inequalities between Protestants and Catholics. The poli tical 
make-up of the executive may also explain the conceptual shift evident within the 
Cohesion, Sharing and Integration document with regards to the understanding of 
identity. The work of Mitchell and Evans (2009) is particularly illuminating here. They 
argue that the electoral success of the more hard-line parties in power-sharing is due to 
the 'ethnic tribune' appeals made by these parties. That is, they have been seen to be the 
robust defenders of their group's cause-through maintaining that they are the 
defenders of their respective community's cultures, identities and political aspirations, 
while making the most out of the power-sharing institutions (Mitchell and Evans 2009: 
152). As Mitchell and Evans (2009: 153) explain, 'The ethnic tribune party can be 
simultaneously pragmatic over resources and intransigent about identity. ' 68 To be seen 
to move away from this role, by adopting a more moderate stance on their community's 
identity may have potential electoral consequences. 
Moreover, Cohesion, Sharing and Integration was drafted during a period of 
economic uncertainty fo llowing the global financial crisis. In the 20 10 (United 
J<jngdom) Treasury Spending Review it was announced that block grant fu nding to 
Northern Ireland wou ld be reduced by 6.9 per cent over a four-year period (HM 
Treasury 2010). This may have impacted on the perceived viability of and questions 
over the necessity of various community relations proj ects and thus influenced the 
68 See also Mitchell et al. (2009). 
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content of the draft Cohesion, Sharing and integration document. The heavy crit icism 
laid against the Cohesion, Sharing and integration document have led to the 
establi shment of a five-party working group set up to find a replacement for the 
Cohesion, Sharing and Integration strategy. A viable and agreed upon alternative to the 
strategy has yet to be realised. Progress in this endeavour has been stymied by the 
recent withdrawal of the Alliance Party from the working group following 
disagreements over proposed social housing plans in north Belfast. The plans have been 
heavily criticised by the Alliance Party for furthering the 'segregation of housing under 
a pure I y notional framework of sharing'. 69 This recent development does not bode well 
for the realization of an alternative to the Cohesion, Sharing and Integration strategy. 
Adding to th is concern over the future of a workable and agreed upon community 
relations strategy is the recent research conducted by Kelly (2012). In interviews with 
key individuals within the political, legislative, policy-making and community and 
voluntary sectors, Kelly uncovered scepticism among respondents with regards to the 
ability of the political leadership in effectively addressing the issue of inter-communal 
division. Indeed, Kelly (2012: 53) noted a sense of frustration among respondents over 
the significant work that remained in order to develop a clear and agreed upon vis ion of 
society for the future in Northern Ireland. 
Despite the many challenges involved in formulating a coherent and agreed on 
community relations strategy, funding from government and from external grant aid 
have established numerous 'community relations' programmes throughout Northern 
Ireland. The fo llowing section provides an analysis on the extent of funding for 
community relations over the past decade. 
Government and non-government expenditure on community relations 
A product of the conflict in Northern Ireland has been the growth in what has 
been called the 'peace-building' sector defined by a funding regime that has provided 
69 See 'Alliance pulls out ofStormont's "shared future" group', BBC News Northern Ireland, 24 May 
20 12. Accessed I June 2012 at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northem-ireland-l8186505>. 
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considerable financial aid for peace-building activities in Northern Ireland (Nolan 
2012). This section examines a number of funding bodies that specificall y target the 
promotion of communi ty re lations. 70 I find that much of this funding fa lls into a 
category of community relations work which encourages the development cross-
community contact, as outl ined in Table 4.1. Whi le governm ent funding fo r community 
relations began in earnest in the early 1980s, I focus on the most recent fundin g reports 
which highlight the current levels of funding for community relations work in Northern 
Ireland. 
Since devolution in 1999, central government spending in Northern Ireland has 
been financed through a block grant from the Treasury as part of the allocation of grants 
to all devolved administrations within the United Kingdom. 71 According to the 
Treasury's Public Spending Statistics 2012, Northern Ireland received a tota l of £9 .4 
billion for the 2011~20 12 financial year (HM Treasury 20 12). Thi s public funding is 
then allocated to government departments through the Northern Ireland Executive. 
Based on an analys is of departmental budgets for the 201 1-2012 financial year, I 
summarise departmental expenditure for stated community relations or related themes 
in Table 4.2 .72 
70 It should be noted that the agencies and initiati ves mentioned in this chapter do not represent an 
exhaustive list of all those involved in the area of community relations in Northern Ireland. lndeed, there 
are a multitude of associations, organizations, community groups that may fall under the broad umbrella 
of community relations. Rather, the agencies di scussed in this chapter represent the agencies most 
influential in pursuing community relations agendas and comprise those that have provided the largest 
financial support for community relations initiati ves. 
71 Treasury allocates block grants to all devolved administrations within the United Kingdom based on 
population size using the ' Barnett Formula ' . 
72 Not all government departments had a stated community relations budget. I have only included those 
departments with a stated budget for community relations or related programmes. 
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Table 4.2. Allocation of funding for stated community relations and other 
programmes by government department for the 2011-2012 financial year 
Dept of Social 
Development 
Dept of Education 
Dept of Finance and 
Personnel 
OFMDFM 
Total 
Total budget for 
2011-2012 
(£m) 
505.5 
1,894.6 
188.6 
78.6 
2,667.3 
Community 
relations 
funding 
(£m) 
59.3 
30.5 
3.8 
48.4 
142.0 
Programme type 
Urban regeneration 
and community 
development/ EU 
peace programme 
match funding 
Youth and 
community relations 
EU 
programmes/special 
EU programmes 
body 
Support for equality, 
human rights and 
community 
relations/EU peace 
programme match 
funding 
Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from the Northern Ireland Executive 
Budget 2011- 2015. 
For the current financial year, a total of £142 million has been allocated for stated 
community relations and related programmes by government departments. This 
represents 1.5 per cent of total government expenditure for the 2011-2012 financial 
year. 73 As Table 4.2 indicates, there is a significant financial commitment on behalf of 
73 These figures are calculations based on the Northern Ireland Executive Budget 2011- 2015 available at 
<http: / /www.northemireland.gov. uk/index/work -of-the-executi ve/budget2 O 1 O. htm>. 
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government towards community relations work. For example, just over half of the 
OFMDFM budget goes towards its equality, human rights and communi ty relations 
themes. Yet it is unclear just how much of the allocated budgets fo r community 
relat ions and related projects are actuall y spent on communi ty relations projects per se. 
Public expendi ture allocation within government departments specifi c to community 
relations programmes is not readily identifi able within the departmental accounts. As 
such, these fi gures represent broad estimates of budget allocation for community 
relations and related programmes. In recent interviews conducted with a range of 
stakeholders engaged in community relations work, Kelly (20 I 2: 85) identified that one 
of the key challenges was understanding the overall landscape of availabl e support fo r 
community relations work, and in particular the aims of each funder and the type of 
impact they envisage. The vague language of the government's aim of a ' shared and 
better future' and of a 'strong and shared community' (Northern Ireland Executive 
2011 b: 29) do not provide a greater understanding of the intended outcomes of thi s 
community relations work. More clarity with regards to the emphasis of specific types 
of proj ects, the fundin g amounts for types of community relations work and on the 
intended outcomes of community relations work should be made a priori ty. 
The recent austerity measures put in p lace by the United Kingdom government 
have impacted on government expenditure across all departments. As stated in the 
Programme for Government 2011-2015 the reduction of block grant fundin g to 
Northern Ireland will have 'severe' consequences 'for fund ing and investment' 
(Northern Ireland Executive 201 lb: 13). The Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring 
Report (No lan 20 12) commissioned by the Communi ty Relations Council (CRC) has 
argued that the current austerity measures coupled with a lack of agreement on a 
framework to address sectarianism does not bode well fo r the future of govern ment 
funding fo r communi ty relations work. Nolan (20 I 2: 11 ) states that 'while the Northern 
Ireland Executive has p ledged its draft Programm e for Government 201 1-20 I 5 to bring 
forward a new draft of Cohesion, Sharing and integration, it is not expected that there 
will be a resource commi tment that will match that whi ch Northern Ireland has enjoyed 
from European and American funders' . Rather, No lan (201 2: 11 ) fi nds that 
approximate ly 80 per cent of what he ca ll s 'peace and reconciliat ion work ' is sustained 
by external grant aid- most notab ly the EU Peace Programme. 
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The Community Relations Council 
The CRC was established in 1990 as a result of a public consultation, facilitated 
by the CCRU, for a new external agency for community relations. The CRC draws 
members from the public, private, voluntary and community sectors, with the aim of 
ensuring independence from government. According to the CRC website, the Council ' s 
strategic aim is to promote a peaceful and fair society based on reconciliation and 
mutual trust. It aims to do this by providing support (finance, advice, information) to 
local community groups and organizations; developing opportunities for cross-
community understanding; increasing public awareness of community relations work; 
and encouraging constructive debate throughout Northern Ireland. 74 
A large part of the Council ' s work is to provide financial assistance to a range of 
community organizations throughout Northern Ireland. Today, the CRC receives most 
of its funding from the CRU within the OFMDFM. For the financial year ending 31 
March 2010, the CRC received just over £8.7 million for community relations and 
victims support from the OFMDFM. The Council also receives funds from the 
independent charity the [Fl and from the EU Special Support Programme for Northern 
Ireland and the Border Counties. Approximately £900,000 of grants to the CRC came 
from the EU Programme and the IFI (CRC 2010). 
The financial assistance received by the CRC is allocated to various community 
relations projects. Figure 4.1 presents data from CRC annual reports and accounts since 
2001 and highlights the amount of direct charitable expenditure by the CRC on an 
annual basis.75 As a tax category, direct charitable expenditure refers to all costs directly 
associated with the financial aid given by the CRC to organizations, including grants 
and running costs for specific projects. Since 2001 , CRC financial assistance to 
community organizations has steadily increased with the exception of 2002-2003. In 
74 For further details about CRC strategic aims visit <http://www.community-relations.org.uk/about-us/>. 
75 Annual Reports and Accounts are not available for download before 200 1. 
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2010, from a total of £9.6 mi ll ion grants made to the CRC, £9. l mi ll ion was expended 
on grants and running costs for CRC supported projects. 
Figure 4.1. Community Relations Council direct charitable expenditure 
2001- 2010 
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Source: CRC Annual Reports and Accounts 2001, 2002 , 2003a , 2004, 2005a , 2006a, 2007, 
2009, 2010. 
It was not possible to access information about the specific breakdown of costs by 
community relations projects. As such, it is unclear what percentage of this funding is 
spent on support for cross-community contact projects. Yet an emphasis on promoting 
intergroup contact is evident within CRC documents. For example, the CRCs Strategic 
Plan 2011-2014 emphasises as a priority the development of ' increased interaction and 
sharing' between communities and the need to promote ' inter-community engagement ' 
and 'inter-community relations' (CRC 2011: n.p.). 
However, the role and functions of the CRC has been the subject of much debate 
among community relations stakeholders (Harbison 2002; Foley and Robinson 2004; 
Kelly 2012). Concerns over the role of the CRC were identified in a report by Foley and 
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Robinson (2004). Through questionnaires and interviews with 190 politicians and 
community and public sector representatives, Foley and Robinson uncovered division 
of opinion with regards to the effectiveness of management and impact of community 
relations programmes. In particular, over half (54 per cent) of those surveyed thought 
that management of community relations programmes by the CRC needed some 
reforms and improvements and over one-third of respondents deemed CRC 
management as ineffective and in need of radical reform (Foley and Robinson 2004: 
27). 
Similar concerns over the Council's functions were uncovered by Kelly (2012). In 
interviews with key stakeholders from the community and voluntary sectors Kelly 
(2012) found widespread concern for the need for clarity on the current and future role 
of the Council. Indeed, Kelly noted that there were varying views on how respondents 
understood the current functions of the CRC and what functions should be prioritised. 
Overall, three main functions were identified; 1) providing information, 2) funding and 
3) policy and advocacy. Of particular concern is the current role of the CRC as a 
funding body. Many of those interviewed held the view that too much CRC time and 
resources are spent on its funding profile at the expense of promoting community 
relations work. Indeed, one respondent described the Council as being 'preoccupied ' 
and 'swamped ' by its funding profile, while another suggested_ that the Council's ability 
to function as a policy advocate had been 'diluted' by its role as a funding body (Kelly 
2012: 83). 
While official government funding for community relations work comprise a 
substantial component of the financial aid for community relations work within 
Northern Ireland, non-government contributions have also been significant. This section 
examines two external funding bodies that have contributed significant financial 
assistance for community relations work. 
The International Fund for Ireland 
In the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, the IFI was established by the 
British and Irish governments in 1986. The IFI is an independent organisation 
established 'to promote economic and social advancement and to encourage contact, 
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dialogue and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists throughout Ireland' .76 It 
is financed through contributions from publi c funds from the Un ited States, Canada, 
Australi a, New Zealand and the EU. As of 2010, the IFI has received a total of £648 
million in financial commitments through these public funds (Deloitte 2010). 
In January 2006, the IFI launched its five-year strategy entitled ' Sharing m 
Space'. The language of ' sharing' represents the IFI commitment to and support of A 
Shared Future. The strategy focuses on four key areas of activity, each of which is 
clustered under an overarching theme: ' building foundations '; ' building bridges'; 
' building integration '; and ' leaving a legacy'. The IFI strategy places a strong emphasis 
on promoting integration and 'a shared future' concurrent with government policy. For 
instance, in August 2008 the rFI launched the Shared Neighbourhood Programme, 
which supports and encourages shared neighbourhoods throughout Northern Ireland. 
The Programme, managed by NIHE, aims to develop 30 shared neighbourhoods over 
three years.77 Table 4.3 provides an overview of [FI activities and financial commitment 
between January 2006 and February 2010. During this period the Fund supported 334 
individual proj ects in Northern Ireland and the southern border counties with a total 
financial commitment of £89.6m (Deloitte 2010). 
76 See !FI 2006. 
77 See the !Fl website at <www.intemationalfundforireland.com> for more information on the Programme 
as well as its other activities. 
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Table 4.3. Projects and financial commitments, International Fund for 
Ireland, January 2006-February 2010 
Strategy areas 
Building foundations 
Building bridges 
Building integration 
Legacy 
Pre-2006 projects carried over 
Total 
Source: Adapted from Deloitte 2010. 
Projects Financial 
supported commitment 
(£m) 
90 25.0 
88 26.2 
50 17.5 
17 14.5 
89 6.2 
334 89.6 
In July 201 I the IFI announced continued financial assistance of £4.6 million for 
projects that focus on promoting cross-community and cross-border relations. Speaking 
in response to the recent riots in East Belfast during the Protestant marching season, 
Chainnan of the Fund, Dr Dennis Rooney CBE announced that the funding 'will go 
towards a number of projects which will break new ground in our unstinting efforts to 
overcome the legacy of the Troubles and to establish cross-community cooperation and 
reconciliation as the norm in our society.' 78 
The European Union Peace Programmes 
The EU Peace Programme (officially known as the EU Special Support 
Programme for Peace & Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties) 
began funding community relations programs in 1995 following the first round of 
ceasefires. A recent EU publication (EU Programmes Body 2007) defines the Northern 
Ireland problem as 'one of perceived national identity and national affiliation with 
78 See ' International Fund for Ireland announces £4.Gm (€5.Sm) support for peace-building, reconciliation 
and community relations projects .' IFI Press Release. 6 July 2011. Accessed 
2 August 201 1 at <http: //www. intemationalfundfori reland.com/press-release-archive>. 
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origins that go back four centuries' . Since 1995 financial aid through the EU Peace 
Programmes has amounted to over €1.9 billion and will continue through to 201 3. A 
breakdown of these figures is provided in Table 4.4. Financial assistance from the EU 
has amounted to just over €1.3 bi ll ion since I 995 with a further €66 1 million in 
contributions made by the Bri tish and Irish governments. 
Table 4.4. Summary of EU and National Funding for Peace I, II and Ill 
Funding EU National Total 
period contribution contribution (€m) 
(€m) (€m) 
Programme 
Peace I 1995-1 999 500 167 667 
Peace II 2000-2004 531 304 835 
Pe a ce II Ext 2005-2006 78 82 160 
Peace Ill 2007-201 3 225 108 333 
Tota l (1995-201 3) 1,334 661 1,995 
Source. SEUPB (2007). 
According to McCall and O 'Dowd (2008: 29-30), funding from the peace 
programmes has been overwhelmingly concentrated on promoting peace and 
reconciliation between the two main communiti es in Northern Irel and. Importantly, the 
Peace Programmes allocate funding using a decentra lised model so that fund s are made 
directl y availabl e to a wide range of stakeholders including voluntary and communi ty-
based organizations. In this way, a number of organizations, independent of 
government, are involved in administering the Programmes. 
Peace 1, as it is commonly known, ran fro m 1995- l 999 . During thi s period 15,0 I 6 
projects were funded through the programme (Harvey 2003; McCall and O'Dowd 
2008). Implicit in the programme design and delivery is the contention that the peace 
process can be strengthened through social and econom ic development, and that cross -
communi ty relationships can be fos tered through social inclusion and economic 
prosperity. Peace I emphasised promoting the development of local partnerships, whi ch 
were claimed to be important for drawing attention to both urban and rural deprivation. 
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Such partnerships are regarded as essential for working with otherwise excluded groups 
and bringing antagonistic groups together to discuss, deliberate and decide on salient 
and often contentious issues (Harvey 2003). For instance, with financial ass istance from 
Peace 1 the Belfast Interface Project was established in 1995 to support local 
communities living at interface areas.79 While the Peace Programme has been criticised, 
most notably for its paucity in developing the central concepts of peace and 
reconciliation,80 a review report concluded 'the Programme created a climate for cross-
community projects to be normal, rather than exceptional' (Harvey 2003: 25). 
Peace II ran from 2000-2006, including a two-year extension to the Programme 
known as Peace II Extension. Peace II had a total financial allocation of €995 million 
and was the largest of the Peace Programmes in terms of funding. The Programme had 
five priority areas, including economic renewal ; social integration and reconciliation; 
locally based regeneration and development strategies; an outward and forward-looking 
region (including, for instance, the promotion of tourism); and cross-border cooperation. 
Funding directed through the CRC from Peace lI Extension provided grant aid for 62 
projects across Northern Ireland. These included support for shared neighbourhood 
initiatives and programs to promote shared and safe environments.81 Peace III, which is 
scheduled to run from 2007 to 2013, is intended to be the last of the ElJ Peace 
Programmes. 82 Peace III carries forward some of the key._aspects of the previous 
Programmes with a particular emphasis on reconciliation and sharing, particularly 
79 For further information see <http: //www.belfastinterfaceproject.org>. 
80 See for instance Harvey 1997. 
81 For more information about Peace II Extension funded projects see CRC website at 
<http ://www.community-relations.org.uk/>. 
82 After the recent opening of the Peace Bridge in Derry/Londonderry European Commissioner Johannes 
Hahn commented that "he would do everything to make sure that the money will be available in the 
future" raising speculations as to whether the EU Peace Programme would be extended. See ' EU Peace 
money ' possible' says European Commissioner' , 26 June 2011 , Belfast Telegraph, accessed 27 June 20 11 
at <http ://www.bbc.co .uk/news/uk-northem-ireland-1 39 194 16>. 
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through the promotion of shared spaces. The Programme is divided into two main 
priority areas: reconcil ing communities and contributing to a shared society. It is 
anticipated that Peace III will provide total funding of €33 3 million (€225 million from 
the EU with further national contributions of€108 million)83. 
Echoing A Shared Future, Peace III places consi derable emphasis on promoting a 
'shared society'. To date, a number of initiatives have been launched with the aim of 
promoting 'sharing' across divide. One of the most publicised of such initiatives was 
the launch of the Derry peace bridge. The symboli sm attached to such a structure is 
stark, since its purpose is to ' connect' the predominantly Catholic city side to the 
predominantly Protestant Waterside. The bridge was funded by the EU Peace Ill 
Programme under its shared space initiative which aims to increase cross-community 
engagement through developing shared public space.84 Speaking to a large crowed at 
the opening of the bridge, which was attended by the First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister, EU Commissioner fo r Regional Policy, Johannes Hahn said, ' I believe that the 
peace bridge will encourage greater levels of cross-community integration and usher in 
a new period of peace and reconciliation fo r the city. ' 85 
Summary of funding for community relations work 
It is clear that Northern Ireland has received considerable funding fo r peace-
building activities. Research conducted by Nolan (20 12) finds that since 1987, Northern 
Ireland and the six border counties of the Republic have received a total of almost £2.5 
billion w ith an average of almost £ 100 million a year fo r a wide range of peace-building 
83 According to the Special EU Programmes Body website <www.seupb.org>. 
" The concept of 'shared space' is di ffi cult to define and it has only recently been developed, most 
notably with regards to the EU Peace III Programme' s Shared Space Initi ative. Goldie and Ruddy (201 1: 
30) suggest that whi le the language of shared space is found to be difficult, it is commonl y used by 
practitioners and policy-makers and amounts to a workable descri ption of what is safe, common, civic 
space for all. 
85 See 'Derry's new peace bridge official ly opens on Saturday ' , 25 June 20 1 l , BBC News Northern 
Ireland, accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northem-ireland-foyle-west-l 39 l 4 708>. 
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activities. This is a significant amount by any standard. Indeed, as Nolan (2012: 172) 
states, 'Nowhere in the world has enjoyed such largesse in relation to population size.' 
Table 4.5 shows the main donors and their financial contribution for peace-building 
activities since 1987. 
Table 4.5. Donors and contributions to peace-building in Northern Ireland 
Programme Total Annual Duration Cross-
(£m) average community 
(£m) contact work 
EU Peace Programmes 1,455.5 76.6 1995-2013 Yes 
International Fund for 628.0 27 .3 1987-2012 Yes 
Ireland 
CCRU/CRU/OFMDFM 134.0 5.6 1987-2011 Yes 
Department of Education 66.0 2.9 1987-2012 Yes 
Northern Ireland 
OFMDFM Victims 70.0 5.0 1998-2011 No 
Irish Government 20.0 1.0 1987-2010 Yes 
Atlantic Philanthropies 90.0 4.5 1990-2010 Yes 
Total 2,463.5 94.75 1987-2013 
Note: This summary table does not include data for other government departments that have 
contributed funds towards peace and reconciliation work, including the Department of Social 
Development which funds the NIHE. These figures were not included in the original table. 
Information was not available on funding amounts for all donors dating back to 1987. 
Source: Adapted from Nolan (2012). 
Through its Peace Programmes for Northern Ireland the EU is by far the largest 
donor with a total contribution of almost£ 1.5 million since 1995 and an annual average 
of over £76 million. The IFI stands out as the second largest donor with a total of £628 
million contributed to peaceabuilding in Northern Ireland and the border counties. 
Significantly, all of the major donors have supported projects that can be 
classified as cross-community contact work (as defined in the typology in Table 4.1). 
That is, work that aims to increase contact between members of the Catholic and 
Protestant communities with the aim of reducing prejudice and fostering the emergence 
of a more inclusive and shared society. Given the unprecedented amount of funding that 
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has gone into such initiatives, it is not surprising that a large body of literature, 
including government and external evaluations, academic publications and reports from 
statutory and non-statutory bodies, has been produced in connection with development 
of community relations work. In the section below, I provide a review of key 
contributions to the literature, focusing on work which has addressed the question of the 
impact of community relations work on attitudes within and between the two main 
communities. 
Assessing the impact of community re lations initiatives 
A growing body of literature has been developed which has investigated 
community relations policy and community relations work and its impact on a range of 
key indicators. This section wi ll not present a comprehensive or definitive review of this 
literature as this has already been documented in some recent and significant 
contributions (see Gallagher 1995; Knox and Hughes 1996; Hughes and Knox 1997; 
Kelly 2006, 20 I 2). Rather, the purpose here is to draw attention to literature generated 
on cross-community contact work, and in particular, to focus specifically on the 
research methods that have been employed to assess the effectiveness of cross-
community contact work. More in-depth reviews of research conducted on specific 
types of contact in the areas of housing, education and social networks will be di scussed 
separately in the empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
Research into the nature and impact of cross-community contact and segregation 
can be distinguished between that which employs qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies . Recent qualitative research has utili sed focus groups and semi -
structured interviews to draw out the nature of the contact experience, whether it was 
positive or negative, and how the experience affected participants. Such research has 
involved participants living in mixed or segregated areas (Byrne et al. 2006; Cairns et 
al. 2007; Cairns et al. 2008), interviews with past pupils of integrated school s (McG lynn 
2003), small-scale surveys of university and college-level students (Craig and Cairns 
1999; Bloomer and Weinreich 2003 ; Niens et al. 2003), and interviews with teachers at 
integrated schools (Donnelly 2004a, 2004b). 
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In assessing the overall effectiveness of intergroup contact in cross-community 
schemes, much of this research remains inconclusive. For example, in assessing the 
impact of community relations projects on young people's tolerance of the other 
community, Bloomer and Weinreich (2003 : 159) conclude that the projects studied had 
only partially achieved their intended outcome. Craig and Cairns (1999) found that 
while intergroup contact within the university setting did lead to a reduction in 
prejudicial attitudes, this was largely dependent upon the contact situation being 
perceived as equal by both groups. McGlynn's (2003) study of past pupils at integrated 
schools found overwhelming support for the proposition that intergroup contact in such 
a setting leads to more favourable out-group attitudes. The study cautioned, however, 
that teachers needed to be fully trained to deal with community relations issues 'lest 
good intentions are sabotaged by a limited understanding and poor delivery of 
multicultural education' (McGlynn 2003: 22). 
While qualitative research has focused on the processes involved in and 
experience of cross-community contact, quantitative research has employed a range of 
indicators from the NISA and NILT surveys to monitor that state of community 
relations in Northern Ireland and to assess the impact of cross-community contact work. 
For example, two key indicators are commonly used to measure perceptions of the state 
of community relations (Fullerton 2004; Devine et al. 2011 ). _Jhese indicators relate to 
people's perceptions of relations between the two main communities over the past five 
years, and their perceptions about what relations will be for the future five years. 
Studies utilizing these indicators have found that in general there has been an upward 
trend in positive perceptions of relations between Protestants and Catholics (Devine et 
al. 2011).86 
With regards to cross-community contact, researchers have used indicators that 
measure levels of mixing between communities within the education sector (see 
Schubotz and Robinson 2006; Hayes et al. 2007; Hayes and McAllister 2009a), the 
86 There have been two notable exceptions to this upward trend during times of particular tension between 
the two main communities. These have included 1996-a year of particular tension surrounding parades 
during marching season; and 2001-2002 during the Holy Cross Girls ' School dispute. 
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housing sector (see Hewstone et a l. 2008); and the workplace (see Dickson et al. 2003). 
Other indicators include the number of out-group friendships individuals report to have 
(Schubotz and McCartan 2009) increases in mixed marriages (Lloyd and Robinson 
2008, 20 11 ), attitudes towards greater societal integration (see Hughes and Donnelly 
200 1; Ful lerton 2004); and perceptions of relative group status and trust between the 
two main communities (see Mac Ginty and du Toit 2007). Overall, thi s research points 
to a correlation between increases in mixing between the two main communities, 
especial ly within these traditionally segregated sectors, and more favourable attitudes 
towards out-group members. This is seen to be indicative of improvements in 
community relations. Moreover, these results suggest that policies targeted at promoting 
cross-community contact are producing beneficial results. 
Less attenti on has been paid to the relationship between the intergroup contact 
experienced by individuals as part of community relati ons initi atives and any changes in 
the individual social identity. In particul ar, little attention has been given to whether 
traditionally divisive national identities are becoming less sa lient among particular 
cohorts. Using the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2, one way of improving 
community relations may be to provide opportunities for groups and individuals to 
embrace new fo rms of identity. Opportunities for a restructuring of identity may be 
present in environments where members of different communities willingly come in to 
contact, on a regular basis, in a supporti ve setting. 
A number of areas within Northern Irish society have been targeted to create such 
an environment. For example, integrated school s provide the opportun ity fo r students 
from the two main communities to be educated together in an institutional setting, 
sharing classrooms and activities over a susta ined period of time. Mi xed-housing 
schemes provide opportun ities for individuals and fami lies to share services and 
facilities as well as find common interest in maintaining a healthy and safe 
environment. Shared shopping and leisure fac iliti es may increase the likelihood of 
friendships and relationships developing between indi vidua ls from di fferent 
backgrounds, potentia lly leading to more mixed social networks and marri ages. 
In the empirical chapters that fo llow, I examine in deta il the specific community 
relations policies that have been developed since the mid- l 980s in order to target the 
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separation of communities in the education sector, the housing sector and among social 
networks, areas that have been traditionally marred by high levels of segregation. In the 
preamble to the empirical chapters, I demonstrate the measures that this study will 
utilize in examining the relationship between the contact approach within community 
relations policy and national identity preferences of self-identified Catholics and 
Protestants. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the development of the cross-community contact approach 
under the broader theme of community relations policy beginning with the 
establishment of the CCRU in 1987. Since this time, a wide range of programmes, 
projects and initiatives (funded through a variety of government schemes and through 
external grant aid) have sought to bring members of the Catholic and Protestant 
communities together. The long term aim of this approach is to promote a culture of 
sharing where traditional group stereotypes are disconfirmed and where people are seen 
as individuals possessing common interests, rather than as representatives of 
traditionally antagonistic communities. 
Major political and institutional shifts have occurred within Northern Ireland 
since 1999 and have influenced the formulation of community relations policy. 
Significant advances to formulating a strategic plan to tackling segregation were made 
with the British government' s A Shared Future policy. The need for a whole-of-
government approach to promoting 'sharing over separation' came in response to the 
Review of Community Relations Policy (Harbison 2002) that found that segregation had 
in fact worsened over the period under review. Added to this was the finding that 
community relations policy had been inadequately monitored and evaluated, suggesting 
that some projects carried out during this period may have been ineffectual in improving 
commun_ity relations. The language of 'cross-community contact ' was largely absent 
from the document and replaced instead with 'sharing'. However, I argued that many of 
the objectives set forth in A Shared Future, including for instance the promotion of 
shared neighbourhoods, shared schools and shared spaces are all based on the 
fundamental assumption of contact theory-that increasing intergroup contact will 
reduce prejudice and increase positive perceptions between communities. 
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Indeed, I showed that since the early 1980s an unprecedented £2.5 bi lli on has 
been spent on peace-building act ivities in Northern Ireland and the six border counties 
and I demonstrated that cross-community contact work has been a central feature of all 
the main funding bodies' strategy for reducing conflict in Northern Ireland. 
With the reinstatement of the Northern Ireland Executive in 2007, a new draft 
programme for community relations is now under review. Once again the political 
climate has significantly changed with the more traditional parties now holding office 
together in the executive. The Cohesion, Sharing and Integration document reveals 
some significant conceptual shifts with regards to issues of concern within Northern 
Irish society. Here, there is much less talk of sharing and a greater emphasis on equality 
and respect for cultural divers ity. Whil e more than half of the allocated budget for the 
OFMDFM continues to be spent on support for equali ty, human rights and community 
relations it is, at this stage, unclear just what the Executive wi ll prioritise when 
allocating funding for its new community relations policy. 
1n the chapters to follow, I examine in detail several social arenas which have 
been targeted as having the potential to improve community relations and which have 
been the focus of public pol icy aimed at doing just this. I demonstrate the strengths and 
weaknesses of promoting intergroup contact in these arenas and investigate whether 
there is evidence to suggest that these arenas provide environments in which more 
moderate and inclusive identities are being rea lised. 
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Chapter 5. Residential segregation, mixing and 
national identity 
The causes, consequences and nature of residential segregation in Northern 
Ireland have long been the focus ofa well-developed body of academic research. 87 With 
few notable exceptions (Harris 1972; Boal 1982; Buckley 1982), however, it is only 
recently that attention has turned towards an examination of mixed residential areas. 
Yet, as Shirlow and Murtagh (2006: 102) point out, ' mixed communities are empirically 
significant as their capacity to resist the inexorable rise of segregation over time and 
place and the preparedness of some, outwardly at least, to live at peace with one another 
is of importance.' 
Alongside this, mixed areas are also significant since they have the potential to 
provide the space in which positive cross-community contact can occur and less 
divisive forms of identification can be realised. Past studies have examined cross-
community contact within mixed areas and the effects that this contact has on a range of 
attitudes towards community relations (Murtagh and Carmichael 2005). They have also 
explored the relationship between living in a mixed area and __ the number of out-group 
friends a person has (Hewstone et al. 2008). 
This chapter, therefore, investigates the relationship between intergroup contact 
represented by living in a mixed residential area (that is an area in which members from 
both the Catholic and Protestant communities reside) and patterns of national identity. It 
asks whether there is any evidence to suggest that those who live in mixed areas are 
more likely to reject traditional group identities in favour of a more neutral position. As 
a result of cross-community contact within mixed areas, residents of these areas may be 
less likely to express competing national allegiances and more likely to identify as 
members of a Northern Irish community. I therefore consider the impact of li ving in 
87 See for example, Darby and Morris 1974; Darby 1976, 1996; Boal et al. 1976; Boal 1982, 1999; 
Doherty and Poole 1995 , 1997, 2000, 2002; Shirlow 200 I; Murtagh 2002; Shirl ow and Murtagh 2006. 
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segregated and mixed residential areas on the national identity preferences of Catholics 
and Protestants usi ng data from the NISA survey and the NILT survey. 
This is an important line of inquiry fo r several reasons. First, because competing 
national claims are expressed territorially. Second, because the spatial separation of 
communities has presented a major challenge for those who aspire to a 'shared' future 
for Northern Ireland. As a perceived obstacle to progress and peace, it is identified as 
field for reform. Since 1998, official government policy has sought to protect and 
promote mixed areas as a means of tack.ling the persistent separation of communities. 
Finally, it warrants investigation because, although high levels of residential segregation 
persist, some Catholics and Protestants have lived and continue to live in what are 
called ' mixed areas'-areas with a ' mix' of residents from both the Catholic and 
Protestant traditions. 
Accordingly, this chapter is structured into four sections. I begin by providing an 
account of the hi story of residential segregation in Northern Ireland, and argue that 
territoria li ty has helped to reinforce and legitimate competing national allegiances and 
expressions of identity. I show how the roots of present day segregation can be traced 
back to the seventeenth century when thousands of Protestant and Presbyterian settlers 
colonised the land in Ulster. I then demonstrate how the nature of residential 
segregation has remained an expression of conflicting national aspirations due to the 
way in which the claim ing of territory and the occupation of physical space has been, 
and continues to be, used to portray images of a 'people ' aligned with either the United 
Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland (Boal 1987; Poole and Doherty 1996; Shirl ow and 
Murtagh 2006). 
In the second section I provide an analysis of the way in which residential 
segregation has been conceptualised within the literature. I examine a number of 
measures that have been used in order to assess the extent of residential segregation 
within Northern Ireland . I then explore the policies that have been adopted to deal with 
residential segregation . I show that until I 998 official government policy was to manage 
and stabili se the high levels of residential segregation found primari ly within large 
urban areas. I argue that it was only after residential segregation was explicitly 
recognised within the 1998 Agreement that more attention has been given to measures 
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that might transform segregated areas into mixed areas. In section three I show that 
despite the lack of policy focus on promoting mixed residential areas, mixed 
communities have continued to exist and protection of these mixed communities has 
emerged as a policy priority due to their perceived symbolic and real potential in 
overcoming divisions within society. 
The history of residential segregation in Northern Ireland 
The spatial separation of competing groups within a defined territory is one of the 
most visible legacies of a divided society. Spatial separation, whether voluntary or 
forced, is identifiable by high levels of segregation 88 along communal lines in 
residential and urban areas. Within Northern Ireland, residential segregation between 
Catholic and Protestant communities is an enduring feature of the contemporary 
conflict, and in the context of communal division it has been identified as both a cause 
and a consequence of conflict (Darby I 976; Boal 1999). For example, Darby ( 1976) 
claims that it is a cause of conflict because separation breeds mistrust and inequality 
between groups; and as a consequence because fear, intimidation, and the need for 
security influence individual and group decisions about where to live. In a similar vein, 
Shirlow and Murtagh (2006: 20) argue that segregation engenders political separation 
and heightens distinctions between physically separated peoples, in effect contributing 
to poor social relations. 
Chapter I noted the importance of the Ulster Plantation in the formation of 
competing national identities. This was in large part due to the creation of spatial 
segregation between the English Protestant and Scottish Presbyterian settlers on the one 
hand and the native Irish (who were predominantly Catholic) on the other. Indeed, 
according to Darby (1976: 26), the period of the Ulster Plantation ' is an appropriate 
88 I use the terms 'separation' and 'segregation' interchangeably in this chapter. Unlike other forms of 
separation (such as separate-religion schools or separate communal social networks) in which the use of 
the term ' segregation ' implies that this has been imposed, the use of the term 'segregation' when referring 
to residential segregation is arguably appropriate given the high degree of community and family pressure 
(and indeed intimidation) to live in certain areas and not in others. 
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starting point for any consideration of residential segregation, because the arrival of the 
Planters es tabli shed demographic patterns which are essentially those dividing Northern 
Ireland 's communities today ' . 
Present demographic patterns of segregation have evolved through a number of 
stages. The first stage occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth century during which 
time the British monarchy set about 'planting' English and Scottish settlers in Ireland. 
The purpose of this was strategic and political. The aim was to gain control of the land 
of Ulster through co-option and re-distribution of land ownership from the Catholic 
Irish to the Protestant and Presbyterian settlers. This dramatically changed the 
demographic landscape of Ulster, which had been occupied and controlled previously 
by a predominantly Gael ic and Catholic population. 89 Within the estates, there was a 
segregation of Protestant settlers and Irish Catholics with the Irish occupying much of 
the poorer settlement on the upland fringes (Robinson 1982: 39-42). Moreover, the 
native Catholic population was forbidden to hold long leases on land or to buy land 
from Protestant landowners (Darby 1976).90 
Across the towns in Ulster, Irish settlement took place on the outskirts and beyond 
the gates, while inside the towns the population was almost exclusively made up of 
Plantation settlers (Barritt and Carter 1972: 53). The most symbolic structures of this 
separation were the city walls of Derry. Inside these walls lived the Protestant settlers, 
while the Catholic Irish migrants to the town settled outside the walls in an area sti ll 
known today as the Bogside. Early evidence of discrimination based on religion is 
found in the 1688 Declaration of the Citizens of Londonderry. Signatories to the 
Declaration resolved to ' stand on our guard, and defend the walls and not to admit of 
any Roman Catholic whatsoever to quarter amongst us ' (quoted in Darby and Morris 
1974: I). Thus, by the end of the seventeenth century the physical map of Ulster had 
89 This population was made up of Cathol ic and Gael ic lords, landowners and peasants. 
90 Whi le the articles of Planta ti on did not permit Briti sh free holders and leaseholders on Plantation estates 
to take on Irish under-tenants, research by Robinson ( 1982) has shown that many Catholic Irish were in 
fact retained on the estates but were delegated to separate townlands. 
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been re-drawn and the segregation of communities had begun. The more prosperous 
settlers occupied the larger town areas and the dispossessed Catholic Irish lived on the 
outskirts of the towns and in rural areas. 
The second major stage of demographic change occurred during the nineteenth 
century, with mass population movement to the market towns. This was driven by 
industrial expansion and rapid population growth. The mid-1800s witnessed large-scale 
internal migration from surrounding rural areas that brought about a significant increase 
in the proportion of Catholics living within market towns, most notably in Belfast and 
Derry/Londonderry. By 1911 it was recorded that 93,000 Catholics lived in Belfast-
representing 32 per cent of the total Catholic population in what was to become 
Northern Ireland (Douglas 1982: 111 ). 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century witnessed a deterioration of 
relationships between Protestants and Catholics. This was due to conflict over resources 
and job opportunities leading to bouts of inter-communal violence. Earlier patterns of 
segregation began to reappear but whereas earlier segregation had meant that 
Protestants lived within the town with Catholics on the outskirts, the residential 
segregation witnessed during the nineteenth century occurred within urban areas with 
the formation of Catholic and Protestant strongholds. Following a period of intense 
inter-communal riots in Belfast from I 855- 74, districts became increasingly 
homogenous and during periods of heightened tensions and violence, the 'wrong sort' 
would be intimidated out of their homes (Budge and O'Leary 1973: 91). These riots 
assumed a momentum of their own, and the residential and social separation of 
communities in tum fostered prejudices and hostilities, making further riots more likely. 
This had the effect of strengthening communal divisions as vulnerable minorities moved 
house to areas of greater security within their respective community clusters (Darby 
1976). 
The effect of violence on strengthening residential segregation has been 
documented in historical records. Official accounts of the existence of these riots and 
subsequent residential segregation within Belfast were recorded in 1857: 
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Since the commencement of the late riots the districts (in 
Belfast) have become exclusive, and by regular systematised 
movement on both sides, the few Catholic inhabitants of the Sandy 
Row district have been obliged to leave it, and the few Protestant 
inhabitants of the Pound district have also been obliged to leave the 
district (Report of Commission into Riots in Belfast, 1857, p.2 
quoted in Darby and Morris 1974: !). 
Thus, while increasing opportunities attracted many Catholics to the market town 
areas, Boal notes, 'at an early phase of Protestant-Roman Catholic contact in Belfast 
quite high levels of segregation were established (Boal 1982: 253). The next stage in the 
segregation of the two main communities occurred as a result of the creation of 
Northern Ireland following the Government of Ireland Act 1920. Pursuant to this Act, 
the six counties of North-East Ireland would remain within the United Kingdom 
creating the province of Northern Ireland. Under the Act the newly created territory 
would retain representation in Westminster. It would be governed by a devolved British 
unionist administration. To ensure a Protestant majority within the province, on ly six of 
the nine counties of Ulster were incorporated to form Northern Ireland. The new 
political unit guaranteed a strong Protestant unionist majority. 91 Entrenching the 
unequal re lationship between the minority Catholic population and the majority 
Protestant population further, the Local Government (Northern Ireland) Act 1922 
removed the proportional representation method for elections, altered the franchise by 
making property ownership as a qualification for the vote, and created new electoral 
spatial frameworks. This had the effect of excluding significant numbers of potential 
Catholic voters who did not own property. Moreover, the new spatial frameworks 
created opportunities for gerrymandering within the newly aligned electoral boundaries 
that deliberatel y favoured the Protestant majority. The realignment of electoral 
boundaries was facilitated by existing residential segregation in both urban and rural 
areas. In turn, the allocation of housing for the maintenance of political control in a 
9 1 According to Darby ( 1976) the religious breakdown within the six counties that made up Northern 
Ireland consisted of 820,000 Protestants and 430,000 Catholics. 
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particular area, rather than on the basis of social need, further increased residential 
segregation (Darby 1976; Douglas 1982). 
The rapid increase in inequalities between Protestants and Catholics (heightened 
by the escalating patterns of segregation) would become a catalyst for the contemporary 
conflict. Discrimination against Catholics in housing and employment, political 
underrepresentation, and the influence of the civil rights campaign in the United States 
led to the establishment in 1967 of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and 
the Civil Rights Campaign (1967- 1972). Civil rights demonstrations and mass protests 
rapidly escalated into violent conflict. 92 As a result of this, spatial segregation 
intensified even further (Purdie 1990). 
The final stage in the segregation of communities in present day Northern Ireland 
occurred during the early 1970s, during which large-scale population movement within 
the major urban areas occurred. This was fuelled by the intimidation of minority 
communities that lived in mixed religion neighbourhoods. This movement was most 
visible in Belfast. For example, Darby and Morris ( 1974) found that an estimated 
14,744 families in the Greater Belfast area changed residence between 1969- 197393 
leading Shirlow to observe that within a European context, population movement in 
Belfast was, until the recent Balkan conflicts, ' the most significant movement of people 
due to violence since the conclusion of World War II ' (Shirlow 2001: 70). 
92 Melaugh ( 1995) notes that many commentators and hi storians view 5 October 1968 as the beginning of 
the contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland. On this day, civi l rights demonstrators in the Waterside 
area of Derry/Londonderry clashed with the Royal Ulster Constabulary resulting in violence. Riots 
intensified after the Apprentice Boys march and in the predominantly Catholic Bogside area police 
clashed with members of the Catholic community leading to what is known colloquially as the Battle of 
the Bogside in 1969. 
93 The authors note that these figures are rough estimates and that it is impossible to estimate accurately 
the total number of families that were forced to leave their homes since 1969. Their fi gures only refer to 
those fam ilies who contacted either official or unofficial agencies for help (see Darby and Morri s 1974: 
Summary a) and b )). 
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Intimidation , fear and the need for security thus determined the social geography 
of much of Northern Ireland. As Doherty and Poole (1997: 532) explain, 'The basic 
cause of the segregation is violence in the form either of direct intimidation or, more 
often, of the fear of threat heightened by awareness of the mosaic of safe and unsafe 
areas. ' Within Belfast the erection of a peaceline between the Falls and Shankhill roads 
symbolised the reality in many parts of the city that Protestant and Catholic perceptions 
of fear and need for security had increased (Darby 1976). As Hughes et al. (2007: 46) 
observe, 'psychological barriers became reinforced by physical boundaries ' . For the 
majority of Catholics and Protestants living in urban areas, the violence deepened the 
sense of identification and commitment to each respective community as well as to the 
perception of the need for community-based protection (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006: 
78). 
Today one of the most definitive characteristics of the social geography within 
Northern Ireland, and particularly within Belfast and Derry/Londonderry, is 
territoriality. As Graham and Nash (2006: 262) argue, territoriality reflects the 
perceived importance of the control of space for the maintenance and legitimacy of 
identity, power and politics. Territoriality links identity with place at a variety of spatial 
levels from Northern Ireland as a whole, to particular local areas and streets . The 
marking of a wall with mural paintings and symbols within a particular area, for 
example, makes both the 'insider' and the 'outsider' aware of their surroundings and 
social standing in that place. 
The visible manifestations of territoriality portray the history of residential 
segregation in Northern Ireland. Within both Protestant and Catholic segregated are 
images depicting significant events from the period of the Ulster Plantation and beyond, 
signifying the importance of this period in history to communities' sense of identity. For 
example, the Sandy Row district (a segregated Protestant loyalist area of Belfast) is 
marked with flags flying from street lamps portraying images of Queen E li zabeth II, the 
Union Jack or King William of Orange. Kerbstones are also clearly marked with the 
colours of the Union Jack and during the marching season are given a fresh coat of 
paint. Within the Fountain Estate in Derry/Londonderry simi lar territoria l markings are 
clearly visible to outsiders, and from the vantage point of the city wal ls it is possible to 
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view a large mural, which states 'Londonderry West Bank Loyalists still under siege, 
No Surrender'. Similarly, segregated Catholic areas are identifiable by the use of the 
Gaelic language to mark street signs, with the colours of the Irish Tricolour painted on 
kerbstones and by mural paintings depicting important events or nationalist heroes of 
the conflict, including, for instance, hunger striker Bobby Sands and civil rights 
campaigner Bernadette Devlin. 94 
The sharp increase in residential segregation during the initial years of the conflict 
has had significant and lasting effects on the physical geography of many areas across 
Northern Ireland, and particularly within urban areas (Boal et al. 1976). One of the 
causes of the increase in residential segregation is what Boal (1996) calls 'the ratchet 
effect ' . The ratchet effect explains the increasing levels of segregation during times of 
violence that never reduce back to their pre-violence levels. Using data from four 
Northern Ireland surveys, Figure 5.1 highlights levels of residential segregation from 
the beginning of the civil rights movement in 1968 through to the post-conflict and 
power-sharing era of 2010. 
94 While the use of such symbols is widely documented in academic literature (see for example Jarman 
1997, 2005b; Sluka 1997), these are observations based on my own first-hand experience while 
conducting fieldwork in Northern Ireland in 2010. 
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Figure 5.1. Catholic and Protestant residential segregation over time (%), 
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The table reveals a relatively stab le trend in residential segregation for both 
Protestants and Catholics since 1968, with around two-thirds of Catholics and 
Protestants stating they live in an area dominated by their own community group. There 
is only a sl ight decline in levels of segregation for the 2009 and 20 IO survey years and a 
slight increase in levels of mixing of Catholics and Protestants within residential areas. 
On the whole, therefore, residentia l segregation remains persistent more than I 0 
years after the signing of the Agreement. However, wh ile the confl ict was officially 
brought to an end and a devolved power-sharing government install ed, episodic 
violence continues. Following the logic of the ratchet effect, outbursts of violence 
triggered by the Drumcree parade95 and the Holy Cross dispute96 has, as Shirlow and 
95 The Drumcree parade has been one of the most controversial Orange Order parades during marching 
season. The trad itional parade route begins at Drurncree church and foll ows along the mai nly nationali st 
Garvaghy Road in Portadown. As Darby explains serious confrontati ons have erupted between residents 
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Murtagh (2006: 8 I) argue, upheld the maintenance of boundaries between segregated 
spaces. The following section examines how residential segregation in Northern Ireland 
has been conceptualised and measured. 
Measuring residential segregation 
The nature of residential segregation has received considerable attention within 
the social science literature. 97 This literature has developed a series of indexes to 
measure the extent of segregation and to characterise levels of segregation over time. 
These have been developed and most widely applied to incidences of racial segregation 
in the United States (see for example, James and Taeuber I 985; Massey and Denton 
1989, 1993). As Douglas and Boal (1982: 11) point out, the complete segregation or 
complete integration of communities is not static phenomenon; rather, it is a process 
that varies over time and space and is influenced by larger processes within society. As 
such, integration and segregation are best thought ofas 'connected ends ofa continuum' 
(Douglas and Boal 1982: 5). 
Nevertheless, it is possible to observe empirically integration and segregation 
within society in the form of the degree of intergroup mixing by measuring to what 
extent members of different communities live in close proximity to one another. Before 
we continue let me first clarify how residential integration/segregation is being 
understood here. Smith ( I 998) suggests two ways of measuring the extent of residential 
on Garvaghy Road and marchers which have resulted in violent demonstrations and road blocks. ln 1996 
protesters forced a number of Catholic families from their homes by intimidation, an act which was not 
prevented by police (see Darby 1997: 103). 
96 The Holy Cross dispute, as it is often called, refers to a series of incidents invo lving residents of the 
Protestant Glenbryn area and pupils and their parents of the Catholic Holy Cross Primary School situated 
I 00 metres inside Glenbryn. Following an incident all eged ly involving a resident of the Catholic Ardoyne 
area driving in to a Protestant Glenbryn member who was hanging a Union Jack near the Holy Cross 
Girls school, a series of violent street protests erupted and Catholic school girls were impeded from 
attending schools without a police escort (see Leonard 2006; Never 2011). 
97 For an extensive review of the literature on residential segregation see Massey 2012 ; Charles 2003. 
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integrat ion within a divided society: measuring integration as a social condition and 
measuring integration as a demographic condition. Integration as a social condition 
reflects the degree of social mixing and cooperation between groups within a residential 
area. Understood in this sense, integration involves positive contact between groups, 
and is measured by the quality of contact (see also Hewstone et al. 2008). However, as 
Smith ( I 998) points out, the social view of integration presents problems of 
measurement. Un less a small-scale case study approach is utilised, it is difficult to 
measure and characterise the interactions of residents and thus the quality of the contact. 
Another way of measuring segregation/integration is by viewing it as a demographic 
condition (Smith I 998). This is defined in terms of the mixing of different groups 
within urban space. Demographic integration has largely been explored with the use of 
quantitative methods such as census and survey data research. 
Residential areas that are taken as integrated on the basis of demographic 
conditions are frequently referred to as 'mixed' and I will also employ this terminology. 
I do so for a number of reasons. First, this is the terminology most frequently used 
within the housing literature in Northern Ireland. Second, the main methodology 
employed in this research uses quantitative data in order to explore demographic trends 
and shifts within a population. Finally, I am concerned in the first instance with 
analysing demographic integration, rather than social integration. 
Several indicators have been used to measure the extent of segregation versus 
mixing in residential areas. One widely used measure is the dissimilarity index first 
proposed by Duncan and Duncan (1955) and later employed by Massey and Denton 
( 1989) and Massey (200 1) within the United States. The dissimilarity index, used in the 
context of residential segregation, measures the total difference of spread over spatial 
units between two population groups, with 1.0 being total segregation and O indicating 
complete integration (Murtagh 2011) . Using the di ssimilarity index, research in the 
United States (Massey and Denton 1992; Massey 2001) tracked the impact of the 
movement of black citizens into urban areas between 1900 and 1960. These studies 
found that black segregati on within urban areas rose to unprecedented heights when 
compared with other minority groups. For example, by 1960 the di ssimilarity index rose 
to between 0.60 and 0.80 in certain cities. 
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Figure 5.2. The extent of residential segregation across towns in Northern 
Ireland, 1971 
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The dissimilarity index has since been employed in Northern Ireland by Poole 
(1982) Poole and Doherty (1997) and later by Shuttleworth and Lloyd (2009). Figure 
5.2 shows the dissimilarity index of residential segregation in major Northern Ireland 
towns in 1971. ln Belfast, for example, the dissimilarity index was 0.76 meaning that to 
achieve residential integration of Protestants and Catholics, 76 per cent of either 
Protestants or Catholics would have had to relocate within the city. Segregation was 
also found to be very high in both Armagh (0.73) and Derry/Londonderry (0.64). 
Importantly, these three towns represent the largest towns within Northern Ireland 
accounting for three-quarters of the total population thereby underlining the significant 
presence of residential segregation at that time. 
Another common measure of segregation, often used in conjunction with the 
dissimilarity index is the isolation index P*. This is a measure of exposure that 
calculates the probability that that the next person someone comes into contact with 
within his or her area of residence will be of the same group (Catholic or Protestant) . 
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The higher the isolation index the greater the implied residenti al segregation (Doherty 
and Poole 1997). Using census data from 197 1, 198 1 and 1991 for the Belfast Urban 
Area, Doherty and Poole (1997) calculated dissimil arity indices and the isolation index 
P* fo r subunits within the Belfast Urban Area. They found that over the three census 
periods Catholic isolation in seven of the nine subunits had dramatically increased. For 
example in Lisburn the Catholic isolation index increased from 0.19 in 197 1 to 0.60 in 
1991. As such the likelihood of a Catholic having contact with someone from the 
Protestant community had substantially decreased over time. For Protestants, while the 
isolati on index had decreased over time in some subunits, they were still the most likely 
to experience hi gh levels of isolation. For example, in Belfast East the isolation index 
for Protestants rose from 0.92 in 1971 to 0.95 in 1991 (Doherty and Poole 1997) . 
Residential segregation is even more pronounced within lower socio-economic areas . 
For example, approximately 90 per cent of public sector housing in Northern Ireland is 
segregated (Shuttleworth and Lloyd 2007, 2009b). 
Using data from the 200 I census, Shuttleworth and Lloyd (2009b) calculated the 
extent of residential segregation based on religious background across NIHE estates 
(shown in Figure 5.3). The dissimilarity index for the major towns of Belfast, 
Derry/Londonderry, Armagh and mid Ulster reveal slightly higher levels of segregation 
to those found in Poole's (1982) analys is. These high levels of segregati on can, in part, 
be explained by the high levels of violence experienced in these areas during the 
conflict and a history of territoriality shaped by sectarianism (Shuttleworth and Lloyd 
2009b ). For example, an analysis of the period 1969-1993 found that 54.5 per cent of 
fata l incidents related to the con flict took place within Bel fast (Doherty and Poole 
1997) . For thi s reason Bel fast has been described as the urban encapsulation of a 
national conflict (see Boal et al. 1976; Boal and Livingstone 1984; Doherty and Poole 
2000). Recent figures from the Belfast City Council confirm the extent of segregation. 
They show 'more than half of the city's population now lives in wards that are either 90 
per cent Protestant or 90 per cent Catholic community background ' (Belfast City 
Counci l 2007). 
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Figure 5.3. The extent of residential segregation across NIHE housing 
estates, Northern Ireland, 2001 
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Despite strong evidence indicating the persistent high levels of residential 
segregation, particular within housing estates, a recent study suggests that the rate of 
increases in segregation in Northern Ireland may be slowing down. Employing the 
dissimilarity index, Shuttleworth and Lloyd (2009b) analyse levels of segregation in 
three census years: 1971, I 991 and 200 l. Their study finds that while segregation 
increased for Northern Ireland as a whole between I 971 (0.56) and 200 I (0.67), it had 
increased only slightly between 1991 (0.66) to 200 I (0.67). This suggests that the rate 
of segregation slowed during the 1990s. 
Whi le the authors do not elaborate on possible explanations for the slowing trend 
m segregation, Doherty and Poole (1997) suggest that the main factor in heightened 
segregation patterns is the level of violence. Using a similar research methodology, they 
find that segregation increased between 1971 and 1991 and argue that the substantial 
rises in segregation during the 1970s can be attributed to the particularly high levels of 
violence extant in the early years of that decade (Doherty and Poole 1997: 533). 
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Significantly, it was not until 1998 that tackling residential segregation was made 
a policy priority within government. Before this time, public policy in housing sought to 
manage the movement of peop le through a 'colour blind ' strategy based not on ly on 
need but also on preference. Thus segregation in housing has been the accepted norm 
throughout the confl ict. It is probab ly the case therefore that the slowing trend in 
increased segregation between the census periods 1991 to 200 l was due to decreases in 
the levels of violence, rather than attempts made by government to reduce residentia l 
segregation. 
In the section below I examine the central bod ies responsible for managing 
housing in Northern Ireland. I demonstrate that it is only relatively recently that tackling 
residential segregation has been identified as a policy priority. The section charts the 
evolution of housing policy and uncovers a policy shift in the way in which residential 
segregation is dealt with. 
Government and community responses to residential segregation 
The Northern Ireland Housing Executive 
Since the beginn ing of the contemporary conflict, planning, management and 
creation of policy for public sector housing in Northern Ireland has been overseen by 
the NIHE. The creation of the NIHE came in the wake of call s for reforms in the 
allocation of housing as part of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland. In 1971 
in response to the political turmoi l and the continuing breakdown of relations between 
communities, urban and housing policy were removed from local authority control and 
powers transferred to the newly established NIHE and Department of Environment for 
Northern Ireland. The NIHE therefore took over responsibility for the allocation of 
social housing. Since most of the intimidation of individuals and families that took 
place within the first years of the contemporary conflict occurred in the public housing 
sector, the NIHE was most directly involved and affected by the issue (Darby and 
Morris 1974). 
During the conflict, the NIHE provided emergency accommodation and longer-
tenn re location for individuals and fami lies forced out of their homes by sectarian 
vio lence. Through the NIHE's Emergency Housing Service, allocation of housing was 
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based on need and preference. For example, a NIHE hand out advised applicants 'to list 
in order of choice the areas within or outside the greater Belfast area in which they 
would like to be rehoused' ( quoted in Darby and Morris 1974: 103). As Murtagh (1998) 
and Byrne et al. (2006) point out, the nature of the conflict meant that NIHE tenants 
chose to relocate to areas dominated by people of their own religious background. 
A fundamental concern of the NIHE throughout the conflict has been the de-
politicisation of policy by removing any trace of sectarian inference from practices and 
procedures (Murtagh 1998). However, this action has had the effect of removing any 
reference to the problem of sectarianism and, according to Murtagh (1998) and Shirlow 
and Murtagh (2006) resulted in 'colour blind' policy and a benign acceptance of the 
existing patterns of residential segregation across Northern Ireland. Indeed, the 
influence that residential segregation and division has had on the organisational culture 
of the NIHE is highlighted in the following passage taken from a recent report by the 
NIHE: 
In the Housing Executive the organisational culture is 
affected by being part of what is known as an 'Ethnic Frontier'-a 
society made up of two different traditions opposed to one another 
through political antagonism ... Throughout the years of conflict in 
Northern Ireland there was a tendency for organisations to adapt to 
the divided society and serve both communities separately. 98 
Throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s the NIHE continued its focus on 
allocating social housing based on need and preference. This has had the effect of 
maintaining the earlier trend of high levels of segregation within public sector housing 
due to tenants ' preference to live within their own community. 
98 Quoted on BRIC website at <http://www.rdc.org.uk/multi/default.asp?itemid=52>. 
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The development of 'shared ' housing policy 
Since 1998 the NIHE has increasingly come under pressure, through the renewed 
focus on sharing over separation, to move away from maintaining and managing the 
status quo within public sector housing. This new focus on mixed religion housing was 
first outlined in the 1998 Agreement in which it is identified as a priority area for 
improving community relations: 
An essential aspect of the reconciliation process is the 
promotion of a culture of tolerance at every level of society and 
includes initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated educati on 
and mixed housing (NIO 1998 Strand 2, Article 13). 
More recently, concern over the high levels of residential segregation has been 
expressed in A Shared Future (OFMDFM 2005), which highlights the importance of 
developing and supporting mixed housing. This emphasis on promoting mixed housing 
was influenced by a report (Deloitte 2008) commissioned under direct rule in 2002 (but 
not published until 2008). This report estimated that the costs associated with 
segregated living could be up to $1.5 billion annually. This, it was argued, was in part 
due to the duplication, and sometimes multiplication of service delivery for segregated 
communities (Deloitte 2008). 
A Shared Future and the fo llow-up Triennial Action Plan vested responsibility for 
tackling the negative consequences of residential segregation and promoting current and 
future mixed housing areas to the NIHE and the Department for Social Development. 
Subsequently, tackling residential segregation through the promotion of mixed housing 
schemes has become a priority area within the NIHE's good relations policy (NIHE 
2007). In line with this, the NIHE have committed to promote 'sharing ' by developing 
mixed religion housing schemes. The types of projects carried out by the NIHE and 
affiliated organizations which aim to increase the shared nature of residential areas 
across Northern Ireland are outlined below in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. Shared housing projects 
Project 
Social new-
build/shared 
future housing 
Shared 
neighbourhood 
programme 
Building 
Relationships in 
Communities 
(BRIC) 
Start Description/ objective 
date 
2006 Locates and designates 
sites for new build 
mixed social housing 
areas 
Works with existing 
2008 mixed communities in 
social housing areas to 
secure and protect the 
'shared' nature of the 
area 
2010 Build good relations 
capacity of NIHE; 
financial assistance to 
local community groups 
focus on increasing 
inclusiveness 
Source NIHE n.d. (b) 
Supporting Cross-
organizations community 
contact work 
NIHE and local Yes 
housing 
associations 
NIHE, IFI , EU Yes 
Peace 
Programme 
Yes 
With reference to the typology developed in chapter 4, most of the community 
relations work carried out by the NIHE and affiliated organizations can be classified as 
promoting cross-community contact. For example, the social new-build programme is 
designed to locate sites for social housing which can be turned into areas known as 
mixed social housing areas. The NIHE has used the 70:30 threshold in their frameworks 
for promoting the shared future housing scheme. For example, the NIHE mixed 
community social housing scheme, which was launched on Carran Crescent in County 
Fermanagh in 2006, signed up to a charter for the community in which no more than 70 
per cent of any one religion is permitted (NIHE n.d.(b)). 
Ar:other means through which cross-community contact is promoted is through 
the shared neighbourhood programme, launched in 2008, and funded by the IFI. To 
date, the IFI has provided £870,000 in funding for the programme (Deloitte 2010) . The 
programme works with existing mixed communities in social housing areas to secure 
and protect the 'shared' nature of the area and provides grants to community 
organizations to encourage the concept of sharing among all people who live in the area. 
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These com muniti es are also supported by what are call ed 'cohesion advisers' employed 
by the Community Cohesion Unit. The advisers appear to have a broad remit which 
includes an act ive role in establishing networks between residents in shared 
communities, ensuring the stability of such communities through the development of 
coordinated intervention response to potential confl ict incidents and to actively promote 
the concept of shared housing in other estates (Wallace Consulting 201 1). According to 
the NII-IE, 30 social housing estates across 25 of the 26 council areas, representi ng 
25,000 households and 70,000 people, are now acti vely involved in the shared 
neighbourhood programme.99 
More recently, the NII-IE (in partnership with the Rural Development Council, 
and with assistance from the EU Peace III Programme) has designed an initiative called 
Building Relationships in Communities (BRIC). BRIC is claimed to 'encourage greater 
levels of social integration within Northern Ireland 's housing sector' and to ' promote 
sharing within the currently highly segregated social housing market' .100 According to 
the BRIC website, funding for the scheme from the EU Peace III Programme has 
amounted to £3.5 million to date. 10 1 
While promoting cross-community contact through the development of mixed 
housing appears to be central to housing policy, it is unclear just how effective these 
initiatives have been, and what constitutes the long term goal fo r tackling residential 
segregation. 102 Indeed, as Shirlow and Murtagh (2006) have commented, the housing 
99 See <http://www. nihe.gov. uk/index/community/community _cohesion/shared_ future_ housing. htm>. 
100 See <http ://www.nihe .gov. uk/index/community/community _ cohes ion/bric. htm>. 
101 See BRJC at <http://www.rdc.org. uk/multi/default.asp?itemid=52>. 
102 To date, there have been only two eval uations carried out on NIHE shared housing initiatives. The first 
was conducted by the NIHE research unit using a smal l-scale questionnaire of residents in a NIHE funded 
shared future housing area in Enniskillen. The overa ll conclusion reached was that the majority residents 
invo lved in the scheme felt positive about shared future housing and wished to continue li ving in the area 
(NIHE 2009). However, only 15 respondents completed the questionnaire and thus the small-scale nature 
of the survey significantly compromises any attempts to generalize the results. 
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policy landscape appears to be characterised by a series of disjointed initiatives and 
small-scale projects making it difficult to see a long term unified goal for mixed 
housing. It also makes it difficult to assess the effects of such efforts in mixed 
communities and it is unclear how successful such programmes have been. 
While information regarding the aims and principles of NIHE programmes are 
readily accessible, other important information is lacking. For instance, it would be 
beneficial to know whether programmes have met with resistance from members of the 
community, whether and what types of issues have arisen in implementing the 
programmes within particular areas, and what the responses are from residents involved 
in the programmes with regards to the importance and centrality of an ethos of 'sharing' 
within the communities. 
It is clear that housing policy has come a long way from adapting to divisions 
within society to being central to the government's community relations agenda. 
Several initiatives are now underway to encourage greater levels of mixing in 
residential areas. Yet, the relatively recent appearance of these initiatives as part of a 
community relations agenda makes it difficult to assess their effectiveness. Despite 
limited official government policy supporting and promoting mixed communities, a 
degree of residential mixing has always existed. For example, in their 1974 study of 
intimidation in housing across Northern Ireland, Darby and Morris (1974: 69) found 
evidence of religiously mixed areas in towns outside of Belfast that were just as 
The second was an external evaluation of the shared neighbourhood programme conducted by Wallace 
Consulting (2011). The evaluation was conducted through focus groups and survey questionnaires with 
residents involved in the shared neighbourhood programme. The evaluation was generally positive in 
favour of the Shared Neighbourhood Programme finding that the majority of residents surveyed 
suggested that the Shared Neighbourhood Programme had been beneficial in fostering relations between 
members of the different communities. 
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demographica ll y stab le as some segregated areas. 103 However, it is only recently that 
research has begun to focus on the nature of these mixed communi ties. The section 
below deta ils recent research into mixed housing in Northern Ireland and explores the 
socio-economic profiles of mixed areas through the use of survey data. 
The nature of residential mixing 
Using integration as a demographic condition, it is possibl e to identi fy a number 
of studies in Northern Ireland that have sought to assess the extent and nature of 
residential mixing. For exampl e, Murtagh and Carmichael (2005) conduct an analys is of 
the 200 I census data on the number of mixed areas across Northern Ireland defining a 
mixed area of consisting of a minimum of 30 per cent of households from the relevant 
minority community. Using thi s 70:30 threshold, their analysis reveals that of all 582 
wards in Northern Ireland, 41 per cent were Protestant segregated, 27 per cent were 
Catholic segregated and 33 per cent were mixed. 
Other research fi nds that most mixed housing is largely confined to middle class 
areas (Boal 1982) and that residential integration is mostly seen at the hi gher end of the 
housing market (Murtagh 2000). Moreover, outside of the main urban areas and within 
small er towns, research has found greater levels of community mixing (Harris 1972; 
Poole 1982; Poole and Doherty 1996). Indeed, Poole and Doherty (1996: 77) found 
' considerable spatial diversity in the incidence of segregation and mixing ' between 
Belfast and the rest of Northern Ireland. This disparity between urban and rural areas 
was reflected in Harris' (1972) study, which reported a strong sense of common 
community in rural areas. 
Using data from the 20 IO NIL T survey comparison of the extent of segregation 
and mi xing in urban and rural areas was conducted and results are displayed in Table 
5 .2. The data reveal that within city areas there is more reported residentia l segregation 
103 The study defined mixed areas as consisting of a mix of approx imately 50/50 Catholics/Protestants 
(Darby and Morris 1974). 
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than mixing, although these differences are relatively small. Within rural areas there is 
only a slight increase in the rate of mixing as compared to residential segregation. 
Table 5.2. Segregated and mixed areas by level of urban density by 
religion(%), 2010 
Protestants Catholics 
Segregated Mixed All Segregated Mixed All 
City 30 25 28 30 21* 27 
Town 36 38 37 38 42 39 
Rural 34 36 35 32 37 34 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (333) (187) (520) (250) (155) (405) 
* Significantly different from segregated at the p<.05 level. 
Source: NIL T survey 2010. 
Despite the high levels of residential segregation in many urban areas, clusters of 
mixed areas are found within the main towns throughout Northern Ireland. ln addition, 
research has documented residentially mixed areas within some of Northern Ireland's 
main urban centres. One of the most documented mixed areas is within Belfast in the 
central area of Ballynafeigh located on the Onneau Road in South Belfast (see for 
example; Murtagh and Carmichael 2005; Murtagh 2011). The housing stock of the area 
consists of both public and private housing. According to Murtagh (2011) the 
Ballynafeigh area appears to be unique within Belfast in that, since the 1860s, it has 
been an area that has housed churches of all denominations. In recent years, its central 
location has attracted significant investment in waterside properties and the area has 
access to strong public transport connections. This contrasts markedly with highly 
segregated and marginalised areas in the west and north of the city. Moreover the close 
proximity of Ballynafeigh to the Queen' s University Belfast has attracted a younger 
student population to the area. 
A significant development in the area over the period from 1991 to 2001 has been 
the changing demography indicated by growth in the proportion of the Catholic 
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population. Murtagh and Carmichael (2005), for example, found that the Catholic 
population increased from 42 per cent to 50 per cent over this inter-censal period, while 
the Protestant population had declined from 30 per cent to 21 per cent. The proportion 
of private renting in the area had also increased to 22 per cent by 200 I. Studies of this 
subunit have highlighted the connection between economic development, social 
mobility and increasing private sector ownership in explaining these demographic 
changes. Murtagh and Cannichael (2005) suggest that these trends reflect the growth in 
investment properties, attracting young professionals who are disproportionately from a 
Catholic background. Estimates from the sample survey revealed that in 2005 Catholics 
represented 43 per cent of the population in the area, Protestants only 19 per cent and 
mixed religion households 19 per cent. When compared with the Northern Irish 
population as a whole, in which 12 per cent of households are of mixed religion, 
Ballynafeigh appears to be an attractive area for mixed households. Thus, Ballynafeigh 
classifies as a mixed area with less than 70 per cent of any one religion living in the 
area. 
The study also conducted a small-scale survey of residents in the area on their 
attitudes towards community relations as well as other salient political issues. Data from 
the survey suggested that residents of Ballynafeigh were more positive about 
community relations than is generally the case in the rest of Northern Ireland. However, 
Protestants were less likely to feel that community relations had improved over the last 
five years. This was, in part, explained by the perceived 'Catholici sation ' of 
Ballynafeigh as younger and more socially mobile Catholics moved in (Murtagh and 
Cann ichael 2005: 46). 
Significantly, less than half of both Catholics and Protestants living in 
Ballynafeigh identified with either of the two main political traditions (nationalist and 
unionist). Instead respondents were more likely to disagree with the statements 'I think 
of myself as a nationalist' and 'I think of myself as a unionist' (Murtagh and 
Cannichael 2005: 81) suggesting that political identity was less salient among this 
cohort than in other areas around Belfast. The study was not able to assess whether 
these more moderate attitudes were a result of living in a mixed area or a result of other 
socio-economic factors such as greater levels of education and socia l mobility. 
152 
A socio-economic profile of mixed residential areas 
As demonstrated earlier, there is some evidence to suggest that residential mixing 
is largely confined to the middle class (Sh irl ow and Murtagh 2006). In order to assess 
the plausibility of this claim I employ the NILT data to examine the relationship 
between residential location and a number of socio-economic indicators that are 
commonly used in social class assessment. Analysis of a number of important socio-
economic indicators reveals a relationship between higher socio-economic status and 
living in a mixed area. This is especially the case among Catholics. As Table 5.3 
reveals, middle class Catholics are more likely to live in a mixed area as they are 
significantly more likely to be employed in a non-manual occupation and hold a tertiary 
level qualification than their segregated counterparts. 
Table 5.3 Socio-economic characteristics by residential area, 1989-2010. 
Protestants Catholics 
Segregated Mixed Segregated 
--·-· 
Age (mean years) 51.4 52 46.4 
-
--
Employed(%) 47 49 43 
Gender(%) 57 54* 59 (female) 
Tertiary degree 11 13* 10 
Non manual (%) 52 56 42 
* Significantly different from segregated at the p<.05 level. 
** Significantly different from segregated at the p< .01 level. 
Source: NISAand NILT surveys pooled file, 1989-2010. 
Mixed 
47.7* 
55** 
58 
16** 
51 ** 
Pop 
49.2 
48 
57 
12 
51 
For Protestant respondents, however, the data does not reveal a striking di fference 
in the socio-economic profiles of those living in mixed neighbourhoods when compared 
to their segregated counterparts. Indeed, of the three socio-economic indicators, only 
tertiary level qualification is found to be of significance among this cohort. 
The significant differences in the socio-economic characteristics among Catholic 
respondents evident in Table 5.3 match a growing trend for the Catholic midd le class to 
be socially mobi le and to move into urban areas that were once primarily populated by 
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the Protestant middle class (Elliott 2002; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006) . Thi s rise in social 
mobility in which the Cathol ic community has seen improvements in education, fair 
emp loyment and increased public sector jobs has helped to create what Breen and 
Devine (1999: 56) have called ' a new Catholic middle-class '. Douglas (1997) argues 
that the Catholic middle class has evolved through new forms of labour market growth 
as well as a series of government initiatives including the establishment of a Fair 
Employment Commission, and anti-discrimination legi slation. A series of community 
relati ons policies aimed to increase cross-community contact and mutual understanding 
also seem to have played a role. As in the Ballynafeigh case, as discussed earlier, new 
investment and employment opportunities have attracted a disproportionately young 
Catholic population shifting the demographic mix of many urban areas. 
The Protestant middle class has also been affected by social mobility. Culturally, 
they have tended to distance themselves from the Orange Order and Masonic Lodges, 
which has enabled them to pursue their interests in civil society outside of the confines 
of their traditional communities (Elliott 2002; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). Thus, while 
traditional identities have not disappeared, they may have become less relevant for the 
middle class that has emerged in the last decade. Moreover, the new opportunities, 
lifestyles and interests that have emerged as a result of increased social mobility have 
influenced places of residence, work and entertainment (Murtagh 2008: 7). 
This is not to deny the ex istence of mixed areas among lower socio-economic 
groups. Indeed, residential mixing is also found within the social housing sector. 
Murtagh et al. (2006) examined the interesting case of mixed housing within the social 
housing sector on the Tonagh estate in Li sburn. According to a survey of the 368 
occupied dwellings on the estate (N=248) conducted by Murtagh et al. (2006), 37 per 
cent were Protestant households, 28 per cent were Catholi c households and mixed 
religion households made up 28 per cent. These figures suggest that Tonagh has more 
than twice the rate of mixed religion households compared wi th Northern Ireland as a 
whole. It is noteworthy that in Shuttleworth and Ll oyd' s (2009a) study of NII-IE 
housing estates, Lisburn scored 0.80 on the dissimilarity index suggesting that the 
highly mixed nature of the Tonagh estate was very unusual for the area. 
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This mixed area in Lisburn is significant for a number of reasons. First, it is 
located within a larger area that is predominantly Protestant. For instance, Old Warren 
and Lagan Valley (which are physically closest to Tonagh) have a majority Protestant 
population of 70 per cent and 83 per cent respectively (Murtagh et al. 2006). Second, 
the social conditions on the Tonagh estate reflect a population with an older age profile, 
higher rates of unemployment and income support than the rest of the region and 
Northern Ireland as a whole. Moreover, reports suggest that crime is a major local issue, 
and out of Northern Ireland's 582 wards, Tonagh ranks 57'h for recorded incidents of 
cnme. 
Despite the relative deprivation of the area, data collected by the survey suggest 
that community relations in Tonagh are relatively strong when compared to the rest of 
Northern Ireland (Murtagh et al. 2006: 31). Indeed, residents on the estate describe the 
area as 'mixed ' and expressed a desire to continue living as a mixed community 
(Murtagh et al. 2006: 25). Moreover, although Tonagh's crime rate is relatively high 
compared with the rest of Northern Ireland, experience of sectarianism was not 
identified as a significant problem among any of the community groups living on the 
estate (Murtagh et al. 2006: 25-34). Interviews with residents also high lighted the 
longevity of mixing and the strength of family ties as reasons for stabil ity within 
Tonagh. These positive community relations were strengthened by cross-community 
infrastructure on the estate, including an integrated primary school. Significantly, a high 
proportion of people on the estate chose to remain neutral when asked about the 
changing nature of community relations in Northern Ireland, and this was especially 
true of mixed households (61 per cent) (Murtagh et al. 2006: 32). This suggests that 
there may be a degree of detachment to broader community relations issues on the 
estate. 
Similar findings to those reported for Tonagh emerged from a comparative study 
of three mixed residential communities conducted by Byrne et al. (2006). Using both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques the study investigated perceptions and 
understandings of ' mixing' within Ballynafeigh in Belfast, the Areema social housing 
estate near Lisburn and the rural community of Rathfriland in County Down. A number 
of indicators were used to define a mixed community. These were that the area included 
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a mix of people from both Catholic and Protestant backgrounds; there were mixed 
relationsh ips; few sectarian incidents occurred; freedom of movement and freedom to 
express community culture; and a high degree of community participation and 'agents ' 
of integration including shared leisure faci lities, shops and community associations 
(Byrne et al. 2006: 123). Significantly, the study found no evidence to suggest that a 
person 's community background influenced their friendships networks. Rather, length 
of residency was the key indicator in relation to levels of interactions and the number of 
cross-community friendships developed (Byrne et al. 2006: 124). Due to the changing 
demographic nature of Ballynafeigh, as indicated by the study conducted by Murtagh 
and Carmichael (2005), this finding may have important implications for future 
community relations in the area as residents move in and out thus shortening the length 
of time and opportunity for neighbours to get to know one another. 
Mixed communities and national identity patterns 
Since the first paramilitary ceasefires in 1994 there has been strong economic 
growth, new patterns of consumption and an attempt to re-imagine city li fe in Belfast in 
an effort to present Northern Ireland as place beyond conflict. Even though this process 
has been ongoing for several years there have been few analyses of what reforms and 
social shifts have meant with regard to the transformation of interests and identities 
(Shirl ow and Murtagh 2006: I 02). Recent research by Hayes and McAllister (2009a) 
has found that those who endorse a Northern Irish identity are more likely than those 
who adopt a traditional Iri sh or British identity to favour living in a mixed 
neighbourhood. Us ing data from the 2006 NILT survey they fo und that 9 out of every 
10 Catholic adults who claimed a Northern Iri sh identity indicated that they would 
prefer to li ve in a religiously mi xed neighbourhood and 8 out of every 10 Protestants 
stated the same (Hayes and McAllister 2009a: 395). 
Fo llowing on from thi s research , I investigate whether those Catholics and 
Protestant who do live in mi xed neighbourhoods di ffer from their counterparts in 
segregated areas in relation to national identity preferences. Specifically, I ask whether 
individuals who li ve in a mixed area (and who therefore come into contact with 
neighbours fro m a different religious background) are more likel y to identi fy as 
Northern Irish identity than indi vidual s who live in a segregated area . 
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To consider this I use a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses to compare 
the national identity preferences of Catholics and Protestants who have experienced 
varying levels of intergroup contact in this particular social setting. 104 I also consider 
whether there is a long term relationship between experience of mixing in residential 
areas and national identity salience by examining two points in time within the bivariate 
analysis. I then consider two periods in time for the multivariate analysis and data 
results are aggregated into two time periods-before the implementation of the Belfast 
agreement and devolution to the Northern Ireland Assembly (1989 to 1998), and after 
devolution (1999 to 2010)-in order to consider whether the broader political climate 
had background effects on national identity patterns. 
As noted previously, while mixing is primarily found among the middle class it 
does also occur among those with a lower socio-economic status. In order to assess 
whether having experience of intergroup contact with neighbours is related to national 
identity independent of other important social indicators highlighted earlier in the 
chapter, a number of important control variables 105 are included in the regression. Table 
5.4 presents the breakdown of type of residential area by national identity among self-
identified Catholics and Protestants at two points in time (1995 and 2010). 
Beginning with Protestants, the data reveal that in 1995 there was no difference 
between respondents living in either a segregated or a mixed area in terms of the 
likelihood that they would identify as Northern Irish. Indeed, it is clear that respondents 
in both types of areas were less likely to identify as Northern Irish than with the Ulster 
identity. However, this pattern dramatically changed over the following 15 year period. 
In 2010, the incidence of Protestants within mixed areas identifying as Northern Irish 
had increased by a full 23 percentage points to 35 per cent and those respondents 
identifying as Ulster had substantially decreased, with only 1 per cent of respondents 
living in mixed areas opting for this identity. Moreover, preference for Northern Irish 
identity among respondents in mixed areas was found to be significantly different from 
104 The coding for these variables can be found in Appendix 3. 
105 These control variables are outlined in chapter 3. 
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those in segregated areas (by 12 percentage points) even though Protestants living in 
segregated areas showed increased preference fo r Northern Irish identity from 1995 . 
Turning to an analysis of national identity preferences among Catholic 
respondents, the data suggest a different pattern. For example, preference fo r Northern 
Irish identity among those in mixed areas was evident in 1995 with 27 per cent 
identifying as Northern Irish as opposed to 17 per cent among their segregated 
counterparts and this difference is statisticall y significant using a two-tailed I-test. 
However, unlike the Protestant respondents, the incidence of those identifying as 
Northern Irish did not increase dramatically over time. Indeed, the data reveal that in 
2010, preference for Northern Irish identity in mixed areas only increased by 2 
percentage points. Moreover, there was not as great a difference between the mixed and 
the segregated samples in terms of their preference for Northern Irish identity. And 
unlike Protestant respondents, Catholics living within mixed areas were significantly 
more likely to identify with the other main tradition (British) and significantly less 
likely to identi fy as Irish compared to those living in segregated areas. 
What appears at first glance to be a somewhat surprising fi nding is backed up by 
previous research. As discussed in chapter 2, perceived status di ffe renti al may have an 
effect on the outcome of a contact situation. The majority-minori ty thesis, developed by 
Tropp and Pettigrew (2005) contends that the impact of contact may vary significantly 
not only in terms of the contact situation but also in terms of the socia l status of the 
groups involved. What might appear as equal status encounter to majority group 
members may be perceived as a potentially threatening and unequal situati on to the 
minority. Accordingly, for minority status members it may be perceived as a safer 
option to adopt the majority view. As Catholics have historicall y formed the minority 
group within Northern Ireland, one plausible explanation for the increase in Bri ti sh 
identity among Catholics living in mixed areas when compared to their segregated 
counterparts is that they perceive of themselves as being in the minority and therefore 
may feel pressure to confonn to the majority view within their area of residence. 
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Table 5.4. National identity by residential area and religious denomination(%), 1995 and 2010 
Protestants I Catholics 1995 2010 1995 2010 
Segregated Mixed All Segregated Mixed All Segregated Mixed All Segregated Mixed All 
British 69 64 68 65 59 63 6 23** 12 4 13** 8 
Ulster 13 17 14 9 1 ** 6 2 1 2 0 2 
Northern 12 12 12 22 35** 27 17 27** 20 22 29 25 
Irish 4 6 4 3 3 3 74 47** 65 68 48** 60 
Other 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 8 6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (478) (179) (657) (306) (160) (466) (349) (167) (516) (250) (155) (405) 
(Chi square 4.959, 4 df, p>.05) (Chi square 16.941, 4 df, p<.01) 1 (Chi square 49.173, 4 df, p<.01) (Chi square 23.596, 4 df, p<.01) 
* Significantly different from segregated at the p<.05 level. ** Significantly qifferent from segregated at the p<.01 level. 
Source: NILT survey 1995, 2010. 
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To test whether these findin gs are robust against important socio-economic 
variables, I employ multi variate logistic regression model s as shown in Table 5.5. In 
each model I present the logistic coefficients, the standard errors (in paren theses), and 
the exponent (B) scores. The third co lumn of each model represents the exponent (B) 
wh ich predicts the odds of identifying as Northern Irish as opposed to British (for 
Protestants) or Iri sh (for Catholics) when a particular variable is considered, holding 
other important variables constant. Four logistic regression models are presented- two 
representing responses to the surveys conducted before the devolution of powers to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly in 1999, and two representing surveys conducted in the 10 
years since. 
The multivariate analyses largely support the bivariate findings . Among 
Protestant respondents , for example, the data reveal a significant increase over time in 
the strength of the relationship between li ving in a mixed area and identifying as 
Northern Irish . In the pre-devolution period there appears to be no significant 
relationship, whereas in the post-devolution period Protestants living in mixed areas 
were 67 per cent more likely to identity as Northern Irish than their segregated 
counterparts. Among Catholic respondents, the data reveal a stronger relationship 
between living in a mixed area and identifying as Northern Irish in both time periods 
under analysis. Supporting the bivariate analyses, this trend, however, has sli ghtly 
decreased in the post devolution period, although Catholic respondents who live in a 
mixed area are still twice as likely to identify as Northern Irish as opposed to those who 
live in segregated areas. While the results indicate that the trend in the Northern Iri sh 
identity may be decreasing among Catholics, they remain more likely to identify as such 
than thei r Protestant counterparts. 
160 
Table 5.5. The relationship between residential area and national identity, 1989-2010 
Protestants Catholics 
Pre-devolution Post-devolution Pre-devolution Post-devolution 
Socio-demographic 
Gender (female) -.214 (.146) .807 .075 (.087) 1.078 .229 (.145) 1.257 .440 (.100) 1.553** 
Age -.008 (.005) .992 -.009 (.003) .991** .002 (.004) 1 002 .005 (.003) 1.005 
Labour-force active .184 (.167) 1.202 .063 (.103) 1065 .322 (.159_ 1.380* .288 (.114) 1.334* 
Occupation (non-manual) .158 (.164) 1.171 -. 219 (.217) .803 -.070 (.166) .933 -.255 (.252) .798 
Church attendance .002 (.161) 1.002 .074 (.093) 1.077 -.091 (.267) .913 .285 (.121) 1.330* 
Marital Status (married) -. 319 (.147) .727* -.054 (.090) .948 .122 (.142) 1.129 .239 (.099) 1.270* 
Education 
(Tertiary) .779 (.203) 2. 180** .773 (.120) 2.166** .325 (.231) 1.384 -.106 (.136) .900 
(Secondary) - 030 ( 180) .970 .340 (.114) 1.405** .102 (.176) 1.107 .056 (.127) 1.058 
(No Qual) 
Residential area 
(Mixed) .11 3 (.158) 1119 .517 (.094) 1.677** .843 (.144) 2.323* .760 (.101) 2.139** 
(Segregated) 
Constant -1.324 (.356) .266** -.890 (.260) .411 ** -1.773 (.301) .170** -1.905 .274 .149** 
Nagelkerke R square .049 .062 .067 .060 
(N) 1,627 2,777 1,165 2,315 
I 
*p<.05 **p<.01. -- Omitted category of comparison Notes: In each model, column one represents the logistic coefficients; column two represents the standard errors 
(in parentheses); and column three represents the Exponent B. Dichotomous dependent variable for Protestants is operationalised as 1 =Northern Irish O=British; for 
Catholics 1 =Northern Irish O= Irish. 
Source: NISA and NILT surveys, pooled file, 1989-2010. 
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In terms of national identity preferences, both sets of analyses show that Catholics 
liv ing in mixed communities are significantly more likely to see their primary identity 
as Northern Irish. This result was most pronounced during the first time period (1989-
1998) under analys is. Indeed, the data suggest that there has not been any sign ifi cant 
increase in the incidence of Catholics identi fy ing as Northern Iri sh since the 
implementation of the Agreement. 
The data reveal a remarkably di fferent trend in identification among Protestant 
respondents. Whereas during the first time period examined Protestants living in mixed 
neighbourhoods were no more likely to identify as Northern Iri sh than their segregated 
counterparts, thi s has dramatically changed in the period since (1999- 2010). This is 
clearly shown in both the bivariate and multi variate analyses. These findings suggest 
that within this social arena, we are witnessing a levelling off of a preference for 
Northern Irish identity among Catholics and an increase in this identity among 
Protestants. 
Explaining identity and residential mixing 
It is clear that the expression of competing identities remains closely li nked to the 
physical separation of communities in residential areas. The data confirm earlier 
research regarding the importance of residential segregation for maintai ning, and in 
some instances fuellin g, divisive national identities. Alongside the findings here that 
residential segregation perpetuates expressions of divided identities a number of other 
well-documented problems that arise from residential segregation are also apparent. For 
example, persistent residential segregation- by community background, socio-
economic status, and other dimensions- has long been associated in direct ways with 
social inequali ty, for example by denying minorities and the poor equal access to 
qua li ty schooling, jobs, and other resources (De Souza Briggs 2002) . Analysis of 
respondents' social characteristi cs, includ ing level of education, employment status and 
type of occupation, reveal that those li ving in segregated areas are less likely to have 
gained an educational qualification or to be employed. Those who are employed are 
much more likely to have a manual position. This suggests that many segregated areas 
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within Northern Ireland experience greater levels of inequality and deprivation than 
many mixed areas. 
Residential segregation is most acute among working class wards and is 
correlated with social and economic deprivation, marginalization, and sectarianism (see 
Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). The riots in East Belfast during the 2011 marching season, 
to provide one example among many, highlight the relative ease with which violence in 
working class areas can erupt. Outbursts of sectarian violence centred on territory and 
persistent inequalities highlight the fragility of peace, especially where this coincides 
with segregation. Indeed, it is within the area ofresidential segregation that the need for 
a multi-level approach to resolving conflict can be most easily seen. This is because the 
contestation of territory, at the heart of the conflict, is borne out within and between 
segregated areas and these areas serve as bases for demonstrations, political 
protestations and identity politics. Tackling these overlapping and mutually reinforcing 
issues is an important challenge for the future of housing policy in Northern Ireland. 
Given the continuing presence of high levels of residential segregation, coupled 
with periods of violence and intergroup riots, it is perhaps surprising to find that mixed 
religion communities have and continue to exist throughout Northern Ireland. This is 
even more surprising given that the existence of these communities has, until recently, 
been sustained with very little official support. Indeed, official government support and 
promotion of mixed areas has been a relatively recent addition to the community 
relations agenda. This, it appears, is due to the fact that the allocation of housing at the 
onset of the contemporary conflict was heavily politicised and associated with 
discriminatory tactics of the state. Thus, for the duration of the conflict, the focus of the 
N1HE was on the allocation of housing on the basis of need and preference coupled with 
a desire to disassociate housing policy from sectarian practices. As such, pushing 
forward a social integration agenda within housing policy was side-lined and the status 
quo within social housing- typically segregation-was maintained. 
Despite these obstacles I have found that mixed areas represent an important 
environment in which less divisive forms of identification are being realised. The 
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findings indicate a significant relationship between li ving in a mixed area and 
identifying as Northern Iri sh. And th is relationship was particularl y strong among 
Protestants. This suggests that the opportunities for intergroup contact present in mixed 
areas may be beneficial for community relations . There are a number of explanations 
for the importance in mixed areas, which are examined below. 
A first explanation is that people who live in mixed areas most likely do so out of 
choice. Unlike many segregated areas in which only those from the right community 
may choose to live out of fear and intimidation, mixed areas provide all people with a 
choice. A conscious decision on the part of the individual to live in such an area (as 
opposed to a segregated area) may indicate that factors other than communal 
background are more important when choosing a location to live. For example, locality 
to work, schools or the city centre may be a driving force in people' s decisions to 
move-and, as I have demonstrated, mixed areas are predominantly found within the 
urban centres. Likewise, whereas living in a small community may highlight identity 
and difference, the relative transience of urban life affords people a hi gher degree of 
anonymity. Because of this , an individual's community identity may be less important 
than in smaller or more rural communities (Jarman et al. 2009: 62). 
Second, previous research has found that social integration happens within mixed 
communities and that there is heightened potential fo r the formation of intergroup 
friendships in such environments. For example, the importance of friendship and family 
ties for the stability of mixed communities was also noted in the report of the mixed 
housing estate in Tonagh (Murtagh et al. 2006). A similar finding was documented in 
Murtagh and Carmichael's (2005) study of the Ballynafe igh area which found that the 
rate of mixed religion households was higher than that of Northern Ireland as a whole. 
Lending further weight to the importance of mixed neighbourhoods as environments 
which promote positive interaction, Hewstone et al. (2008: 73 -4) who conducted 
extensive analysis of both segregated and mixed neighbourhoods found that people 
living in mixed areas were more inclined towards intergroup interaction than those 
living in segregated communities. The report also documented the presence of cross-
community friendships between neighbours in mixed areas . 
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Finally, local infrastructure that supports the mixed nature of an area may be 
important in providing a sense of belonging and pride in the area. Mixed areas are often 
supported by strong local community organizations that foster and support cross-
community relations. For example, the neighbourhood of Ballynafeigh has been 
supported for many years by the Ballynafeigh Community Development Association 
(BCDA). 106 The BCDA offers physical space to facilitate interaction between people 
from different community backgrounds. These physical spaces provide a neutral venue 
for a range of community groups to access. Recent statistics indicate a total of 88 active 
groups using the BCDA offices on the Ormeau Road alone (Murtagh and Carmichael 
2005: 34). As well as providing space for community groups to meet, the BCDA also 
organizes social events and is active in promoting mixed leisure activities. 
Mixed areas are also more likely to be connected to integrated schools nearby. For 
example, within the mixed housing estate in Tonagh the existence of strong cross-
community infrastructure, including an integrated primary school, was considered 
fundamental to the continuing mixed nature of the area. The report also found a sense of 
pride in the area and a desire to keep Tonagh free from sectarian symbols (Murtagh et 
al. 2006). Thus, it can be argued that there is real investment of residents' time and 
energy in mixed environments and a desire to maintain the mixed nature of the 
community. 
Investment in the local area and the establishment of strong community bonds 
within mixed areas will be essential for their longevity and stability. Evidence suggests 
that the delicate demographic balance within many mixed areas is under threat as more 
members of one community move in while members of another move out. This is 
particularly due to an increase · in the private rental sector and the gentrification of 
particular areas with new middle class developments in the Belfast city area may 
increase perceptions of exclusion among working class segregated communities 
(Gaffikin et al. 2008: 177-8). According to Gaffikin et al., some new developments 
106 For more information on the BCDA visit <,vww.bdca.net>. 
165 
withi n the Belfas t city centre have effectively become gated communities (phys ically 
manifest in wall s, gates and security doors) helping to generate new layers of di vision. 
Murtagh (2008) al so noted these new layers of division with increased social mobility 
among Catholic who are now li ving in once exclusively Protestant areas coupled with 
sharper demarcations of territory in working-cl ass areas in Belfas t. 
In interviews with individual in a highly segregated Protestant area Hughes et al. 
(2007: 43) fo und new norms of avoidance of intergroup contact around the Belfast city 
centre . Here many Protestant respondents indi cated that whilst they once would have 
shopped and sociali sed in Belfast, they now preferred to travel to Newtownards or 
Bangor (both of which are maj ority Protestant towns) due to the perception that Belfast 
had become more ' green ' and therefore less welcoming fo r Protestants. 
Added to this is the relative ease with which particular areas can become spatially 
segregated, even if the residents of that area do not activel y wi sh it to be so. For 
example, Fossett and Waren (2005: I 893) argue that residential segregation can occur 
even when no individual wishes to reside in the type of ethni cally homogeneous 
neighbourhood fo und in highl y segregated cities . They demonstrate how relatively weak 
preferences fo r living with like individuals can produce divided spatial networks . Thi s 
outcome may, in part, explain the difference between the stated preference of peopl e to 
live in mixed areas and the persistence of hi gh levels of res idential segregati on in 
Northern Ireland. 107 
While the findings of thi s study indicate the merits of community relations work 
focused on increasing the number of shared residential areas, it should be noted that thi s 
study has some important methodological limitations. The maj or limitation is the issue 
of causali ty. Given the cross-sectional nature of the data employed, it is not possible to 
discern whether increased contact between communiti es through mixing in res idential 
107 For example, in the 201 0 NILT survey 86 per cent of respondents stated that they were in favour of 
more res idential mixing in the area in whi ch they li ved. 
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areas leads to identity moderation, or whether those who hold more moderate views 
choose to live in mixed areas. Only by employing longitudinal data can definitive 
conclusions be reached as to the direction of the relationship between mixing and 
identity. In the absence of such data, however, inferences can still be drawn as to the 
importance of such environments for more moderate identities. This study has shown 
that such environments are indeed important. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the depth of residential segregation in Northern Ireland 
and the degree to which efforts to promote mixing in residential areas is linked with 
more moderate fonns of identity. I began by outlining the history of residential 
segregation in Northern Ireland, arguing that this form of segregation has been closely 
aligned with divisive group identities which manifest in physical, and often 
intimidating, expressions of territoriality. 
I then discussed a range of indicators commonly used to measure the extent of 
segregation and found that while residential segregation persists and has in fact 
increased on many social housing estates, recent research finds that overall the rate of 
segregation may be slowing due to decreases in violence and the advent of the peace 
process. Coupled with this, is an emerging body of literature that has identified 
residential areas throughout Northern Ireland which can be described as mixed. An 
interesting finding has been that mixed areas have existed despite the fact that 
residential segregation was the accepted norm throughout the conflict. Indeed, it is only 
since 1998 that official support for the maintenance and development of mixed areas 
has become a central policy objective for improving community relations. Efforts are 
now being made to promote shared neighbourhoods as outlined in the government' s A 
Shared Future community relations policy. Of course, support for shared 
neighbourhoods provided by the NIHE focus on shared social housing, meaning that 
support for mixed areas made up of private ownership is dependent on the existence of 
strong local community organizations. As this research confirmed, residential mixing is 
disproportionately confined to the middle classes. It is unclear what the government 's 
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strategy for maintaining the mixed nature of many of these areas with high levels of 
private ownership wi ll be. 
In conclusion, I uncovered evidence to suggest that the support for and promotion 
of mixed areas are worthwhile policy objectives as they are environments in which 
more moderate and inclusive identities are expressed. Through analyses of a large 
pooled sample of survey respondents, I found that both Catholics and Protestants who 
state that they live in mixed areas are significantly more likely to express a Northern 
Irish identity than either of the traditional national identities. While it was not possible 
to ascertain the quality of contact that residents in mixed areas experience, previous 
research (Hewstone et al. 2008) suggests that quality social interactions do occur in 
such areas, leading to the formation of more intimate bonds. The challenge for policy 
makers and practitioners wi ll be to maintain the delicate demographic balance of such 
areas in an increasingly socially mobile society. Given that official government support 
for such areas has only recently become central to the community relations agenda, it 
will be interesting to return to such an analysis of identity patterns within shared 
communities in the future . In the next chapter, I exp lore cross-community contact 
within the education sector. 
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Chapter 6. Integrated education and national 
identity 
The education system in Northern Ireland reflects the divided nature of the society 
through the existence of two parallel school sectors. One sector is provided by the state 
and is frequented mostly by pupils from a Protestant background. The other is operated 
by the Catholic Church and is populated predominantly by pupils from a Catholic 
background. Like residential segregation, the development of separate 108 school sectors 
is representative of the broader political conflict over competing national claims, 
territorial allegiances and opposing views about the legitimacy of the state (Moxon-
Browne 1991 ; McGarry and O'Leary 1993 ; Gallagher 2004a). However, since the early 
1980s a third school sector has emerged that is designed to educate Catholic and 
Protestant children together. The schools in this sector are known as integrated 
schools. 109 
108 In this chapter I will use the terms ' separate' and ' separated' to refer to denominational schools within 
Northern Ireland. There is some debate over the use of the term 'segregated' to refer to denominational 
schools in Northern Ireland. The terminology of 'segregated' school may suggest that a school is 
'segregated' based on force (from either the state or the churches or both), rather than being 'separate' by 
choice. Whereas under the apartheid system in South Africa, for example, schools were clearly 
segregated through state mandate, in Northern Ireland denominational schools operate on the basis of 
choice. Indeed, there is no legal mandate for segregation of Catholic and Protestant pupils in education in 
Northern Ireland. As such, I will refer to denominational schools in Northern Ireland as separate-religion 
schools while noting that these schools are usually referred to as segregated schools within the literature 
and within policy circles. 
109 For detailed accounts of the nature and history of the integrated sector see the Northern Ireland 
Council for Integrated Education (NICIE) <www.nicie.org.uk>; Dunn and Morgan 1991; Morgan and 
Fraser 1999; Hughes and Donnelly 2006. 
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This integrated sector emerged out of concerns that the separate nature of 
education in Northern Ireland contributed to division by restricting opportun ities for 
Cathol ic and Protestant chi ldren to engage in cross-community contact. I shall argue 
that the rationale for the call fo r integrated schools is simil ar to the basic argument 
advanced by contact theorists- that increasing intergroup contact between members of 
different groups can lead to a reduction of prejudice and to more favourable attitudes 
towards the out-group (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). 
There is a growing body of research on integrated education in Northern Ireland 
(see Hansson et al. 20 13 for an overview of recent research). This includes examination 
of impact of integrated education on a range of social attitudes, such as prejudice, 
tolerance, and trust towards members of the other main community. Only recently, 
however, has research begun to investigate the relationship between integrated 
education and expressions of political and national identities (Hayes et al. 2007). This 
chapter builds on this research by investigating the impact of segregated and integrated 
education on national identity preferences in Northern Ireland using data from the NISA 
survey and the NIL T surveys over the period 1989 to 2010. 
The chapter is structured as fo llows . I begin by providing an outline of the history 
of the three education sectors in Northern Ireland. I use government statistics to 
determine the extent to which segregation persists, concluding that only a minority of 
the school-aged population attend schools within the integrated sector. I then discuss the 
emergence of this sector and, in particular, the establi shment of two types of integrated 
schools-planned integrated schools and transformed schools. This sets the stage for an 
examination of the nature of integrated schools. Data on enrolments by religious 
background from the Department of Education is utilised to show that a significant 
religious imbalance among pupils remains in a number of (nominall y) integrated 
schools. The goals of integrated school s are then examined through analys is of re levant 
policy documents and pub lished accounts from advocates of such school s. I show that 
there is a degree of ambiguity into the expressed goals of integrated education and that 
in recent years there has been a policy shift away from the aim of integrating schools 
per se towards promoting 'sharing' across the education sector. Against this 
170 
background, statistical tests of the associations between attending an integrated school 
on the national identity preferences of Catholic and Protestant respondents are applied 
and the results are discussed with reference to current practices and implications for the 
future of the integrated education sector in Northern Ireland. 
Education in Northern Ireland 
Since 1923, the two main communities in Northern Ireland have been educated 
separately in a state-sponsored dual education system. Under this system, a majority of 
pupils from the Protestant tradition have attended state-controlled schools, while 
maintained schools-financed by the state but operated by the Catholic Church-have 
mostly attracted pupils from the Catholic tradition. Today, nearly 90 per cent of the 
school-aged population is educated in this segregated sector, attending either a state-
controlled school populated predominantly by Protestants or a school within the 
maintained sector, operated by the Catholic Church and populated predominantly by 
Catholics. Ironically, early attempts to limit the influence of religious instruction in 
schools acted as a catalyst for the development of the dual education system. An 
initiative by the Minister for Education, Lord Londonderry, called for all schools in 
Northern Ireland to be non-denominational (Darby 1976). 11 0 Londonderry argued that 
the education system should be protected from de-nominalisation, since failure to do so 
would lead to ' division when union is so essential to the well-being of the province' 
(quoted in Darby 1976: 126). 
Major opposition to Londonderry's position from stakeholders within both the 
Protestant and Catholic communities culminated in a campaign against these proposals. 
110 Earlier attempts in Ireland had been made to establish non-denominational education through a 
national school system in 1831. The purpose was to create a single school system wh ich could provide for 
separate religious instruction for the different religious groups. However, the system was gradually 
eroded by campaigns from clergy from both the Protestant and Catholic denomination. By the end of the 
nineteenth century national schools had become segregated into de facto denominational institutions (see 
Smith 200 I). 
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For example, in 1924 a number of Protestant organizations formed the United Education 
Committee, arguing for 'Protestant teachers for Protestant children' (quoted in Darby 
I 976: 28). The Catholic Church also rejected Londonderry ' s proposals arguing that the 
establishment of a non-denominational education system might lead to proselytising 
(see Dunn and Morgan 199 1). In response to these pressures, a new Education Act was 
passed that created a ' state' system. This system was designed to teach the Protestant 
faith (Gallagher 2004a: 6 I). Unsurpri singly, the Catholic Church announced that the 
proposed schools would be ' impossible ' for Catholic chi ldren (Darby I 976: 28). Indeed, 
church opposition to proposals for a uni fied education system was so widespread that 
by 1930 the government had establi shed a de facto segregated education system 
(Richardson 2000; Hayes et al. 2007).111 Prime Minister James Craig set the tone for the 
re-structured education system, stating '[y]ou need not have any fears about our 
education programme for the future . .. It will be absolutely certain that in no 
circumstances whatever wi ll Protestant chi ldren be in any way interfered with by 
Roman Catholics, any more than Protestants wish to interfere with Roman Catholi c 
children ' (Darby 1976: 28). 
These two sectors also include a number of voluntary schools, including 
controlled grammar schools attended predominantly by Protestants, voluntary grammar 
schools with Catholic management, and Irish medium schools attended predominantly 
by Catholics. It is important to note here that there is no legal restriction on the entry of 
pupi ls from either community to any of these school types. However, parental choice 
has followed a tight pattern of school patronage. 
111 It is important to note that there had also been early support for the concept ofa national schools 
system from within the Catholic Church. In the early nineteenth century Catholic Bishop James Doyle of 
Kildare wrote in favo ur of the creation ofa unified school system and stated, ' I do not know any 
measures which would prepare the way for a better fee ling in Ireland than uniting children at an early age, 
and bringing them up in the same school, leading them to commune with one another and to fo rm those 
little intimacies and friendships wh ich often subsist through life ' (Doyle 1830 quoted in Richardson 2000: 
93). 
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The high levels of separate education that exist in Northern Ireland' s education 
system are highlighted in Table 6.1, based on data from the Department of Education in 
Northern Ireland. It shows the percentage of pupils enrolled in primary, post-primary 
and grammar schools by their stated religion and the type of school attended for the 
2010/ 11 school year. 
Table 6.1, Enrolment figures for primary, secondary and grammar schools 
by religion and school type (%), 2010- 2011 
Protestant Catholic Other All 
School Type 
State-controlled 78.4 3.5 66.4 38.7 
Catholic- 1.2 90.0 6.0 47.1 
maintained 
Integrated 7.9 4.9 11 .5 6.7 
Other 12.4 1.5 16.0 7.3 
(N) (113 ,815) (154,578) (34,108) (302,501) 
Note: Integrated schools include both grant maintained and controlled integrated schools. 
Figures do not include enrolments for nursery schools or special scho-ols. 'Other' schools refer 
to voluntary schools under other management. 'Other' religion refers to those who stated 'no 
religion', 'other religion ' or 'other Christian '. 
Source: Calculated by author from enrolment figures provided by Department of Education 
2011. 
This provides clear evidence of the persistence of a divided education system. In 
the 2010/11 school year, 90 per cent of Catholics attended a maintained school and 78 
per cent of Protestants attended a state-controlled school. Moreover, only 1 per cent of 
Protestants attended a maintained school and only 4 per cent of Catholics attended a 
state-controlled school. Despite the high levels of segregation found within the 
education sector, Table 6.1 also reveals that a minority of both Catholics (5 per cent) 
and Protestants (8 per cent) attended a school within the ' integrated' sector. This 
'integrated' sector reflects efforts made by select members of the community-parents, 
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teachers and government officials-who endorse a view that schools should become 
directly involved in efforts to improve community relations in Northern Ireland. Central 
to the logic and justification of this position is the belief that a lack of contact between 
Catholics and Protestants throughout the school years perpetuates division and conflict 
in Northern Ireland. To date, 61 integrated schools have been established at primary and 
post-primary level and they provide an education and environment for social 
experimentation for some 6 per cent of the school age population (see Northern Ireland 
Council for Integrated Education (NICIE) 2008; Department of Education 2011). 
Educational reforms 
With the renewal and escalation of political violence in the late 1960s and through 
the 1970s, Northern lreland's social, economic and institutional structures came under 
scrutiny in an attempt to understand the causes of the violence. As part of this, the role 
of the segregated education system was given particular attention 112• Studies conducted 
during this period highlighted the lack of knowledge that young people from each 
community had of one another and of each other 's traditions. They also drew attention 
to how few opportunities there were for cross-community interaction (Rose 1971; 
Darby et al. 1977). Darby and Dunn (1987) suggested that curriculum differences in 
segregated schools introduced children to differing and potentially opposing outlooks 
on the world. For example, religious education and the teaching of history have been 
heavily influenced by the denomination of the school. Curriculum differences within 
segregated schools meant that only one history and one tradition was taught in each, 
leaving little opportunity for pupils to learn about the other community. The potential 
for separate-religion schools to exacerbate difference between the two main 
communities was noted by Murray (1995: 222) who argued that, '[c] hildren are 
social ised into an awareness of difference and di stinctiveness' making identities 
stronger and more exclusive. 
112 See for example, Murray 1985 , 1995; Darby 1976; Dwm 1986; Darby and Dunn I 987. 
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Echoing Lord Londonderry's original calls for education to bring about union 
rather than division, advocates challenging the segregated system argued that education 
could play an influential role in bringing about societal change. It would do so, they 
alleged, by fostering an understanding of the different traditions and by undermining 
negative stereotypes within society (Hayes et al. 2007). Concerns driving this demand 
for change have focused on whether contact between Protestant and Catholic children 
during the school years could help to reduce tensions by confronting and eliminating 
prejudice at an early age (Dunn and Morgan 1991, 1999). 
Initial attempts to promote integrated education were widely regarded as the 
unrealistic aspirations of idealists, especially given the immediate situation in which 
sectarian violence was escalating (Morgan and Fraser 1999). Nevertheless, in the 1970s 
the pressure group All Children Together attempted to initiate change within the 
education sector. All Children Together campaigned for legislation to allow existing 
schools to change their structure in order to attract pupils from both the main 
communities. In what seemed to confirm the views of many within Northern Ireland, 
these initial attempts failed, since no schools were willing to take up the challenge. 
The failure of All Children Together to bring about change during this period was 
predictable enough given the social and political context in which it was attempting to 
operate. The 1970s witnessed a period of political upheaval, escalating levels of 
violence and the further breakdown of community relations. Following the failure of the 
power-sharing Northern Ireland Assembly in 1974, attempts at building a moderate 
centre ground between unionists and nationalists in politics had been all but abandoned. 
Members of the community also raised concerns that interference with the well-
established and functioning education sector might further exacerbate tensions and 
disrupt an important source of stability for children during this period (Morgan and 
Fraser 1999). Moreover, as with the earlier attempts by Lord Londonderry to create a 
unified education system, the Catholic Church voiced strongly its opposition to 
integrated education . 
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Despite th is opposition, All Children Together pursued its obj ectives. With the 
help of donations fro m charities, fo undations and individuals, it opened the fi rst 
integrated secondary school (Lagan College) in September 198 1. The establishment of 
Lagan Co llege was entirely dependent on private funding. Indeed, the idea of integrated 
educat ion was so contentious during this period that Lagan College had to rely on 
private donations until 1984, when the Department of Education took over 
responsi bility for its funding (Hayes et al. 2007). 
However, the 1980s wi tnessed important changes with regard to government 
strategy in dealing with the conflict in Northern Ireland. The di rect rule administration 
began to focus attention on social and economic ini tiatives fo r improving community 
relations. These ini tiatives were reflected in administrative change and legislati on, 
includi ng the establishment of the CCRU in 1987, the CRC in 199 1, and the 1989 
Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order. Community relations policy during this 
period was driven by three main goals: the promotion of cross-community contact; the 
promotion of greater tolerance and cultural pluralism; and a commitment to equality 
opportunity (Gallagher 2004a: 60). Under the broad theme of community relations, 
education was thus targeted as an institution through which the government's social 
policy could be channelled. 
In practice, there have been two main approaches to improving community 
relations through education. The first approach, developed through the Department of 
Education, has focused on the promotion of EMlJ (see chapter 4 and below) within 
existing controlled and maintained schools (Smith and Robinson 1996). The aim of this 
approach is to educate pupils on comm unity relati ons issues and encourage 'mutual 
understanding' between the two main traditions. This approach focuses on modi fy ing 
the curriculum to faci li tate greater understanding and di alogue on issues surrounding 
commun ity re lations, rather than changi ng the structure of the education system 
(Richardson 2000). 
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Education/or mutual understanding 
The first official commitment by the Department of Education to promoting 
community relations came in 1982 with the publication of the policy circular The 
Improvement of Community Relations: the Contribution of Schools (see O'Connor et al. 
2002). This publication formally introduced the idea of using education to improve 
community relations. When the 1989 Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order was 
implemented, it introduced a new Northern Ireland curriculum. This curriculum 
included the two new themes of EMU and CH (see chapter 4) programmes. EMU and 
CH are based on four fundamental objectives: to foster respect for self and others and to 
build relationships; to understand conflict; to appreciate interdependence; and to 
enhance cultural understanding (Smith and Robinson 1996). Alongside this, the 
Department of Education established a voluntary Cross Community Contact Scheme 
between controlled and maintained schools. It was envisaged that EMU and the Cross 
Community Contact Scheme would complement each other (O'Connor et al. 2002). 
While the teaching of EMU and CH were compulsory components of the 
Northern Ireland curriculum, it is difficult to assess the impact that these schemes have 
had on the attitudes of children. This is because there is no unified method for teaching 
the themes set out by EMU and CH. Moreover, teachers may avoid themes deemed to 
be contentious and that attach to community divisions such as politics and religion. 
Smith and Robinson (I 996), for example, found that many teachers felt insufficiently 
trained for such work and simply avoided certain subject areas for this reason. 
New curriculum developments within the education sector have since replaced 
EMU and CH with Personal Development and Mutual Understanding and Local and 
Global Citizenship. 113 According to the latest education policy put forward by the 
Department of Education (2011), Personal Development and Mutual Understanding is 
113 See the Counci l for Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment and the Northern Ireland Curriculum at 
<http://www.nicurriculum.org.uk/> for further details regarding changes to the curriculum. 
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des igned to promote children 's emotional development, their relationships with others, 
and the development of their moral thinking and values . According to the Department 
of Education the curriculum theme of Local and Global Citizenship is designed to 
provide young people with opportunities to investigate and understand the causes of 
conflict, and to equip them with ski ll s to manage and resolve conflict peacefully 
(Department of Education 201 1 b: 12). It remains unclear how these new curriculum 
developments will influence the teaching of certain contentious themes attached to 
community relations . 
The Cross Community Contact Scheme is now known as the Schools Community 
Relations Programme, administered by the five Area Education and Library Boards. 114 
The Programme 's remit is to ' bring together young people from across the community 
through ongoing, constructive and collaborative activities which lead to greater mutual 
understanding ' (O 'Connor et al. 2002: 6). However, a review by O'Connor et al. (2002) 
commissioned by the Department of Education found a number of weaknesses in the 
Schools Community Relations Programme. For example, they found inconsistent links 
between the schools involved. Moreover, while approximately 700 schools have signed 
up to the Programme, the actual numbers of pupils actively engaged is has remained 
consistently low. According to the review, only 21 per cent of primary students and 3 
per cent of post-primary students were enrolled. The review does not voice a firm 
opinion regarding whether the Programme has led to 'greater mutual understanding ' . 
Integrated education 
The second approach to improving community relations through education 
regards the separate education of Catholic and Protestant chi ldren as a major obstacle to 
efforts to improve community relations. It is based on the premise that instead of 
114 Whi le the Department of Education for Northern Ireland has responsib ili ty over decisions regard ing 
fu nding all ocations and the delivery of the statutory curricu lum, much of the adm inistration of the school 
system is delivered by Northern Ireland's fi ve regional Area Education and Library Boards (see Morgan 
and Fraser 1999). 
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educating Catholic and Protestant children separately, all children, irrespective of 
community affiliation, should be given the opportunity through education to meet, get 
to know and understand people who are from a different background through attendance 
at integrated schools. Such an opportunity should undermine negative stereotypes and 
improve community relations. 
While curriculum strategies have proposed promoting cultural awareness among 
segregated school children, a parallel social movement developed in the 1980s. This 
movement called for deepening levels of social integration through educating Catholic 
and Protestant children together. The rationale behind this movement finds its 
theoretical basis in contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). It is based on the idea 
that conflict and prejudice arise between groups when there is a lack of information 
about the other group and when there is a lack of opportunity for contact that would 
facilitate greater understanding between groups. Without significant opportunity for 
contact, it is argued, it becomes impossible for individuals to realize their similarities 
and to accept their differences. 
Intergroup contact theory, or the contact hypothesis as it was initially formulated, 
provided the theoretical justification for the desegregation of the school system in the 
United States 115 (see Allport 1954; Durrheim and Dixon 2005; Hayes et al. 2007) and 
115 In 1954 the United States Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. Board of Education declared racially 
segregated schools to be unconstitutional as the system produced unequal educational opportunities and 
outcomes and ultimately contradicted the clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment related to ' equal 
protection' and 'due process' (Durrheim and Dixon 2005). This decision initiated a shift in the way in 
which the social role of education was viewed. Schools became regarded as institutions that had the 
potential to foster improvements in relations between different ethnic and racial groups by diversifying 
the range of networks available to students through intergroup contact. In relation to intergroup relations 
it was argued that 'segregation leads to a blockage in the communication and interaction' between groups 
and that such 'blockages tend to increase mutual suspicion, distrust, and hostility' (Brown v. Board of 
Education 1954, cited in Zirkel and Cantor 2004: 2), whi le intergroup contact could lead to a reduction in 
racist attitudes amongst whites and, ultimately, to the promotion of integration and understanding among 
the wider community (Hayes et al. 2007). 
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has since been applied in other contexts, including educational initiatives between 
Palestinian and Israeli children (Donne lly and Hughes 2006), as well as in schools and 
desegregated neighbourhoods within South Africa (Dixon and Reicher 1997; Durrheim 
and Dixon 2005). 
Proponents of intergroup contact theory argue that under the right condi tions, 
contact between oppos ing groups can lead to a reduction in prej udice and intergroup 
bias (Allport 1954). The conditions for successful contact include: equal status between 
groups in the contact situation; cooperative intergroup interaction; opportunities for 
personal acquaintance between groups; and the support of authori ties within and outside 
the immediate contact situation. A further condition has since been added which 
contends that the contact situation should have ' friendship potential' (Pettigrew 1998). 
Integrated schools within Northern Ireland may provide an environment in which 
conditions fo r positive intergroup contact can be met. Fi rst, integrated schools with an 
equal balance of pupils from both of the main traditions may perceive of themselves as 
having equal group status within the school. Second, classroom activities may be 
structured in such a way so as to promote common goals among all pupils. Third, 
classroom activities may be structured to promote cooperative interaction among all 
pupils. Fourth, integrated schools may provide the institutional support necessary for 
intergroup contact and finally, the schoo l environment has ' friendship potential ' . 
Calls for the need to tackle the separate nature of Northern Ireland 's education 
system and lesson drawing from earlier attempts to desegregate school in the Un ited 
States have led to the establishment of the integrated schools sector. This sector 
emphasizes the benefi ts that sustained intergroup contact can have on improving 
community relations and draws on intergroup contact theory for theoretical justification . 
In the two sections below, I demonstrate the di fferen t types of integrated schools that 
exist in Northern Ireland and identi fy the challenges that these school s face in meeting 
basic some requirements of integration as well as existing within a broader system 
dominated by separation . 
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Planned integrated schools 
The first planned integrated school, Lagan College, was created outside of formal 
state structures through financial donations from charitable organizations (Morgan and 
Fraser 1999; Smith 2001). It opened in 1981 with a total of 28 pupils in the first year 
(Morgan and Fraser 1999). Due to its success in surviving the first difficult years, Lagan 
College provided the impetus for other like-minded groups to follow suit. Morgan and 
Fraser (1999: 376) call this ' a remarkable achievement and a practical demonstration of 
parental choice and parental involvement in action '. 
Following the establishment of Lagan College, official support for integrated 
schools came in the fonn of the 1989 Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order. This 
provided an official legislative basis for the support of integrated education and meant 
that integrated schools could be less dependent on financial contributions from 
charitable organizations to meet running costs (Smith 2001). Under the order, a 
statutory duty is given to the Department of Education to ' encourage and facilitate ' the 
development of integrated schools where there is clear parental demand for them 
(Hansson et al. 2013). In practice, this has resulted in two types of schools. The first are 
schools that have been established out of parental demand for an integrated school in a 
particular area. These schools aim to achieve a student intake ratio of 40:40:20 of 
Catholic, Protestant and Other so as to avoid a majority of one of the two main 
traditions. These integrated schools are known as planned integrated schools. Under the 
1989 Education Ref orm {Northern Ireland) Order all existing integrated schools were 
given the choice of receiving grant maintained integrated or controlled integrated 
status. 116 Most schools that have opened as a consequence of parental demand have 
chosen 'grant maintained integrated' status. 
116 The main difference between these t.vo types of integrated schools is found in the structures of the 
Board of Governors with a closer relationship existing bet.veen 'controlled integrated ' schools and the 
Education and Library Board (Gallagher et al. 2003). 
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Transformation schools 
Alongside forma l support for the estab li shment of new integrated schools, the 
1989 Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order provided for a second route to 
integration. Under the Order, existing segregated schools were given the option to 
'transform' to officiall y recognised integrated status. This is the second type of 
integrated school and consists of already established segregated schools that have been 
transformed into recognised integrated schools. 
While no pre-existing integration is necessary to apply for transfonnation status, 
schools wishing to transform are required to demonstrate that they have a reasonable 
prospect of achieving a minimum of 30 per cent enrolment drawn from the re levant 
minority tradition. 11 7 Moreover, the school must achieve a 10 per cent intake of pupi ls 
from the minority tradition within the first year before official approval to transform is 
granted. The process of transformation can be initiated either by written request of at 
least 20 per cent of parents of pupils at the school, or by a resolution proposed by the 
school's Board of Governors. Almost all schools that have taken the transformation 
route have chosen controlled integrated status. 
The process of transfonnation to official integrated status may take place over a 
number of years. Th is is due to the need for significant structural changes within the 
schoo l to reflect a new integrated ethos. For example, the compositi on of the 
117 Initi ally, however, the statutory requirements for transformation as stated in the Order only required 
schools to ' be likely to be attended by reasonable numbers of both Protestant and Roman Catholi c pupils' 
(cited in McGonigle et al. 2003: 4). No further explanation of what constituted a 'reasonable number' was 
offered. This caused major concern among advocates of integrated education, who argued that the Order 
provided a very loose conception of integration that could threaten the continued growth an d impact of 
the integrated sector (McGonigle et al. 2003). In 1997, the Department of Education published A 
Framework for Transformation ( 1997), which set out revised requirements for school s wish ing to 
transform. 
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management, staff and enrolments of the school must change in order to meet the 
requirements set out by the Department of Education. There are also a number of 
challenges that the schools must address. For example, transforming schools must make 
practical decisions about issues such as the display of religious and cultural symbols, 
the celebration of specific dates throughout the year and the recognition of holidays 
(Smith 2001). Moreover, Hughes and Donnelly (2006: 510-11) found a number of 
complex issues for schools taking the transformation route to integration. These issues 
centred on the imposition of 'integrated status' on an existing segregated culture where 
most of the teachers are drawn from one community and where there may be some 
opposition to the transformation process. 
It is clear that the integrated sector has come a long way since the opening of the 
first integrated school in 1981. Today, there are 61 integrated schools which represent 7 
per cent of the overall school population. Indeed, in light of the fervent opposition to 
such schools from members of the political community and clergy, the growth of this 
sector represents a significant achievement in grassroots action. However, as I will 
argue in the following section, a closer inspection of the structure of integrated schools 
reveals significant variation between the level of 'integration' within schools. This is 
evident from the large numerical imbalances between majority/minority groups within 
many integrated schools. Moreover, there appears to be q_o unified definition of 
integration either within the integrated sector, or in official government policy. 
Integrated education: a closer inspection 
There are two requirements for integrated schools to function effectively. The first 
is that there should be a balance of pupil numbers between the two main traditions, as 
well as a balance of staff and in the composition of the board of governors. The second 
is that the curriculum incorporate elements of both British and Irish culture and 
traditions, as well as the teaching of local history and interdenominational religious 
instruction (Dunn and Morgan 1991; Hayes et al. 2007). 
However, a survey of government and organization reports reveals a number of 
intended outcomes envisaged for integrated education, yet no clear indication of how 
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integration shou ld be implemented. For the Northern lreland Council for Integrated 
Education (NICIE) the ' education together in schools of pupils drawn in approximately 
equal number from the two major traditions' aims to provide an 'effective education 
that gives equal recognition to and promotes equal expression of the two major 
traditions.' 11 8 Integrated schools should promote 'equality and good relations ' and 'a 
better and shared future.' 119 Elsewhere NICIE expands on the obstacles that segregation 
imposes on society as it states that a 'segregated system of education perpetuates fear of 
the "other", perpetuates stereotypes and prevents meaningful dialogue which builds the 
understanding and respect which are the bedrock of good community relations' (NICIE 
2010: n.p.). According to the IFI, which provides financial support for integrated 
schools, the ethos of an integrated school should encourage the development of 
'understanding and mutual respect' (IFI 2010: 5). Outlining arguments for the need for 
integrated education, the IFI states that segregation prevents 'the development of a 
shared identity' and has 'created division in recreation, housing, the media, sport and 
education' (IFI 2010: 5). 
The Department of Education defines an integrated school as 'a school which 
contains a reasonable number of pupils from both the Protestant and the Catholic 
communities ' 120 which has 'an overt aim of providing pupils with effective education 
that gives equal recognition to and promotes expression of the two major traditions ' 
(Department of Education 1998), while A Shared Future calls for integrated education 
to 'consciously prepare their pupils for life in a diverse and inter-cultural world' 
(OFMDFM 2005: 5). More recently, the Executive's draft community relations 
strategy-Cohesion, Sharing and Integration (OFMDFM 2010: 11 , 16)- sets out its 
commitment to what it calls 'sharing in education' as well as a commitment to 
118 See Nl CIE Sraremenl of Principles at <http ://www.nicie.org/about-us/nicie/statement-o f-principles/> . 
119 ibid . 
120 See <http ://www.deni.gov.uk>. 
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integrated education, it provides no definition of integration. In July 2012, Education 
Minister John O'Dowd announced the creation of a Ministerial Advisory Group on 
advancing shared education. The Minister stated: 'I am committed to providing all 
children with an opportunity to experience shared education which I believe has the 
potential to deliver real educational benefits, to ensure best use of resources and to 
further community cohesion.' 121 
It is unclear whether the development and promotion of planned integrated 
schools will continue to receive government support in the future . While Education 
Minister John O'Dowd announced ongoing commitment to an ethos of sharing, the 
media brief did not specifically mention integrated schools. Already, the development 
of such schools has been a source of conflict. According to Dunn and Morgan (1999) 
this has been due to the rapid expansion of the sector in a relatively short period of time. 
This has raised concerns regarding the costs associated with maintaining the integrated 
sector and the potential for state run schools to lose out financially as a result. For 
example, in 1995 and 1996 approximately one-third of the Department of Education's 
budget for start-up costs for new schools was allocated to integrated schools, even 
though these schools represented only around 1.5 per cent of the education sector. 
Indeed, in the relatively small education system operating in Northern Ireland, the 
considerable financial investment involved in maintaining tbe integrated sector has 
made integrated schools look like the main beneficiaries of government funding (see 
Morgan and Fraser 1999).122 
12 1 See CRC website for more information at <http: //www.community-relations.org.uk/about-
us/news/i tern/ 11 02/mi n ister-appoints-shared-ed ucati on-advisory-group/> . 
122 Significantly, the costs associated with maintaining a separate education system in Northern Ireland 
recently came under attack by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Owen Patterson claiming it ' a 
criminal waste of money' , see 'Schools strategy a criminal waste of money, says Owen Paterson ', 6 
October 2010, Belfast Telegraph, accessed 15th June 2012 at 
<http: //www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/education/schools-strategy-a-criminal-waste-of-public-money-
says-owen-paterson-1496840 I .html>. 
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Significantly First Minister and Leader of the DUP, Peter Robinson, noted the 
challenges in thi s sector due to competition for funds. In a recent interview Robinson 
states ' . . . The limited number of integrated schools in Northern Ireland do offer a choice 
but more often than not they join in the competition fo r fund s against the other two 
main education sectors and in truth will never create the critical mass needed to make a 
real difference.' 123 And adding yet another challenge to the continuation of the 
integrated sector was the announcement in June 2010 by the Minister for Education, 
Catriona Ruane, that there would be a 70 per cent cut to the Ministry's community 
relations budget (Nolan 2012: 156). 
As a result of tensions within the education sector over financial allocations as 
well as the reality of the considerable financial investment involved in the creation of 
new schools, government policy has moved towards the transformation route as a more 
attractive option for maintaining an integrated sector. Thus, in recent years transforming 
existing segregated schools to official integrated status has become the more financially 
attractive option for the Department of Education (see Morgan and Fraser 1999; 
McGonigle et al. 2003). This shift towards transformation is evidenced in the 
Department of Education 's publication Towards a Culture of Tolerance: Integrating 
Education (2007: 11), which explicitly identifies transformation as 'a cost-effective way 
[of] using existing capital stock' . This move has received criticism, namely from those 
advocates of integrated education who regard transformation as a dilution of integration 
and as a way of appearing to support integrated education whilst saving money (see 
Morgan and Fraser 1999: 375). 
123 See ' Peter Robinson call s for an end to school segregation ', 16 October 20 I 0, Belfast Telegraph, 
accessed I 5th June 2012 at <http: //www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/education/peter-robinson-calls-fo r-
end-to-school -segregation-1 4978235.html#ixzz I fn96pvhz>. 
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Evidence from enrolment data suggests that these suspicions are not unfounded. 
In practice, transformation has only occurred in controlled schools with predominantly 
Protestant enrolments. To date, no Catholic maintained school has transformed. 
Evidence of this is provided in Table 6.2. Using enrolment figures from the Department 
of Education for the 2010/11 school year, this shows the number of enrolments at grant 
maintained integrated schools (comprising 4.8 per cent of the total school aged 
population) and controlled integrated schools (1.9 per cent of the total school aged 
population) and the distribution of these enrolments by religious affiliation. For the 
2010/ 11 school year 47 per cent of primary students at controlled integrated schools 
came from a Protestant background with 26 per cent from a Catholic background. At the 
post-primary level, the disparities are even greater. Of the 2,703 pupils enrolled in 
controlled integrated schools 66 per cent come from a Protestant background and only 
16 per cent come from the Catholic tradition. These figures indicate that enrolments at 
controlled integrated schools fall far short of the minimum requirement of 30 per cent 
enrolment of the relevant minority tradition, especially in the post-primary sector. 
Table 6.2. Primary and post-primary school enrolments in controlled 
integrated and grant maintained integrated schools(%), 2010 
Primary PoJ;t-Primary 
Controlled Grant All Controlled Grant All 
integrated maintained integrated maintained 
Protestants 47.3 34.0 39.0 66.1 42.2 47.5 
Catholics 26.5 43.1 36.9 16.7 42.5 36.8 
Other 26.2 22.9 24.1 17.2 15.3 15.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 0 100.0 
(N) (3,144) (5 ,258) (8,402) (2, 703) (9,430) (12,133) 
Note: 'Other' religion refers to those who stated 'no religion', 'other religion' or 'other Christian'. 
Source: Calculated by author from data collected from Department of Education Statistics 2011 
(Department of Education 2011 ). 
The data in Table 6.2 suggest that there are large imbalances in enrolments from 
the two main traditions within controlled integrated schools. While official policy may 
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require schools to meet the minimum enrolment balance, it is clear that this condition 
has not been met. Moreover, it remains far from clear that the government's claim that 
'integrated schools give equal recognition to and promote equal expression of the two 
main trad itions' (OFMDFM 2010: 16) is being met in schools in which there is a large 
imbalance between Catholics and Protestants. 
These findings have important implications for the practical app licati on of 
intergroup contact theory in such settings. This is because, as the results indicate, 
controlled integrated schools fai l to meet at least one of the conditions for positive 
intergroup contact, namely the equal status of both groups within the contact situation. 
Coupled with the lack of a unifi ed definition and aim for integration within schools, the 
ability of such schools to provide a di ffe rent kind of education fo r children in Northern 
Ireland can be called in to question. Without uniformity the implementation of an ethos 
of integration may di ffer greatly depending on the individual nature of the school. 
Integrated education and community relations 
Despite the concerns raised above, an increase in the number of integrated schoo ls 
1s generally regarded as a sign of an improvement in relations between the two 
communities. Indeed, integrated education is generall y regarded as an important driver 
of positive social change (Hughes and Donnelly 2003). Within Northern Ireland, a 
number of important studies have explored vari ous facets of integrated education . Irwin 
(199 I) produced the first major study of the integrated sector that exam ined the impact 
of integrated education on the attitudes and behaviour of the pupils. The study found an 
increase in the number and duration of inter-community friendships (that is friendships 
betvveen pupils from the Protestant and Catholi c commun ity) amongst current and past 
pupi ls, suggesting that attendance at an integrated school influenced decisions made 
later in life. Similar findings were demonstrated in a study of integrated and separate-
religion secondary schoo ls (McClenahan et al. 1996). 
In another study comparing pupils from post primary integrated and segregated 
schools, Stringer et a l. (2000) established a strong relationship between the type of 
school a pupil attended and their attitudes towards the division of communities in 
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Northern Ireland. Pupils who had attended an integrated school were more in favour of 
societal integration, including mixed marriages, and more opposed to segregation than 
their segregated counterparts were. In addition to this, school children who attended an 
integrated school reported having more intergroup contacts outside of the school 
environment than those who attended a segregated school. The study made causal 
claims, arguing that that integrated schools promoted intergroup contact which then led 
to a change in attitudes. In line with this, research conducted by the International 
Conflict Research Institute found that Northern Ireland Young Life and Times survey 
respondents who had either attended planned integrated schools or participated in cross-
community projects were significantly more likely than their counterparts who did not 
have these opportunities to favour mixed neighbourhoods, workplaces and schools 
(Schubotz and Robinson 2006). 
More recently, research has sought to investigate the impact of integrated 
education on political outlooks. Using time-series data from the NJLT survey (from 
1998 to 2003) and data from the 1998 and 2003 Northern Ireland Election survey, 
Hayes et al. (2007) addressed the question of whether attendance at an integrated school 
has a significant effect on the political outlooks of Protestants and Catholics. They 
measured political outlooks by combining indicators within the survey that gauged 
respondents' political and national identity preferences as well ~s their attitudes towards 
the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. While they found that integrated education 
was important in shaping identities (Hayes et al. 2007: 471), this was in part contingent 
on the type of school that respondents attended. Here they identified two types of 
schools: 'formally' and 'informally' integrated schools. Formally integrated schools 
refer to those schools with a roughly equal numerical balance of the two main traditions. 
An informally integrated school refers to those schools that have undertaken the 
transformation process to integrated status. They also noted that the impact of contact 
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was dependent on the nature of the contact situation as well as the numerical 
composition and status positions within the school (Hayes et al. 2007: 476). 124 
The findings from the study revealed that Protestant pupils who attended an 
integrated school (whether fonnally or infonnall y integrated) were less likely to follow 
traditional identity patterns (namely to identi fy as British and unionist) and to identify 
instead on more neutral grounds (namely as Northern Irish) . Moreover, those who had 
attended an integrated school were less likely to support the constitutional link with 
Britain than those who received a segregated education (Hayes et al. 2007: 473). 
Significantly, however, almost no Protestants within the integrated sector supported a 
united Ireland as their constitutional position. Instead, a number of respondents chose to 
remai n undecided. 
Conversely, for Catholic pupils the findings of the study suggested that attendance 
at an infonnally integrated school when compared to a segregated school was the 
significant factor in breaking the traditional mould. Catholics who attended an 
informally integrated school were significantly less likely to opt for both an Irish and a 
nationalist identity, preferring instead to identify as Northern Irish. However, unlike 
their Protestant counterparts, Catholic pupils who had attended an infonnally integrated 
school were more likely to cross the divide on the constitutional issue and favour 
maintaining the union with Britain. The suggestion here was that the apparent 
willingness for Catholic pupils to cross the traditional divide can be explained by the 
124 While the terms 'formally integrated ' and 'i nformally integrated' or ' mixed ' refer to different types of 
integrated schools, it should be noted that there are limitations in using this terminology as it implies that 
there are signifi cant demographic differences within the different types of schools. As I have 
demonstrated, however, this is often not the case. Indeed, I found large imbalances in enrolments from the 
two main traditions within ' formally ' integrated school s. Acknowledging the ambiguity surrounding 
these terms (which I discuss in detail later in the chapter), I will use these terms as it is commonplace 
within both the academic literature and among pol icy practitioners to refer to these school s in this way, 
and these terms have also been incorporated into the measures for integrated education within the NISA 
and NIL T surveys . 
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group status position of Catholics within informally integrated schools (Hayes et al. 
2007). 
These are important findings, since they suggest that the type of contact that takes 
place can make a significant difference to the social outcomes that such contact is likely 
to engender. As demonstrated earlier, the informally integrated sector consists of those 
schools transforming to integrated status, and up to this point all of these schools have 
come from the Protestant tradition. There is a large numerical imbalance in these 
schools, with those from the Catholic tradition decidedly in the minority. Hayes et al. 
(2007: 464, 474) argue that this minority position influences Catholics' perceived status 
position and thus their experience of intergroup contact. Catholics in this situation are 
more likely to adopt the political outlook of the majority group. This suggests that 
pupils ' contact experiences may greatly differ depending on whether they constitute the 
majority or minority group within the school. These findings have important 
implications, since they bear on the effectiveness of integrated schools in bringing about 
the societal change through intergroup contact. 
While a substantial body of research has probed the impact of integrated 
education on attitudes towards and perceptions of the out-group, as well as the 
relationship between intergroup contact within the school environment and friendship 
patterns, the relationship between intergroup contact within the school environment and 
national identity patterns has received more limited attention. The lack of inquiry in this 
area is a significant omission from research into the effects of contact initiatives in 
divided societies. As noted in Hayes et al. (2007), it is competing claims over territory 
expressed through identity labels that form a very significant factor in dividing the two 
communities within Northern Ireland. Thus, self-identification as either 'British' or 
'Irish' has strong resonance with the majority of people in Northern Ireland. 
The only study to investigate whether a relationship exists (between varying 
levels of integration and national and political identities) is that conducted by Hayes et 
al. (2007). Their findings are important since they suggest that individuals who attended 
an integrated school were less sectarian in their political outlooks. However, their 
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fi ndings also suggested that the type of contact, and specifica ll y the numerical balance 
of the school, was important in predicting respondents ' political outlooks. 
In the fo ll owing section, I continue this line of enquiry by examining the profi les 
of students who attended either a mixed or fo rmally integrated schoo l in Northern 
Ireland. Us ing N ISA and NILT survey data, I analyse and compare the socio-economic 
profi les of students who attended integrated and separate-reli gion schools. I then 
explore the relationship between different levels of intergroup contact within schools 
and the national identity preferences of pupils through biva riate and multivariate 
analyses. 
Identity and intergroup contact in schools 
There has been some suggestion that the majority of pupils who attend integrated 
schools come from middle class homes. If this is the case, then it could be expected that 
students who attend mixed or integrated school s will already be predi sposed to more 
liberal values and ideas expressed within the family home. They may also have had 
more opportunity for travel and thus more opportunity to meet people from a range of 
backgrounds. To test whether those who attend integrated schools are indeed more 
likely to come from a middle class background, I examine a number of important socio-
economic indicators and cross these with the type of school respondents attended. Table 
6.3 examines the socio-economic profiles of those respondents who attended either an 
integrated or separate-religion school between 1989 and 1995 . From 1998 onwards the 
NILT survey disaggregated integrated into ' fonnall y integrated ' and 'mixed '. 125 
Therefo re Table 6.4 examines the social profiles of those respondents who attended 
either a fonnall y integrated, mixed or separate re ligion school between 1998 and 20 10. 
125 See Appendix 2 Table 20 and Table 2E for specific wording of questions in the NISA and NILT 
surveys. 
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Table 6.3. Socio-economic characteristics by school type, Northern 
Ireland, 1989-1995 
Protestants Catholics 
Integrated Separate- Integrated Separate-
religion 
-
Age (mean years) 48.7 50 .7 
'-
Gender (female)(%) 59 57 
Tertiary degree(%) 4* 7 
Employed(%) 49 46 
Non manual(%) 55 53 
* Significantly different from integrated at the p<.05 level. 
Source: NISA surveys 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995 
religion 
47.5 44.7 
59 59 
5 4 
42 43 
49* 44 
I 
Pop 
mean 
48.2 
58 
6 
45 
50 
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Analysis of the results in Table 6.3 only partially support the claim that integrated 
education primari ly attracts those from a middle class background. There appears to be 
little difference in the social profiles of Catholics and Protestants who attended either an 
integrated or separate-religion school. Indeed, there were no significant differences 
found between the two sectors with regards to employment status or occupation. 
Table 6.4. Socio-economic characteristics by school type, Northern 
Ireland, 2005-2010 
Protestants Catholics 
Formally Fairly Separate- Formally Fairly Separate- Pop 
integrated mixed religion integrated mixed religion mean 
Age (mean 40 .5** 49.2 52.1 38.3** 47 .1 47.0 49.5 
years) 
Gender 66* 59aa 57 67* 60 59 58 
(female)(%) 
Tertiary 8 15aa 12 17 12 14 13 
degree(%) 
Employed 46 so•• 45 46 47 46 46 
(%) 
Non 61 59aa 53 51 49 46 51 
manual(%) 
- --
•• Significantly different from separate-religion at the p<.01 level. 
* Significantly different from sepa rate-religion at the p<.05 level. 
** Significantly different from separate-religion at the p<.01 level. 
Source: NIL T surveys 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010 
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Analysis of Table 6.4 reveals few statistically significant differences in socio-
economic characteristics between those who attended formally integrated schools and 
those who attended separate-religion schools. For Catholics, there does not appear to be 
much of a difference in the social profiles of those who attended an integrated school 
compared to their counterparts who attended separate-religion schools. This is not a 
surprising finding given the tendency for more Catholics (who have to date been in the 
demographic minority) than Protestants to attend a school with a Protestant majority. 
However, those who attended a formally integrated school are more likely to be female 
and hold a tertiary level degree. Among Protestants, however, the data indicate that 
those who attended an integrated school were more likely to go on to hold tertiary level 
degrees and to be employed in white-collar jobs. And the social profiles of Protestant 
respondents who stated to have attended a mixed school differ significantly with those 
that reported having attended a separate-religion school. These results suggest that, 
among Protestants at least, socio-economic position does matter. This is not a 
particularly surprising finding given that many Protestants elite grammar schools in 
Northern lreland are, at least officially, of mixed status. Given these findings, it is 
important to control for the potential influence of these variables on identity preferences 
in the main analyses to come. 
Accordingly, I examine the relationship between differ.ent levels of intergroup 
contact within schools and the national identity preferences of pupils, utilizing survey 
data from the NISA and NIL T surveys over a 22 year period. This analysis explores 
whether there are differences in the national identity preferences between Catholic or 
Protestant respondents who attended an integrated school against those who attended a 
segregated school. Only individuals who state that they come from either a Catholic or 
Protestant background are included in the analysis. The central hypothesis is that 
individuals who attended an integrated school (and thus experienced intergroup contact 
within school) will be more likely to hold a cross-community identity than individuals 
who attended a state controlled or Catholic maintained school (and thus having limited 
or no intergroup contact within school). 
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Th is hypothesis is first tested using a series of bivariate analyses. The analys is 
compares national identity preferences of Protestants and Catho lics who attended either 
an integrated or a segregated school at two points in time. I estab lish the overall strength 
of any re lationsh ip between type of school attended and through chi-square tests. The 
second part of the analysis involves fo ur logistic regression models that estimate the 
degree to wh ich there are differences between the type of school attended and 
preference fo r the Northern Irish identity holding a range of important socio-economic 
and socio-demographic variables constant. Here I compare differences between 
Catholics and Protestants. 
Turning first to the bivariate analysis, Table 6.5 presents the breakdown in school 
type by nati onal identity among self-identified Catholics and Protestants at two points in 
time-1995 and 2010. The results show only partial support for a relationship between 
integrated education and particular identity choices. Focusing first on Protestant 
respondents, the results suggest that in 1995 patterns of national identity were rel atively 
stable and did not vary according to school attended. Protestants who attended a 
segregated school were just as likely to identify as Northern Iri sh as those who claimed 
to have attended an integrated school. However, a different picture emerges in the NILT 
2010 survey. Here, less than 60 per cent of Protestants who stated that they attended 
either a mixed or form ally integrated school identified as British. The most sign ificant 
differences, however, are seen among those who identified as Northern Irish. In 20 I 0, 
those who attended either a formally integrated or mixed school were over three times 
more likely to identify as Northern Irish than equivalent respondents in the 1995 survey. 
Moreover, 25 per cent of students at separate-religion schools identified as Northern 
Irish compared to 41 per cent at mixed schools. This is a significant difference, as 
indicated by the t-test results. More than one in three Protestants who attended a 
forma ll y integrated school also identifi ed as Northern Irish. Almost no Protestants at 
either a mixed, formall y integrated or segregated school identified with the out-group 
Irish national identity. 
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Table 6.5. National identity by school type and religious denomination(%), 1995 and 2010 
--··.-.__. 
Protestants Catholics 
-- ------
1995 2010 1995 2010 
Mixed Separate- All Formally Mixed Separate- All Mixed Separate- All Formally Mixed Separate- All 
religion integrated religion religion integrated religion 
British 67 67 67 58 56 63 62 18** 11 12 6 12 7 8 
Ulster 13 14 14 I 0 3 7 6 3 1 1 0 2 0 
Nth 12 13 13 37 41 ** 25 27 19 21 21 25 25 25 25 
Irish 6 4 4 5 0 4 3 57 66 65 62 55 59 59 
Other 1 2 2 0 0 2 1 O* 3 1 6 5 8 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (112) (596) (708) (19) (59) (436) (514) (77) (460) (537) (16) (40) (379) (435) 
(Chi square 2.052, 4 df, p>.05) (Chi square 11.652, 8 df, p>.05) (Chi square 9. 004, 4 df, (Chi square 4.167, 8 df, p>. 05) . 
p>.05) 
* Significantly different from separate-religion at the p<.05 level. •• Significantly different from separate-religion at the p<.01 level. 
Source: NISA and NIL T surveys, pooled file, 1989-2010. 
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A different picture emerges when we analyse the effects of school type on 
national identity among Catholic respondents. Catholics were more likely to identify as 
Northern Iri sh than Protestants in 1995 (although this preference was not influenced by 
the type of school attended). And, unlike Protestants, Catholics who attended a mixed 
school were more inclined to identify with the out-group identity, in this case the British 
identity. There was a decline in the number of pupils who attended a mixed school 
identifying as Irish. This difference was found to be statistically significant when 
comparing attendance at mixed and separate-religion schools in 1995 . 
The multivariate analyses displayed in Table. 6.6 highlight the relationsh ip 
between attendance at an integrated school and national identity preferences, holding a 
range of socio-economic variables constant. Here I present four logistic regression 
models. Two of these represent responses to the surveys conducted before the 
devolution of powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1999. The other two analyses 
are models representing surveys conducted in the 10 years since devolution. In each 
model I present the logistic coefficients, the standard errors (in parentheses), and the 
exponent (B) scores. The third column of each model represents the exponent (B) which 
predicts the odds of identifying as Northern Irish as opposed to British (for Protestants) 
or Irish (for Catholics) when a particular variable is considered, holding other important 
variables constant. For every unit increase in an independent variable the odds of 
identifying as Northern Irish either decrease or increase. 
The models support the finding of the bivariate analysis presented in Table 6.5 
that shows that a shift in national identity preferences has occurred over time. After a 
range of socio-economic indicators are controlled for in the regression model s, the 
likelihood of Protestants who attended an integrated school identifying as Northern Irish 
has increased over time. Since devolution, Protestants who attended an integrated 
schoo l were almost 30 per cent more likely to identify as Northern Irish than their 
segregated counterparts. 
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Table 6.6. The relationship between school type and national identity, 1989-2010 
Protestant I Catholic Pre-devolution Post-devolution Pre-devolution Post-devolution Socio-demograph ic 
controls 
Gender (female) -.217 (. 145) .805 .064 (.087) 1 066 .205 (.143) 1.228 .453 (.099) 1.574** 
Age -.008 (.005) .992 -009 (.003) .991 ** .003 (.004) 1.003 .007 (.003) 1.007* 
Labour-force active .185 (. 167) 1.203 .065 (.102) 1.068 .438 (.155) 1.550 .. .368 (. 11 3) 1.445** 
Occupation (non-manual) .166 (.164) 1.181 -.215 (.216) .806 -.020 (.163) .980 -.219 (.250) .803 
Church attendance .010 (. 162) 1 010 .046 (.093) 1.047 -.077 (.264) .926 .301 {. 120) 1.352* 
Marital status (married) -.312 (.148) .732* -.049 (.089) .952 .134 (.140) 1.144 .261 (.098) 1.298** 
Education 
(Tertiary) .773 (.203) 2.167** .781 (.120) 2.184** .407 (.227) 1.503 -.040 (. 135) .961 
(Secondary) -.056 (.181) .945 .331 (.114) 1.393** .090 (.174) 1.095 .054 (.126) 1.056 
(No qual) 
School Type 
(Formally 
.101 (.274) 1.106 .191 (.286) 1.210 integrated) 
(Mixed) .200 (.169) 1.222 .245 (. 130) 1.277* .329 (.176) 1.390* .483 (.155) 1.622** 
(Segregated) 
Constant -1.323 (.354) .266** -.758 (.258) .468** -1 .648 (.297) .192** -1 .859 (.272) .156** 
Nagelkerke 
.050 .049 .030 .031 R square 
(N) (1625) (2777) 
------
(1165) 
---
(2342) 
*p<.05 **p<.01. -- Omitted category of comparison 
Notes: In each model, column one represents the logistic coefficients; column two represents the standard errors (in parentheses); and column three 
represents the Exponent B. Dichotomous dependent variable for Protestants is operationalised as 1 =Northern Irish 0=British; for Catholics 1 =Northern Irish 
0= Irish. Source: NISA and NILT surveys pooled file, 1989-2010. 
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Support fo r a shift in national identity patterns over time among Catholics is also 
ev ident with those attending a mixed school over 60 per cent more likel y to identify as 
Northern Irish. The multivariate analyses reveal that attendance at mixed schools , rather 
than at fonnally integrated schools, is most strongly associated with the fonnation of 
less divisive identities. 
The results from the mu ltivariate analysis support the hypothesis that indiv iduals 
who attended an integrated school (and thus experienced intergroup contact within 
school) are more likely to identify with the cross-community identity (the Northern Irish 
identity) than individuals who attended a segregated school; this is especiall y true of 
Catholic respondents. However, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses reveal that 
attendance at a fonnally integrated school is not a significant predictor of moderation in 
identity. 
Explaining identity in the education sector 
Perhaps surprisingly, the overall results of the data do not suggest a strong 
relationship between attending a formally integrated school and a moderation in 
national identity preferences . It is surprising because the integrated education sector is, 
at least theoretically, an environment best suited to provide the conditions necessary for 
positive intergroup contact to occur. That is, the school classroom provides a safe and 
supportive environment in which individuals from different community backgrounds 
can come together to learn and play cooperatively. Moreover, schools provi de an 
important environment in which friendships may be formed. There are severa l potential 
explanations for the weakness of the relationship between school integration and 
moderations in national identity. 
From a practical perspective, one explanation for the weakness of the results may 
be the nature of the indicators used in the survey to measure the two types of integrated 
schoo ls. For example, the indicators are not able to asce11ain how respondents evaluated 
the numerical balance of the school they attended. And they cannot indicate whether 
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this evaluation fits accurately with the respondents ' ideas of what constitutes a 
'formally integrated' as compared to a 'fairly mixed ' school. 
This point is highlighted by comparing response rates from the NILT data with 
government statistics from the Department of Education on enrolment numbers in 
integrated schools. By doing so we can assess how accurate respondents were in their 
perceptions of the type of school that they attended. As demonstrated earlier, controlled 
integrated schools-schools that have transformed to official integrated status and 
contain large numerical imbalances between the two main religions- only account for 
1.9 per cent of all schools in Northern Ireland. Grant maintained integrated schools, 
referring to those schools that are planned integrated, account for 4.8 per cent of all 
schools. Comparison of these with responses to the question 'Was this a formally 
integrated school or was it a school that was just fairly mixed?' (emphasis in original) 
from the 2010 NIL T survey suggests that perceptions of what numerically constitutes as 
integrated school may differ. Table 6.7 shows the proportion of Northern Ireland adults 
who reported that they attended either a formally integrated, fairly mixed or segregated 
school. As we can see, 3.7 per cent of respondents claim to have attended a 'formally 
integrated' school while I 0.4 per cent claim to have attended a ' fairly mixed ' school. 
Table 6.7. School type by religious denomination(%) 
Protestant Catholic Total 
Formally integrated 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Fairly mixed 11.4 9.2 10.4 
Separate-religion 84.9 87 .2 85.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(N) (516) (436) (952) 
Source: NIL T survey 2010. 
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This disparity between survey response rates and the actual number of contro ll ed 
and grant maintained integrated schools suggests that we cannot assume that 
respondents equate 'fairly mi xed ' wi th transformed contro lled in tegrated schools and 
' forma lly integrated ' with grant maintained in tegrated schools. It could be that 
respondents fee l more comfortable with stating that their school was just 'fairl y mixed ' 
because they were unaware of the exact numerical balance with in the school. 
Furthermore, 'fairly mi xed ' could be literally interpreted as pertaining to a school wi th a 
' fa ir mix' of Catholics and Protestants, which does not suggest that the schoo l had a 
large numerical imbalance between the two main traditi ons. Because of this ambiguity, 
it is not possible to use these measures with confidence in analys ing di fferences 
between the two types of integrated schools. Moreover, the very small number (N) in 
the individual surveys (for exampl e in 2010 N=35) fo r those respondents claiming to 
have attended a 'formally integrated ' school produces very high standard errors and 
may explain the lack of statistically significant results. These measures must therefore 
be analysed with these qualifications in mind. 
A second explanation is revealed through a closer inspecti on of the nature of 
integrated schools in Northern Ireland. Quali tative studies suggest that an integrated 
ethos may be underm ined by a lack of unifonnity in implementing integration (if at all ) 
within this sector (see Montgomery et al. 2003). Unfortunately it is not possi ble to 
identify the processes involved within integrated schools that may influence a person's 
identity using survey measures. However, while the survey data is unable to capture the 
types of methods used to promote integration within schools, qualitative accounts from 
teachers at integrated schools indicate that a variety of approaches are being used to 
promote integrati on between pupils from the two main traditi ons. Here I draw on 
previous research (Johnson 200 1; Hughes and Donnelly 2006; Montgomery et al. 2003) 
that has sought to understand the practice of integration through interviews with 
teachers and principals of integrated schools. 
One important finding in all three of these studies was the very different 
approaches to integration found with in the integrated sector. These differences were 
found between planned integrated schools and transfom1ing schools where the unequal 
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enrolment numbers between the two traditions is most apparent. For the transforming 
schools, the study conducted by Johnson (2001) found that the particular history behind 
the decision to undergo transformation as well as the area in which the school was 
located influenced how smooth the transformation proceeded. Issues relating to the 
changeover from a separate-religion to an integrated administration could stall the 
transition and, in many of the schools evaluated, staff cohesion was described as a 
'work in progress'. Hughes and Donnelly (2006) also raise this issue, arguing that the 
process of transformation was often met with resistance from a small group of parents 
and teachers who favoured retaining the status quo. 
A qualitative study carried out by Montgomery et al. (2003) which sought to 
investigate how integration was implemented within integrated schools, had similar 
findings. It found no unified model of integration across the integrated sector and, as a 
consequence, 'integration' was implemented to varying degrees within schools. The 
study found three broad models used: passive-do nothing because it will happen 
naturally; reactive- do something if the need arises; and pro-active- after consultation 
with staff, agree on a policy and establish appropriate structures for promoting 
integration within the school (Montgomery et al. 2003: 31 ). Geographical location and 
the demographic makeup of schools were also significant in explaining different 
approaches to integration. For example, the study found thi!t transforming schools 
located in highly segregated areas tended to play down certain themes related to 
integration, especially when this coincided with a larger imbalance of pupils from the 
two main traditions. 
These qualitative accounts suggest that the integrated education sector may sti II 
have a way to go before an 'integrated' ethos becomes the accepted norm and all the 
conditions for positive intergroup contact can be met. However, given the current policy 
focus on 'sharing' across all schools (as well as the apparent preference for the 
transformation route to integration over the creation of planned integrated schools), it 
may be the case that an equal balance of Catholic and Protestant students within 
integrated schools is taken out of the current definition of what constitutes an 
'integrated' school as stated by the Department of Education. Indeed as the findings of a 
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recent report commissioned by the Integrated Education Fw1d (IEF) conclude, 'for 
policy implementation to be effecti ve a much clearer distinction between 'integrated', 
' mi xed', and ' shared' schooling needs to be drawn ' (Hansson et al. 2013: 66-67). 
Add ing to these concerns is the question of the extent to whi ch government will 
continue to support the creation of more integrated schools. For example, in interviews 
with politicians on a range of community relation issues , Foley and Robinson (2004: 
21) found a degree of scepticism over what role integrated schoo ls could play within a 
society wh ich contained two distinct religious traditions. For example, the issue of the 
potential threat to community culture that integrated education may pose was raised in 
an interview with a SDLP MLA. With regards to the protection of religious instruction 
with in schools, the MLA stated that there needed to be 'a much greater debate around 
the whole idea of integrated education ' (Foley and Robinson 2004: 21 ). Scepticism over 
the utility of integrated schools was also noted by UUP leader David Trimble who, in a 
debate on community relations policy, expressed doubts that the integrated education 
sector should continue to be supported by the state when the education system is already 
characterised by fragmentation (Foley and Robinson 2004: 21 ). 
It is unlikely that the integrated sector will continue to flourish if it is not met with 
the necessary institutional backing. As Oberschall and Kendall-Palmer (2005) argue, in 
the absence of institutional support at the political level, greater social integration is not 
likely to occur. For example, parents not only want quality education fo r their children, 
but also an environment in which their children are treated equall y, are free from peer 
harassment and are taught from a curriculum that is unbiased towards their group. 
Oberschall and Kendall-Palmer (2005: 87) contend that as long as these needs can be 
met with in separate-religion schools, parents are most likely to favour such schoo ling 
even if they are predisposed to the idea of integrated educat ion. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined what types of people attend integrated schools. 
More specificall y, l looked into whether those who have attended integrated or mixed 
schools are more likely to ho ld more moderate identities than those who have 
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experienced separate-religion education. Given that the Agreement contains a specific 
pledge 'to fac ilitate and encourage integrated education' for the creation of ' a culture of 
tolerance at every level of society' (NIO 1998), and support for integration has been 
evident in opin ion poll surveys that find that the majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland favour more integration in the education sector and the establishment of more 
integrated schools, this is a significant line of inquiry. 
The findings from the data analysis do suggest a moderate relationship between 
attending an integrated school (that is a mixed school) and identifying as Northern Irish 
for both Catholics and Protestants. And this relationship exists despite the large 
imbalances of pupils from the two main traditions present within the integrated schools. 
This suggests that it may be the perception of mixing, rather than the actual balance of 
Protestant/Catholic students that is important. 
The extent to which integrated schools can make a difference to broader 
community relations is limited by a number of factors. First, the integrated sector 
represents just 6 per cent of all schools in Northern Ireland. And whi le the integrative 
movement gained momentum throughout the 1980s and 1990s, recent government 
policy suggests that the focus has shifted from promoting integrated schools per se 
towards promoting cooperation and contact between separate-religion schools. This 
means that the fu ture of the integrated sector is uncertain. 
The research in this chapter was also limited by the small number of cases as well 
as the ambiguity surrounding the definition of the measures 'fairly mixed' and 'formally 
integrated' used in the surveys. Future research would benefit from the development of 
measures wh ich ask respondents to specify the type of school they attended. Of course, 
given the nature of this line of inquiry, the measures are only able to capture perceptions 
of past, rather than present, intergroup contact. As a consequence of this, whatever 
measures are used will always be limited in their explanatory ability because it is not 
possible to discern whether past intergroup contact has been compromised, influenced 
or reinforced by subsequent life experiences . 
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The fo llowing chapter explores the extent of cross-community contact that occurs 
with in social networks in Northern Ireland. These networks consist of friends, family or 
more intimate partnerships. 
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Chapter 7. Social networks and identity 
The separation of communities in Northern Ireland persists not only within 
education and housing but also among relationships between individuals and groups of 
people. That is, Catholics and Protestants mostly mix socially with members from their 
own community and typically marry within their own community. This social 
separation between Catholics and Protestants intensified during the contemporary 
conflict because people who mixed across the traditional divide were often the subject 
of intimidation and violence (Barritt and Carter I 972; Harris 1972; Darby 1986; Whyte 
1990; Lloyd and Robinson 2011 ). Consequently, fear of intimidation and the desire for 
security led the majority of people to socialize exclusively within their own 
communities. 
A substantial period of time has now passed since the signing of the 1998 
Agreement that officially brought the contemporary conflict to an end and an even 
longer period of time has passed since government policy first sought to bridge the 
divide between communities by promoting an agenda aimed at increasing the 
opportunities for cross-community contact between members of the Catholic and 
Protestant communities. Recently, a number of studies h~ve found that cross-
community friendships and more intimate forms of relations exist and are continuing to 
emerge and that these relationships have had positive effects on attitudes towards a 
range of social and political issues (Paolini et al. 2004; Hewstone et al. 2006; Hewstone 
et al. 2008). This chapter builds on this research by exploring and comparing three 
arenas for social mixing: within friendship networks, within families , and as a 
consequence of marriage ties. It examines the manner in which these agents of 
socialization may influence identity patterns among Catholics and Protestants. This is 
the first study to systematically examine and compare these types of social networks 
and how they relate to individual national identity preferences. 
The chapter is organised into five sections. The first outlines the high levels of 
social separation that exist in these three arenas within Northern Ireland . The second 
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draws on the broad theoretical literature on social networks to distinguish between three 
types of networks: homogenous social networks pertaining to closed fr iendship and 
fami ly ties , endogamous social networks in the case of marriage within one's own 
community, and mixed social networks corresponding to the formation of friendship, 
kinship and marriage ties across the traditional divide. The third section explores the 
nature of friendship networks in Northern Ireland. I exam ine whether indi viduals with 
certain socio-economic characteristics are more likely or not to have mixed friendship 
networks . I then tum to an investigation of the relationship between the types of 
friendship networks respondents ' possess and their national identity preferences. The 
fourth section examines intermarriage in Northern Ireland to determine whether 
particular socio-economic factors are associated with marrying outside of one's group. 
Then through bivariate and multivariate analyses the relationships between mixed 
marriages, endogamous marriages and respondents ' national identity preferences are 
established. In the fifth and final section these techniques are applied to kinship 
networks. 
Social networks in Northern Ireland 
The social separation of communities in Northern Irel and is maintained and 
reproduced through the persistence of homogenous social networks. More often than 
not, members of the Catholic and Protestant communities have socially separate circles 
of fr iends and family that are drawn from within their respective communities. There is 
also a high degree of intra-community marriage. It is in these aspects of social relations 
that the divide between the two main communities is most striking. As shown in Figure 
7.1, in 1989, 68 per cent of Catholics and Protestants had hom ogenous friendship 
networks, 86 per cent had homogenous kinship ties, and 94 per cent of those who were 
married stated that their partner was from the same religion. Polynomial trend-lines that 
correct for mi ss ing survey years indicate that homogenei ty in friendsh ip and fami ly 
networks, as well as within marriage ties, has remained relatively stable over time. 
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Figure 7.1. Trends in homogenous social networks(%), 1989-2010 
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Earlier studies have documented the existence of social separation in Northern 
Ireland. For example, a seminal study of two rural areas in Northern Ireland found that 
the separation of Catholics and Protestant networks was most marked in the case of 
kinship and was separated into two distinct systems 'maintained by the almost universal 
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refusal to recogn ise kinship across the division' (Harris 1972: 143). This separation was 
found to have consequences for social engagement as kinship was considered to be of 
particular importance in the formation of other types of social relationsh ips. As such, 
contact between Cathol ics and Protestants was severely inhibited. The cross-community 
contact that did occur, Harris claimed, was restricted to polite greetings and 
conversations in which sensiti ve subj ects such as political and religious beliefs were 
stud iously avoided. The result of this meant that it was only with members of the same 
' si de ' that individuals could relax and speak openly. Importantly, Harris (I 972) also 
found that this culture of avoidance led people to think about each other in terms of 
group stereotypes. 
Similar patterns of social interaction were noted in Barritt and Carter 's (1972) 
studies of group relations in Northern Ireland. In rural areas they observed that while 
friendly relationships between neighbours of different religions existed, these were 
marked by a ' consciousness of difference '. ln this sense, 'the prudent kept off 
controversial subjects; the less prudent ( or those in a more intimate degree of 
friendship) may indulge a friendly banter but it will be of a kind which throughout 
remembers the religious difference' (Barritt and Carter 1972: 58). 
With respect to kinship networks, Harris (1972) highlighted the sociali zing forces 
of both the church and political and community organizations that shaped an 
individual 's social networks. With respect to social gatherings, for instance, Harris 
found that the Catholi c Church often performed the function of providing a social centre 
for members of the community. Membership in politically oriented groups such as the 
Orange Order has also provided important social networks. Women had their most 
important non-kin ties with other members of their churches with whom they were 
brought into contact through actual church services. Men were commonly also brought 
into contact with their fe llow co-reli gioni sts through politically oriented groups (Harris 
1972: 133). 
The importance of the role of churches as socializing agents was also noted by 
Muldoon et al. (2007) . In their qualitative analysis of religious and national identity in 
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Northern Ireland, churches were seen as generating and perpetuating religious 
segregation. In the words of one interviewee: 
The churches had a big part in dividing people because they 
provide a place for people to go on Sunday but they also provide 
social things for them to do, they've got halls, and they can provide 
a whole ... lifestyle for people so that they can stay with their own 
kind of people ... so the churches played a big part in dividing 
people up, in my opinion ... to this day (quoted in Muldoon et al. 
2007 : 97). 
In addition to the influence of the churches, the tendency to live within areas 
dominated by one community influences with whom one socializes. Socializing almost 
exclusively within one's own community has become an entrenched social norm across 
Northern Irish society after years of violence and intimidation drove people into areas 
dominated by their own community. 
As noted in the introductory chapter, divided societies are characterised by 
mutually contradictory assertions of identity (Dryzek 2006). Through the process of 
socialization, most people in Northern Ireland grow up holding national allegiance to 
either Britain or Ireland. Processes of national identity formation have been found to 
begin at an early age. For example, studies have revealed that children as young as five 
or six years old are able to categorize themselves as members of a national group. This 
process of national enculturation generates a sense of personal affiliation and belonging 
which in tum impacts on how the child views and expresses attitudes towards members 
of other national groups (Tajfel et al. 1970; Barrett 2007). 
These processes of identification and categorization occur within the social 
networks that an individual is raised in. As Kalmijn (1998: 400--401) notes, children are 
typically brought up with a sense of group identification. This may take the form of an 
awareness of a common history, or a sense of being different from others. How strongly 
younger generations identify themselves with the group depends to a great extent on the 
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homogeneity of the networks in whi ch they are embedded. Wi thin the context of 
Northern Ireland, the dual education system is regarded as entrenching di vision with in 
society through restricting indi vidual opportuni ty to form di verse social networks at an 
early age (see Dunn 1986; Fraser and Fitzduff 1986) as well as through providing 
Catholic and Protestant children with di fferent vers ions of history and national 
belonging (Gallagher 2003, 2004a). 
When adolescents live in neighbourhoods that are homogenous with respect to the 
social and cultural characteri stics of their parents, they are more likel y to develop a 
sense of belonging to that group. Within segregated neighbourhoods in Northern 
Ireland, understandings of the nation are visually demonstrated through the use of 
elaborate mural paintings, kerbstone paintings and fl ag fl ying. Through the use of 
symbolic markers of territory and commemorative mural paintings self-perpetuating 
understandings of national identity are reinfo rced through co llective remembering 
(McAuley 2004: 542). In this sense, the individual ' s social framework- the 
neighbourhood- helps to entrench a sense of identity through a complex interaction 
between the materials available and the different versions of history visually and orally 
presented within the confines of the neighbourhood (McBride 200 I : 13). 
Comparisons between groups have also been fou nd to occur at an early age. 
Connolly and Maginn (1999) show that some children, from the age of about three, are 
able to develop an understanding of the categories of the other through a perception of 
differences between the Protestant and Catholic communities. Although possibly not 
using the tenn s Protestant and Catholi c, young children are able to appl y negati ve 
characteristics to members of the other group. More recentl y, Connoll y et al. (2002) 
found that by the age of six , 90 per cent of children surveyed were aware of the 
community divi de in Northern Ireland and one-third of those surveyed were ab le to 
identify with one of the two main communities .126 Moreover, according to Devine and 
126 The researchers conducted a survey ofa representati ve sample of352 children aged 3-6 drawn fro m 
across Northern Ireland. The children were shown a range of objects and photographs representing 
common events and symbols associated with the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern 
212 
Schubotz (2004), a survey of 16-year-olds in Northern Ireland found that the majority of 
participants (60 per cent) said that their national identity was important to them. If an 
individual lives in a segregated Protestant/Unionist neighbourhood, for example, attends 
a state controlled school, and has homogenous social networks based on the prevailing 
community background, then they are is likely to have been brought up with a particular 
understanding of history, community and identity that is congruent with the prevailing 
attitudes and beliefs of the wider Protestant/Unionist community. 
Social network theory 
There is an enormous diversity and intensity of social networks in societies across 
the world and these networks operate at many levels (for a review of the diversity of 
social networks studied in the social science literature see Scott 1988, 2000). They exist, 
for example, in organizations between colleagues, trade union members, voluntary or 
community organizations, traders and farmers. With the advent of online 
communications, they now also exist virtually through online social networking sites 
such as Facebook, MySpace, Linkedin, and Twitter (see Lewis et al. 2008; 
Subrahmanyam et al. 2008). At the personal level, social networks exist between friends 
and families and in more intimate relations such as between marriage partners (see 
Laumann 1973; McPherson et al. 2001). It is this latter cluster of social networks that 
form the focus of this chapter. 
'Homophily' is a term used to describe the extent to which people within a social 
network are similar across a range of characteristics. It derives from the idea that 
contact between similar people (measured by class, ethnicity or other socio-
demographic indicators) occurs at a higher rate than among people who are dissimilar 
using these same measures. 127 Homophily influences the structure of a wider range of 
Ireland. The children were asked to explain what they knew about the different events and symbols and 
their responses were then coded and statistically analysed (Connolly et al. 2002). 
127 For a detailed review of the literature see McPherson et al. 2001. 
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network ties including marriage, friendship, info rmation transfer, work and other types 
of relationships. It limits people's social worlds and, as a result, their personal networks 
are homogeneous with regards to a range of social, demographic, behavioural and 
intra personal characteri stics (McPherson et al. 200 I). Thus, while homophily 
characterizes and structures network systems, homogeneity characterizes personal 
networks (McPherson et al. 2001: 429) . 
Homogeneous personal networks, include, but are not exclusive to, networks 
among friends, kin, and work colleagues (McPherson et al. 2001). For example, studies 
have found strong levels of homogeneity among different ethnic and religious groups 
with regards to bonds of marri age (Kalmijn 1998), close relations (Marsden 1987) and 
schoo lmate friendships (Shrum et al. I 988) . Marsden 's (1987) study of social networks 
in the United States, in particular the nature of close relations between people, found 
that in a national sample only 8 per cent of adults with networks of two or more people 
claimed to 'discuss important matters ' with a person of another ethnic group. 
Why is homogeneity such an enduring feature of social networks within societies? 
For one thing, homogeneity in social networks is important for the survival of the 
group. Thus, the probability that members of groups hold equivalent beliefs tends to 
increase as the homogeneity or density of their social network increases (Bienenstock et 
al. 1990: 171). Conversely, heterogeneity is a measure of the diversity of a social 
network as it refers to the distribution of people among different groups (Blau 1977; 
Bienenstock et al. 1990). In Blau's (1977) seminal work, Heterogeneity and Inequality, 
he explains that heterogeneity fosters intergroup relations because it increases the 
chances fo r contact between members of different groups (Blau (J 977: 90). In thi s way, 
the greater the levels of heterogeneity the greater the chances for social contact 
involving members of different groups. 
Th is argument that heterogeneity fos ters intergroup relations is similar to the basic 
premise advanced by contact theory (Allport 1954; Brown and Hewstone 2005; 
Petti grew 1998). Recall that the fundamental premise of contact theory is that confl ict 
and prejudice arise between groups where there is a lack of positive interaction and 
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information between groups and where there is a lack of opportunity for contact that 
would facilitate the acquisition of such information. Without significant opportunity for 
contact, it is argued, it becomes impossible for individuals to realize their similarities 
and to accept their differences. As such, intergroup contact has the potential to increase 
learning about the out-group (Pettigrew 1998) and recent studies have found that out-
group contact can result in more diverse social networks (Dovidio et al. 2003). 
Accordingly, Blau's (1977) theory is concerned with opportunities for promoting social 
mixing defined as intergroup contact. 
The fact that patterns of networks are so significantly affected by the relative size 
of groups in the pool of potential contact is one of the central insights of Blau's work. 
However, while Blau (1977) highlights opportunity for contact as fundamental for the 
formation of heterogeneous social networks, the structure of society may render it 
unlikely that contact between groups will occur on a frequent and positive basis . Within 
divided societies there are a number of factors that reinforce salient group distinctions 
and that may compromise the influence of heterogeneity of social relations. For 
example, the spatial segregation of groups limits the influence of heterogeneity because 
'we are more likely to have contact with those who are closer to us in geographic 
location than those who are distant' (McPherson et al. 2001: 429). Previous research has 
found that the spatial allocation of housing and the degree to_ which it is segregated 
inversely correlates with intermarriage (Peach 1980). As one would expect, the 
opportunities for individuals from different groups to meet are small if homogenous 
groups live, work and socialize in different areas. 
Analysis of social networks thus assumes a particular importance in the context of 
divided societies. This is because the social networks to which individuals belong have 
the capacity to influence a variety of political and social behaviours as they expose 
people to information and stimuli that they may not possess individually (Mcclurg 
2003) . Within the social science literature, there is much support for the contention that 
social networks act as important agents of socialization that influence a range of 
attitudes and behaviours of an individual (see for example Converse 1969; Lyons and 
Alexander 2000; Putnam 2000; Blais et al. 2004). For example, research has 
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emphasised the role of the family as an important agent of socialization and, in 
particular, the importance of the socio-economic status of the parents (Dawson and 
Prewitt 1969; Jennings and Niemi 1974) as well as parental civic engagement, political 
knowledge and political participation (Meirick and Wackman 2004; McIntosh et al. 
2007). 
With regard to political participation, voting is found to be strongly correlated 
between friends, family members and co-workers (Beck et al. 2002) as well as 
candidate preferences (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1991). Thus, if an individual 's social 
networks are homogenous with respect to important socializing agents, such as family 
and fr iends, it can be expected that a range of social and political attitudes and 
behaviours will be significantly influenced by the prevailing values and attitudes of the 
group. 
Similarly, if an individual 's social networks are heterogeneous with respect to 
important socializing agents, it may be expected that the individual will not be as 
influenced by the views of one viewpoint over another. This is because mixed social 
networks may weaken the salience of group attitudes by allowing a range of different 
views to be heard. Recent studies have found that the attitudinal compos ition of an 
individual 's social network can affect the strength of their attitudes. For example, in a 
controlled participant study, Visser and Mirabile (2004) found that individuals 
embedded in networks comprised of like-minded others were more resistant to attitude 
change than those with attitudinally-mixed social networks. This is because people who 
are surrounded by significant others who share a particular attitude may be socially 
rewarded for expressing views that reinforce thi s attitude, and may be socially 
sancti oned for expressing divergent views. By increasing heterogeneity, and thus by 
making intergroup relations more common, intragroup pressures that inhibit social 
interaction between groups may lessen and social mixing may become more acceptable 
and decrease the strength of divisive attitudes (Blau 1977: 81). 
This is precisely what community relations initiatives in Northern Ireland have 
sought to achi eve by increasing opportunities for members of the Catholic and 
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Protestant communities to come into contact with each other. Such opportunities may 
be found within the small but growing integrated education sector, within mixed 
residential areas, and at shared shopping and leisure facilities. While there is strong 
evidence to suggest that social networks often remain homogenous, data also reveal that 
a minority of Catholics and Protestants choose to form friendship, kinship and marriage 
ties with members of the traditional out-group community. While it is not possible, nor 
desirable, to force people to become friends or to form more intimate relations and 
family ties, greater opportunities for cross-community contact found in the areas 
mentioned above and a new era of peace in the province may signal increasing 
opportunities for, and social acceptance of, social mixing. 
Analysing social networks in Northern Ireland 
In the empirical analyses that follow, these mixed social networks are examined. 
In particular, the question is asked whether having a mixed social network influences 
the way in which people perceive of their national identity? That is, do individuals who 
cross the traditional boundary and come to form friendships and other intimate relations 
with members of the other main community identify differently than those whose social 
networks are firmly embedded within their own community? This question is 
considered using two pooled datasets-the NISA/NIL T for the period 1989- 2010 and 
the NILT for the period 1998-2005. These provide a number of relevant measures. For 
example, to establish the extent of out-group friendship, the NISA and NILT surveys 
ask, 'how many of your personal friends are the same religion as you? ' The response 
categories include 'All/Most', 'Half, 'Less than half, 'None'. Since only 1 per cent of 
respondents indicate having no friends of the same religion, the measure is coded into a 
simple binary-those with all or most of their friends from the same religion 
(corresponding to homogenous friendship networks) and those with half or less than 
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half of their friends fro m the same religion (con-esponding to mixed friendship 
networks). 128 
Before considering the survey results, it is important to discuss a number of 
difficulties in analysing social networks using survey data. First, as mentioned earlier, 
social networks vary in density and di versity. Thus, a social network of friends may 
consist of several close friends who an individual has known for a long time, has spent a 
considerable amount of time with, and has confided in on important and sensiti ve 
matters. It may also include a number of people who consider each other friends but 
who are not nearl y as closely connected to one another. It can even include 
acquaintances known only to the individual because they are connected in some way to 
the wider friendship network. As such, the density of network ties varies from strong to 
weak, ranging from those with whom the individual is most close to, to those with 
whom the individual is familiar but only through common connection to other fr iends. 
Thus, the descriptor 'friend ' is ambiguous, as the measurement of just who qualifies as 
a friend depends upon a variety of criteria employed by the respondent (Peach 1980). 
A second caveat concerns the degree to which the characteristics of friends within 
a homogenous group are important outside of this particular group. For example, each 
of the members of this particular network may also have friends with whom the 
particular characteristics of another group to which they belong are not important. Thus, 
they may each have friendship networks that cut across ethnic, racial and gender lines 
linking these individuals together along some other set of shared characteristics. This 
makes it harder to assess the density or diversity of an individual's network. Simi larly, 
in the case of kinship ties , in most instances it is fair to assume that members of our 
128 Alternative coding was applied to see whether this made a difference to the analyses. For example, I 
coded each of these categories separately and found that the response rates for the category ' All/Most' 
and 'None' were too small lo have any significant utility. I then grouped these two categories with 'Half 
and ' Less than half respective ly which gave me a larger number of responses to work with, without 
sign ifi cantly changing the results. 
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immediate family- parents and siblings-represent our closest kinship ties, while other 
family members such as aunts, uncles and cousins are ordinarily more removed. If this 
is the case we are more likely to share certain influential characteristics- such as socio-
economic status-with our closest kin rather than with other kin who may have married 
into other socio-economic circles, may live overseas or have different occupational and 
educational levels. To this extent, we could say that kinship networks vary in levels of 
intensity and diversity according to the scope of analysis and available data. Yet we are 
unable to gauge these levels because the current measures do not distinguish between 
different types of kin. 
Finally, the measures used in this study are not able to reflect the complexity of 
the networks under analysis. For example, the measures cannot tell us the exact number 
of out-group friends or family that a respondent has, nor about the frequency of the 
quality of those connections. 129 Moreover, there is reason to suppose that respondents 
may overstate their actual intergroup contact and degree of closeness to avoid the 
perception of prejudice by reporting 'some ' friends of the out-group or even to associate 
having a personal friend with being friendly toward that group)-the so-called 
favourable perception bias (De Souza Briggs 2007: 272). 
While these are significant limitations, the measures still hold considerable utility 
for the purposes of the current investigation. Using the same measures across successive 
surveys makes it possible to identify trends within the general population. These trends 
concern the degree to which people from both Catholic and Protestant communities 
claim to have mixed social networks. As I demonstrate, the measures under analysis 
reveal significant differences in both socio-economic characteristics as well as in 
identity preferences depending on whether a respondent belongs to homogenous or 
mixed networks. These results justify the use of such measures as well as their 
129 A scale devised to measure friendship quality has been utilised in qualitative surveys in Northern 
Ireland. See Stringer et al. 2009. 
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continued use in further research, and they suggest that there is value in developing 
finer gra ined measures to obtain greater clarity on these effects. 
Friendship networks 
The occurrence and nature of mixed fr iendships has received a considerable 
amount of attention in the scholarly li terature on the Northern Ireland conflict (see 
Paol ini et al. 2004; Stringer et al. 2009; Tam et al. 2009; Tausch et al. 2011) Moreover, 
research concerning normative influences on contact (see De Tezanos-Pinto et al. 2010; 
Turner et al. 2008) reveals the importance of diverse social networks for improving 
attitudes through having greater numbers or proportions of cross-group friendships. It 
has also been shown that having friends who can be classified as belonging to the other 
main community has a range of positive effects for community relations and that 
friendship and other more intimate relations represent the most important type of 
intergroup contact for reducing prejudice and negative stereotypes about the out-group 
(Pettigrew 1997; Tropp and Pettigrew 2005; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). 
Mixed friendship networks are found to engender greater levels of trust among 
Catholics and Protestants and even to lead to forgiveness among those who have had 
direct exposure to violence (Hewstone et al. 2006). It has been suggested that knowing 
someone who has an out-group friend can also lead to more positive feelings towards 
the out-group. This is the so-called extended contact hypothesis (Wright et al 1997). 
Exploring thi s hypothesis, Paol ini et al. (2004) found across two cross-sectional studies 
that extended contact among Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland was 
associated with more positive out-group attitudes and that it reduced intergroup anxiety 
and greater perceived out-group variab ility. Other research shows that having the 
opportunity to meet with members of the out-group in cross-community schemes 
increases the likelihood of having fri ends from other rel igious and community 
backgrounds (Schubotz and McCartan 2009). Thus, even weak ties between social 
groups may have the effect of linking different groups who would otherwise be 
insu lated from one another (Granovetter 1973, 1982). 
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To date, however, there has been little investigation of the relationship between 
mixed friendship networks and national identity preferences in Northern Ireland. As 
shown in previous empirical chapters, having the opportunity for contact with 
neighbours and school peers is significantly related to less divisive forms of 
identification. We could expect, therefore, that having a diverse friendship network in 
which an individual comes into frequent and voluntary contact with those from a 
different community background would increase the likelihood of identifying with 
neutral Northern Irish identity. To begin, then, I first investigate what types of people 
are more likely to have diverse friendship networks. This helps to highlight in what 
sections of society more diverse social networks may be found. Furthermore, by 
identifying important socio-economic characteristics related to social mixing it is 
possible to control for the effect of these on national identity in the multivariate 
analyses to follow. 
Socio-economic characteristics and friendship networks 
Individuals with greater social mobility are more likely to have the opportunity to 
meet people from other backgrounds, ethnicities and nationalities through work, travel 
and more diverse networks. This is borne out by NILT survey data as shown in Table 
7.1 . For both Catholic and Protestant respondents, those with mixed friendship networks 
scored higher on only one measure related to increased social -mobility. For example, 
those with mixed networks are more likely to be employed, suggesting that the 
workplace provides opportunities for cross-community contact leading to the formation 
of cross-community friendships . Somewhat surprisingly, however, there does not 
appear to be any significant difference with regards to higher levels of education and 
heterogeneity. While it might be expected that those who attend university are more 
likely to meet people from a different background than those who left school early, this 
does not appear to make a difference here. 
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Table 7.1. Socio-economic characteristics by friendship network, 1989-
2010 
Protestants Catholics 
Homo- Mixed Homo- Mixed Pop mean 
genous genous 
Age (mean years) 52 .1 49.8** 45.4 47.8** 
Employed(%) 46 53** 45 
Gender (female)(%) 56 58 59 
Tertiary degree(%) 11 12 12 
Non manual(%) 54 54 44 
* Significantly different from homogenous at the p<.05 level. 
** Significantly different from homogenous at the p<.01 level. 
Source: NISA and NILT surveys pooled file, 1989- 2010. 
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The results in Table 7.2 provide a time perspective on these re lationships by 
linking fr iendship network types to national identity preferences at two po ints in time 
(1995 and 2010). For Protestants, the results reveal no significant difference in 1995 in 
the levels of majority British identity between individuals with homogenous and mixed 
friendship networks. They also show only slight gaps in identification with Ulster and 
Northern Irish categories. However, 15 years later, there is an increase in those with 
mixed friendship networks di scarding traditional Briti sh identity in favour of Northern 
Irish identity by 17 per cent. While the proportion of respondents with homogenous 
friendsh ip groups who identify as Northern Irish has increased, this remain s 
significantly lower (by 9 per cent) when compared to those with mixed religion 
networks. 
The relationship between friendship networks and national identity is much more 
pronounced among Catholic respondents. For example, those with mixed friendship 
networks were almost tw ice as likely to identify as Northern Irish than those with 
friendship networks consisting of co-religion ists. Quite strikingly, the degree of 
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Catholic identity as Irish significantly decreases (by 25 percentage points in 1995 and 
18 percentage points in 2010) the more out-group friends one has. Indeed, in 2010 only 
48 per cent of Catholics with mixed friendship networks identified as Irish, while over 
one in three identified as Northern Irish. Unlike their Protestant counterparts, Catholic 
respondents with a mixed friendship network are more likely to identify as British. 
Two-tailed t-tests confirm the significance of these observations. 
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Table 7.2. Friendship network by national identity and religious denomination(%), 1995 and 2010 
Protestant Catholic 
1995 2010 1995 2010 
Homo- Mixed All Homo- Mixed All Homo- Mixed All Homo- Mixed All genous genous genous genous 
British 69 63 67 65 56* 62 7 17** 12 5 11 * 7 
Ulster 16 10* 14 7 4 6 1 2 1 0 
Nth 11 16 13 24 33* 27 16 28** 21 19 35** 25 Irish 
Irish 3 7* 4 2 5 3 75 50** 65 66 48** 59 
Other 1 3 2 1 2 1 0 1 1 9 5 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (445) (260) (705) (339) (170) (509) (307) (228) (535) (276) (157) (433) 
(Chi-square 18. 853, 4 df, (Chi-square 9.934, 4 df, p<.05) (Chi square 36. 707, 4 df, (Chi square 22.821 , 4 df, 
p<.01) p<.01) p<.01) 
*Significantly different from homogenous at the p<.05 level. 
**Significantl y different from homogeneous at the p<. 01 level. 
Source: NISA and NILT surveys pooled file , 1989-2010. 
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The multivariate analyses displayed in Table 7.3 largely confirm the bivariate 
findings. The third column of each model shown represents the exponent (B) 
highlighting the odds of identifying as Northern Irish as opposed to British (for 
Protestants) or Irish (for Catholics) when a particular variable is considered, net of all 
other predictor variables. After controlling for a range of relevant socio-demographic 
variables, the relationship between having mixed friendship networks and identifying as 
Northern Irish remains significant. This is most pronounced among Catholic 
respondents and the strength of the relationship has increased in the post-devolution 
period. While Catholic respondents with mixed friendship networks in the pre-
devolution period were almost twice as likely to identity as Northern Irish as to identify 
as Irish, they are now almost three times more likely to do so. For Protestant 
respondents, the analyses reveal a weaker relationship which has increased only sl ightly 
over time. In the post-devolution period, Protestant respondents with a mixed friendship 
network are 37 per cent more likely to identify as Northern Irish than British. 
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Table 7.3. The relationship between friendship networks and national identity, 1989-2010 
Protestants Catholics 
Pre-devolution Post-devolution Pre-devolution Post-devolution 
Socio-demographic controls 
Gender (female) -.229 (.1 46) .795 .060 (.087) 1.062 .196 (. 144) 1.217 .435 (. 102) 1.545** 
Age -.007 (.005) .993 -.009 (.003) .991 ** .002 (.004) 1.002 .003 (.003) 1.003 
Labour-fo rce active .168 (. 168) 1.183 .061 (.1 03) 1.063 .328 (.158) 1.389* .255 (. 11 5) 1.290* 
Occupation (non-manual ) .193 (.164) 1.2 13 -.199 (.2 17) .819 -.008 (. 164) .992 -. 117 (.257) .889 
Church attendance .009 (. 163) 1.009 .033 (.093) 1.034 -102 (.267) .903 .263 (. 123) 1.301 * 
Marital status (married) -.320 (. 148) .726* -.031 (.090) .970 .1 03 (. 141) 1 .108 .277 (.100) 1.319** 
Education 
(Tertiary) .784 (.204) 2.191** .787 (.120) 2.198** .365 (.229) 1.440 -.105 (. 138) .900 (Secondary) -.036 (.180) .965 .349 ( .114) 1 .417** .083 (. 175) 1.087 .01 5 (.129) 1.015 (No qual) 
Friendship network 
(Mixed} .296 (. 143) 1.345* .321 (.090) 1.378 .661 (. 137) 1.937** 1.006 (.097) 2.735** (Homogenous) 
Constant 
-1.425 (.357) .240** - .852 (.259) .427** -1.729 (.303) .177** -1.974 (.278) .139** 
Nagelkerke R square .053 .054 .054 .091 (N) (1,6 19) (2 ,675) (1,162) (2,304) 
*p<.05 **p<.01. -- Omitted category of comparison 
Notes: In each model , column one represents the logistic coefficients; column two represents the standard errors (in parentheses); and co lumn three 
represents the Exponent B. Dichotomous dependent variable for Protestants is operationalised as 1 =Northern Irish 0=British; for Cathol ics 1 =Northern Irish 0= Irish. 
Source: NISA and NIL T surveys pooled file, 1989-2010. 
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As the data show, a mixed friendship network is a strong predictor of Northern 
Irish identity. This is especially the case among Catholic respondents who were three 
times more likely to identify as such than their segregated counterparts. This 
relationship was not nearly as strong for Protestants suggesting that different processes 
are involved in the negotiation of identities within friendship networks for Catholics and 
Protestants. A number of explanations for this divergence are advanced. 
First, as discussed in relation to integrated schools in chapter 5, the impact of 
contact may vary significantly according to the social status of different groups (see 
Tropp and Pettigrew 2005; see also Stephan and Stephan 1985; Mac Ginty and du Toit 
2007). In other words, while members of one group may regard the contact situation as 
one of equal group status, it may appear as potentially threatening and unequal to those 
who regard themselves as being from a group with less social status. In support of this 
idea, Tropp and Pettigrew (2005) found that the effects of intergroup contact on 
reducing prejudice were greater among majority members and much weaker among 
members of lower status groups. 
While it is not possible to ascertain the exact numerical make-up of friendship 
networks or the quality of interactions within them using existing data, there is research 
suggesting a higher degree of anxiety experienced by Protestants in intergroup contact 
situations (Craig and Cairns 1999; Mac Ginty and du Toit 2007; Hayes and McAllister 
2009a). For example, in a survey of attitudes of university and higher education college 
students, Craig and Cairns (1999) found Protestant respondents to have higher levels of 
anxiety regarding intergroup situations and more negative views about the other 
community as a whole. Likewise, Mac Ginty and du Toit (2007: 26-27) find that the 
relative group status of Protestants has changed in post-Agreement Northern Ireland due 
to feelings of cultural insecurity and perceived advances made by the other major 
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cu ltural tradition. 130 And in a study using NISA and NILT survey data Hayes and 
McAllister (2009a) found that Protestants were less optimistic about the future of 
community relations. Importantly, these studies were carried out in the post-Agreement 
era during a period of heightened anxiety among the Protestant community over the 
implications of the Agreement which was seen as unfairly benefiting the 
Catholic/nationalist community (see Hayes et al. 2005; McAuley and Tonge 2007). 131 
In contrast, it could be that Catholics are more likely to have lower levels of 
anxiety in contact situations. Blau's (1977) seminal work on patterns of networks is 
particularly illuminating here. This suggests that patterns of networks are significantly 
affected by the relative size of groups in the pool of potential contacts such that 
members of the smaller group will have more out-group friends than members of the 
larger group. Historicall y, of course, the Catholic community has been the minority 
community in Northern Ireland (Darby 1986; Ruane and Todd 1996). For many 
Catholics then, the normalization of contact with members of the out-group (for 
example at work, within the neighbourhood and through social networks) may have had 
the effect of reducing anxiety in intergroup encounters. 
Marriage ties 
Marriage is the most intimate of social ties. Marriage choices are not only affected 
by the extent of group membership, but also by the distribution of populations 
according to social environments since this determines the options that individuals have 
for establishing social relations (Blau et al. 1982; Blau et al. 1984). In societies with two 
or more dist inct groupings, high levels of endogamy suggest clear and strong group 
130 Mac Ginty and du Toit (2007: 25) take cultural tradition to refer to either of the two main politico-
religious (Catholic-nationalist-republican) and (Protestant-unioni st-loyalist) groups. 
131 The broader implications of Protestant disillusionment with the Agreement, and how this has impacted 
on relative group status and community identity, wi ll be discussed in greater detai l in the concluding 
chapter. 
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boundaries with little to no mixing between groups. Horowitz (2001 b: 49) argues that 
endogamy gives concreteness to conceptions of group boundaries leading to less porous 
boundaries and the strengthening of in-group ties. Conversely, if two subgroups that did 
not previously practice intermarriage begin to do so, this suggests that they are 
beginning to perceive of the boundary between them as insignificant (Horowitz 2001 b: 
49). Thus, intermarriage between groups represents the weakening of social boundaries 
and is therefore considered to be one of the most definitive measures of the breakdown 
of social and cultural barriers (Kalmijn and Flap 2001). From a practical perspective, 
mixed marriage represents a blurring of group boundaries in current and future 
generations. Furthermore, such marriages appear to serve as a symbolic contradiction to 
negative stereotypes as well as a source of positive familial contact between groups 
(Wigfall-Williams and Robinson 2001 : 1). 
Throughout the contemporary conflict, Northern Ireland has been characterised by 
high levels of endogamy due to the fear of violence and intimidation and the resulting 
polarisation of communities (Harris 1972; Maxon-Browne 1991). The early 
sociological literature in Northern Ireland showed that interreligious marriage in 
Northern Ireland was both unusual and socially unacceptable (Barritt and Carter 1972; 
Harris 1972). Indeed, in some cases, mixed religion partnerships were targeted with 
intimidation, violence and even death (Leonard 2009; Lloyd an~ Robinson 2011). Fear 
of intimidation and violence had the effect of preventing many cross-community 
friendships from forming . Endogamy has thus served as an important factor in 
maintaining social boundaries between communities (Harris 1972; Whyte 1986, 1990). 
Some commentators have argued that the sharp distinction between British and Irish 
national identities in Northern Ireland might have become less salient had it not been for 
high rates of endogamy (Maxon-Browne 1983). 
While endogamous marriage patterns are prevalent, mixed marriages in Northern 
Ireland have and continue to exist. Indeed, due to the existence of mixed-marriages 
during the conflict a support group known as the Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage 
Association was established in 1974. Originally established as a support body for 
mixed-marriage couples, Association has now expanded its role to include the lobbying 
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of politicians and government bodies to recognise the importance of mixed marriage fo r 
the process of reconciliation. The Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association 
explains the defining features of a mixed marriage in the context of Northern Ireland: 
'Mixed marriage' strictly means a marriage contracted 
between a Christian and a non-Christian, but it has come to mean, 
particularly in Ireland, a marriage contracted between a Roman 
Catholic and another Christian from the Protestant 
denomination .. . In Ireland today, and particularly in Northern 
Ireland, mixed marriage is not just a marriage between two people 
who belong to different churches, but a marriage between people 
from different communities between whom tensions have existed 
for several hundred years. 132 
For the purposes of this research, I use the term mixed marriage pertaining to 
marriages between Catholics and Protestants noting that other terms such as 
intermarriage and cross-community marriage are also used (see Robinson 1992; 
Leonard 2009) . 
While the rate of mixed marriages is not officially recorded, data from the 2001 
census is ab le to estimate the extent of such partnerships. Analysis of the module 
'community background of spouse' displayed in Table 7.4 reveals the extent of 
intennarriage (Catholic females and Protestant males) in 2001. The data show that 12.4 
per cent of Catholic and Protestant couples indicated that their partner was from the 
other main community background. 133 Of these partnerships, Catholic fema les had a 
higher rate of intennarriage (8.6 per cent) than Protestan t females (3 .8 per cent). And 
Catho lic fema les had a slightly lower rate of endogamy (90.5 per cent) than Protestant 
m See the Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association at <http://www.nimma.org.uk/about/what. htm>. 
133 The community background measure includes respondents ' stated religion or religion brought up in. 
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females (94.9 per cent). Significantly, only 1 per cent of Protestant females and less 
than 1 per cent of Catholic females stated that their spouse was of no religion. 
Table 7.4. Community background of spouse by gender of spouse (%), 
2001 
Male spouse 
Catholic Protestant Other No Total 
religion religion 
Female spouse 
Catholic 90.5 8.6 0.2 0.7 100.0 
Protestant 3.8 94.9 0.2 1.0 100.0 
Other religion 8.2 15.8 72.0 4.0 100.0 
No religion 10.3 29.1 1.4 59.1 100.0 
Source: NISRA 2001 census. 
The data in Table 7.4 suggest that while for the most part partnerships in Northern 
Ireland remain highly endogamous approximately 1 in 10 people from either of the two 
main communities form intimate partnerships across the divide. While this is a 
relatively small proportion it is none the less sufficiently large to justify further enquiry 
into whether there is a relationship between exogamy and identity patterns. And as 
Leonard (2009: 100) has argued, since religion continues to function as the primary 
basis of party politics in Northern Ireland, cross-community marriages are imbued with 
political significance. Since the incidence of exogamy is regarded as one of the 
definitive measures in the blurring of group boundaries for current and future 
generations, then investigation of such partnerships is warranted. 
Socio-economic characteristics and mixed marriage 
As with mixed friendship networks, it is important to identify socio-economic 
characteristics that may be related to the likelihood that an individual will marry outside 
of their own community. As indicated in Table 7.5 , there are statistically significant 
differences in the socio-economic profiles of respondents who are in mixed marriages 
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compared to those in endogamous marriages. Among Cathol ics, those in mixed 
marriages are significantly more likely to be younger, to have lived outside of Northern 
Ireland, to be empl oyed and in a non-manual occupation, and to have a tertiary level 
degree. Simi lar patterns are found among Protestants, although within thi s group it is 
the rate of those having lived outs ide of Northern Ireland that is most pronounced. 
The 1998- 2005 dataset includes a variable that asks respondents whether they 
have lived outs ide Northern Ireland for more than six months. This is an important 
variable to include because having lived outs ide of Northern Ireland indicates that the 
respondent has had sign ificant opportuni ty fo r contact with people from a variety of 
backgrounds. And among Catholics and Protestants who have li ved outside of Northern 
Ireland, one in three reported to be in a mi xed marriage. These findings suggest that 
having spent time elsewhere in Britain or in another country is an important predictor of 
mixed marriage outcomes. 
Table 7.5. Socio-economic characteristics by marriage type, 1998- 2005 
Protestants Catholics 
Endo- Mixed Endo- Mixed 
gamous marriage gamous marriage 
Age (mean years) 51.3 45.0* 48.0 41.7** 
Employed (%) 54 64** 56 67** 
Non-manual (%) 56 56 47 59** 
Tertiary deg ree(%) 13 17 12 22** 
Lived outside N.I. 18 33** 22 29** 
(%) 
•• Significantly different from endogamous marriage at the p<. 01 level. 
Source: NIL T surveys pooled file 1998-2005. 
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The findings here also support previous research by Lloyd and Robinson (201 1) 
who find that mixed-marriage couples differ in terms of socio-demographic 
characteristics to those who marry within their own comm unity. Using a simi lar 
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methodology employed in this study, Lloyd and Robinson (2011: 2141) found that 
respondents in mixed religion partnerships had higher incomes and better educational 
qualifications than those of their counterparts living in same religion partnerships. 
Lloyd and Robinson (2011: 2143) also found that those in mixed religion partnerships 
were much more likely to have lived outside Northern Ireland than those who were not. 
These results in Table 7.5 add weight to general findings on social mobility and 
intermarriage. For example, previous research reveals significant correlations between 
higher educational attainment and exogamy (Kalmijn 1998: 413) and to be less likely to 
be unemployed (Lloyd and Robison 2011). Indeed, in a study conducted on the 
incidence of mixed marriage in the Republic of Ireland, O'Leary (2001: 648) found that 
those sections of the population who are most exposed to modernization-that is those 
living in an urban area, coming from a non-farming background, and attaining a higher 
education-are more likely to marry outside their own religious group. These 
tendencies may partly be due to the greater opportunities for interaction with people 
from different backgrounds that arise from tertiary study, travel and occupational 
diversity. Furthermore, highly educated people may be more individualistic and less 
attached to their family and community of origin (Kalmijn 1998). And studies on 
intermarriage have found that ascribed characteristics such as ethnicity can be expected 
to become less important in marriage choices when achie.v:ed characteristics such as 
educational attainment become more important (Gi.indi.iz-Ho~gi:ir and Smits 2002: 421). 
Does having a partner from a different religion influence the way in which 
individuals identify? Specifically, is being in a mixed marriage significantly related to 
identifying outside of one's traditional identity group in favour of more neutral fonns of 
identification? NILT survey data suggest that this is indeed the case (Table 7.6). For 
Protestants in an endogamous relationship, 73 per cent self-identified as British and the 
proportion was lower for those in a mixed marriage at 62 per cent. A similar direction 
and scale of shift is evident among Protestant couples indicating a Northern Irish 
identity (24 per cent in mixed marriages compared to 16 per cent in endogamous 
marriages). 
233 
The relationship between marriage type and national identity is much more 
pronounced among Catholics. There was a dramatic difference in the proportion of 
Catholics in mixed religion partnerships who self-identified as Irish (36 per cent) 
compared to those in endogamous partnerships (65 per cent}-a reduction of nearly 30 
percentage points. Furthermore, for Catholics in mixed partnerships, 32 per cent self-
identified as Northern Irish in contrast to 24 per cent in endogamous relationships. The 
most significant results, however, can be seen in the rate of Catholics self-identifying as 
British. Consistent with earlier findings in this study, Catholics who experience 
intergroup contact are more likely than those with little intergroup experience to identify 
as British. Indeed, 28 per cent of Catholics living in mixed religion partnerships self-
identified as British whilst only 8 per cent in endogamous partnerships did so. These 
findings also highlight the differences between Protestants and Catholics since very few 
Protestants in either a mixed or endogamous partnership were wi lling to identify with the 
majority out-group Irish identity. 
Table 7.6. Marriage type by national identity and religious denomination 
(%), 1998-2005 
______ .:...__:..__..:_ _ 
Protestants Catholics 
Endogamous Mixed All Endogamous Mixed All 
marriage marriage marriage marriage 
British 73 62** 72 8 28** 10 
Ulster 7 5 7 1 0 
Nth Irish 16 24** 17 24 32* 25 
Irish 2 4 3 65 36** 63 
Other 1 4* 2 1 4 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (3,1 59) (277) (3,436) (2,312) (218) (2,530) 
(Chi square 33.791, 4 df, p<.01) (Chi square 112.614, 4 df, p<.01) 
* Significantly different from same religion at the p<.05 level. 
** Significantly different from same religion at the p<.01 level. 
Source: NILT surveys pooled file , 1998-2005. 
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Logistic regression analyses, displayed in Table 7.7 confirm the bivariate results 
and reveal that the effect of mixed marriage on identity is significant. This result is 
confirmed after controlling for the extensive range of socio-demographic and socio-
economic variables that were found to be significantly related to marriage type. 
Table 7.7. The relationship between mixed marriage and national identity, 
1998-2005 
Protestants I Catholics 
Socio-demographic controls 
Gender (female) .185 (.106) 1.203 
1 
.239 (.109) 1.270* 
Age -.016 (.045) .984 .050 (.044) 1.051 
Labour-force active .249 (.130) 1.282* .171 ( .127) 1.186 
Occupation (non-manual) .148 (.111) 1.160 .033 (.114) 1.034 
Church attendance -.146 (.107) .864 -.107 (.144) .899 
Lived outside N.I. -.043 (.130) .957 -.551 (.133) .577** 
Education 
(Tertiary) .970 (.153) 2.637** .539 (. 170) 1.714** 
(Secondary) .241 (.124) 1.273* .549 (.125) 1.731** 
(No qual) 
Marriage type 
(Mixed marriage) .440 (.171) 1.552** .563 (.201) 1.757** 
(Endogamous) 
Constant -1.977 (.291) .139** -1 .384 (.278) .250** 
Nagelkerke R square .051 .056 
(N) (2,664) (1,926) 
*p<.05 **p<.01. -- Omitted category of comparison Notes: In each model, column one 
represents the logistic coefficients; column two represents the standard errors (in parentheses); 
and column three represents the Exponent B. Dichotomous dependent variable for Protestants 
is operationalised as 1 =Northern Irish 0=British; for Catholics 1 =Northern Irish 0= Irish. 
Source: NIL T survey pooled file, 1998-2005. 
Beginning with Protestants, the exponent (B) presented in the third column of each 
model shows that the odds of identifying as Northern Irish as opposed to British 
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increases by more than 50 per cent fo r those in mixed marriages. For Catholics, the 
effect was stronger-Catholics in a mixed marriage are over 70 per cent more likely to 
identi fy as Northern Irish as opposed to Irish than those in an endogamous marriage. 
The data from the bivariate and multivariate analyses suggest that being in a 
mixed marriage is a strong predictor of more neutral forms of identification. This is 
particularly evident among Catholic respondents. However, the data also reveal that 
Catholics in mixed marriages are more willing to adopt the traditional national identity 
of their spouse, namel y a British identity, and the bivariate analyses reveal this to be the 
most significant shift in identity. Do these trends extend to the broader fami ly unit? This 
is considered below with an analysis of national identity among homogenous and mi xed 
kinship networks. 
Kinship networks 
The family plays an important role in the formation of attitudes and identity and it 
can have a strong influence on the types of social networks an individual belongs to 
(Harris I 972; Erickson 1988; Bienenstock et al. 1990). The ro le of the family, and in 
particular the role of parents as socializing agents , is found to be of particular 
importance in Northern Ireland. For example, half of the respondents in the Young Life 
and Times survey in Northern Ireland indicated that their families were central to their 
views of the other religious community (Devine and Schubotz 2004). A study into the 
effects of social contact on political attitudes conducted by McAllister (1983) found that 
an important influence on political behaviour- the likelihood that a Protestant 
respondent will identify as Irish and a Catho lic respondent will identify as British-was 
having relat ives by marriage that belonged to the opposite rel igion. The importance of 
kinship ties in maintaining the community divide was first discussed in-depth by Harris 
(1972: 143- 146), who fo und that, in the area she studi ed, close relationships only 
occurred among family and extended fami ly. And as most people married within their 
own communi ty the majority of people belonged to homogenous kinship networks, 
therefore decreasing the likelihood to get to know people from the other community. 
Harris ( I 972) argued that because of thi s, prejudice and misinformation could flourish. 
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As a consequence of homogenous kinship ties, contact between members of the 
Catholic and Protestant communities was found to be severely restricted to polite 
greetings and superficial contact. Yet, as previously shown, intermarriage in Northern 
Ireland does occur and the data suggest that having a partner from a different religious 
background may influence perceptions of identity. Individuals connected through 
intermaniage may be more likely to overturn negative feelings or prejudice towards the 
out-group as the social networks created out of the intennarriage widen to include 
members of both groups. Thus, we might assume that these effects may extend to other 
family members, such that having kin from different religious backgrounds could also 
be a predictor of more neutral forms of identification. 
We are now in a position to examine relationships between different types of 
kinship ties and a range of socio-economic characteristics found to be associated with 
mixed marriage and mixed friendship networks. Table 7 .8 reveals no significant 
difference in levels of education, employment or occupation between those with mixed 
kinship ties compared to those within homogenous kinship ties. 
Table 7.8. Socio-economic characteristics by kinship ties, 1989-2010 
Protestants Catholics 
Homogeneous Mixed Homogenous Mixed Pop mean 
Age (mean years) 51 .5 50.6 46 .2 47.3 49.2 
Employed(%) 49 46 49 47 49 
Gender (female)(%) 56 58 57 66** 57 
Tertiary degree(%) 12 12 13 12 12 
Non-manual(%) 54 52 45 46 51 
** Significantly different from segregated at the p<.01 level Source: NISA and NIL T surveys 
pooled file, 1989- 2010. 
There are at least two explanations for the relatively minor differences in socio-
economic status of both groups. First, unlike friends and marriage partners, individuals 
do not choose their relatives. While it is more likely that members of close kinship 
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networks, such as parents and siblings, wi ll be of a simi lar socio-economic status, this 
may not necessarily extend to other kin such as those related by marriage. Indeed, as 
McPherson et al. (200 I: 427) argue, kinship ties tend to introduce educational and class 
heterogeneity into confiding and support networks due to generational differences in 
educational achievement. Second, we might also expect greater variabi lity of identity in 
mixed kinship ties because such ties are stronger than other forms of social ties. Indeed, 
precisely because family ti es are not voluntary and because of their strong affective 
bonds and slow decay, they may all ow for much greater value, attitudinal, and 
behavioural variability than would be common in more voluntary, easier to dissolve ties 
such as school and workplace ties (McPherson et al. 2001: 431 ). 
The data in Table 7.9 show the percentage distribution of national identity 
preferences by type of kinship network fo r Catholic and Protestant respondents. It 
shows only small differences in the rate of those with both homogeneous and mixed 
kinship ties identifying as Northern Irish at both points in time. However, among 
Protestants, having mixed kinship ties increases the likelihood of identifying as 
Northern Irish by 9 percentage points in 1995 . There is also a slight increase in the 
Northern Irish identity over time, most visible among Protestant respondents. Once 
again, for Protestants, having a mixed religion network did not increase the likelihood 
of identifying as Irish. The results are different for Catholic respondents. While there 
was almost no difference with regard to identifying as Northern Irish in either survey 
year, there was a dramatic decrease of 17 percentage points in the proportion of 
Catho lics with mixed kin identifying as Irish in 1995 and a much higher proportion of 
the same group indicating British identity. T-tests confirm the significance of these 
results. This dramatic variation in identity preferences suggests a strong influence on 
Catholic community members of having family from a Protestant background, sim il ar 
to the effect found in the mixed marriage analysis. 
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Table 7.9. Kinship network type by national identity and religious denomination(%), 1995 and 2010 
Protestant I Catholic 
1995 2010 1995 2010 
Homo- Mixed All Homo- Mixed All 
Homo- Mixed All Homo- Mixed All 
genous genous genous genous 
British 68 57 67 63 58 62 9 24** 12 7 9 8 
Ulster 14 12 14 7 0** 6 2 1 1 1 1 
Nth 12 21* 13 26 33 27 21 22 21 25 27 25 
Irish 4 7 4 2 7* 3 67 50** 65 60 59 59 
Other 2 3 2 1 1 1 0 2 1 8 4 7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (640) (68) (708) (421) (93) (514) (445) (91) (536) (358) (75) (433) 
(Chi-square 6.126, 4 df, p>.05) (Chi-square 15.064, 4 df, p<.01) (Chi square 20.942, 4 df, p <.01) (Chi-square 2.238, 4 df, p>.05) 
-
* Significantly different from same religion at the p<.05 level. ** Significantly different from same religion at the p<.01 level. 
Source: NISA survey 1995 and NIL T survey 2010. 
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By 2010, however, the data reveal a significant decline in the number of Catholics 
with mixed kinship networks identifying as British from 24 per cent in 1995 to only 9 
per cent in 2010. Moreover, having relatives from the other main community appears to 
make no difference to identifying as Irish with two-thirds in both categories identifying 
as such. One possible explanation for the relative stability of the traditional Irish 
identity in 20 IO is the increased acceptance of expressions of Irishness following formal 
acknowledgement of this identity in the Belfast Agreement. There is now some 
suggestion (Mitchell 2003; Todd 2005; Muldoon et al. 2007) that with the advent of 
peace in Northern Ireland, expressing an Irish national identity is becoming more 
commonplace as people perceive this identity with less negative connotations. As such, 
among an individual's family circle those from a Catholic background may feel less 
pressured to adopt the traditional identity of their Protestant relatives. 
The multivariate analysis in Table 7 .10 presents a more in-depth account of the 
relationship between kinship type and national identity. The data reveal some 
significant associations between these variables that were not immediately apparent in 
the bivariate results. The first model indicates a strong relationship among Protestant 
respondents who have a mixed kinship network and a preference for Northern Irish 
identity. Here, those with a mixed network were 73 per cent more likely than their 
segregated counterparts to identify as Northern Irish as opposed to British. The strength 
of the association has not increased in the post-devolution period as shown in the 
second model. Among Catholics, however, there is an increase in the probability of 
identifying as Northern Irish if a respondent has family from the other main community. 
According to the fourth model, in the post-devolution period Catholic respondents are 
almost twice as likely to identify as Northern Irish as opposed to Irish than those with 
family from the same religious community. 
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Table 7.10. The relationship between kinship networks and national identity, 1989-2010 
Protestant I Catholic I 
Pre-devolution Post-devolution I Pre-devolution Post-devolution 
Socio-demographic controls 
Gender (female) -.225 (.146) .799 .061 (.087) 1.063 .196 (.143) 1.217 .419 (. 100) 1.521** 
Age -.007 (.005) (.993) -.009 (.003) .991 ** .004 (.004) 1.004 .007 (.003) 1.007* 
Labour-force active .212 (. 168) 1.236 .067 (.102) 1.070 .433 (.156) 1.542** .358 (.113) 1.431** 
Occupation (non-manua l) .171 (.164) 1.187 -.228 (.218) .796 -.001 (.164) .999 -.207 (.253) .813 
Church attendance -.034 (.163) .967 .017 (.093) 1 017 -.089 (.265) .915 .288 (.121) 1.334* 
Marital Status (married) -.336 (.148) .714* -.048 (.089) .953 .133 (.140) 1.143 .248 (.099) 1 .281 * 
Education 
(Tertiary) .775 (.204) 2.170** .803 (.120) 2.233** .420 (.227) 1.522 -.058 (.136) .944 
(Secondary) - 031 (.181) .970 .355 (.114) 1.427** .128 (.174) 1.136 .084 (.126) 1.088 
(No qua!) 
Kinship network 
(Mixed) .548 (.199) 1. 730** .438 (.124) 1.550** .388 (.178) 1.473* .624 (.121) 1.867** 
(Homogenous) 
Constant -1.390 (.359) .249** -.781 (.258) .458** -1.718 (.301) .179** -1.883 (.274) .1 52** 
Nagelkerke R square .055 .053 .032 .042 
(N) (1,625) (2,775) ... (1,162) (2,305) 
*p<.05 **p<.01. Notes: In each model, column one represents the logislic coefficients; column two represents the standard errors (in parentheses); and 
column three represents the Exponent B. Dichotomous dependent variable for Protestants is operationalised as 1 =Northern Irish O=British; for Catholics 
1 =Northern Irish O= Irish. 
Source: NISA and NILT surveys pooled file, 1989- 2010. 
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The bivariate analyses suggested only sma ll increases in the number of 
respondents identifying as Northern Irish. They also revealed that an increased number 
of Catholic respondents identify as British if they have family members from the 
Protestant community. Yet this relationship was not evident in the 2010 survey. 
At a first glance it could be assumed that due to the strength of bonds between 
family members, there is less pressure to conform or change identity patterns. However, 
a closer inspection of the relationship between mixed kinship and national identity 
patterns through multivariate analyses reveals distinct differences in the national 
identity preferences of those with homogenous versus those with heterogeneous kinship 
ties. Indeed, there is a significant positive relationship between having mixed kinship 
ties and identifying with the more moderate and cross-communal Northern Irish 
identity. And this was found to be important for both Catholic and Protestant 
respondents. 
Explaining social networks and identity patterns 
Social relations in Northern Ireland have been characterised by high levels of 
homogeneity. These patterns have persisted, and homogeneity remains the norm long 
after the signing of the 1998 Agreement. However, there is emerging evidence that 
more mixing in social networks may be occurring aided by an increase in the number of 
integrated schools, mixed neighbourhoods and shared shopping and leisure facilities. 
These environments may provide individuals with the opportunity to meet and form 
relationships across the traditional divide. 
If friendship and more intimate relations are found to be particularly influential in 
moderating attitudes, then we could expect that such forms of intergroup contact will 
also be related to moderations in identity. As the results dem onstrate, those with mixed 
social ties in all three types of networks are significantly more likely to moderate their 
national identities than those with homogenous social ties. However, there is some 
variation in the strength of these relationships across the three areas under analysis. For 
example, the data show that for Catholics, the most important predictor of identifying as 
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Northern Irish is having a mixed friendship network. Indeed, this was by far the 
strongest predictor of all three areas analysed. This may be because, being the minority 
group within Northern Ireland, Catholics have typically had more contact with out-
group members and thus more opportunities to form friendships across the traditional 
divide. As Blau (1977: 21) has pointed out, since each cross-group friendship must 
involve a member from each group then smaller groups must have more cross-group 
friendships on a per capita basis. For Protestants, having a mixed friendship network 
was the weakest predictor of identifying as Northern Irish across all three areas 
examined. This may be because, being the traditional majority group Protestants 
typically have less out-group friends and feel more secure about their communal 
identity when entering into intergroup contact. 
The data also show that having relatives from the other main religion is important 
for predicting more moderate forms of identity. While this was not as evident in the 
bivariate analyses, multivariate analyses confirmed this observation for both Catholic 
and Protestant respondents. Similarly, among those who indicated they were in a mixed 
marriage the strength of the relationship with the Northern Irish identity was seen in 
both the bivariate and multivariate results . These findings suggest that mixed social 
networks are important for creating environments in which more moderate forms of 
identification can be realised. Indeed those with diverse social networks are less divided 
on the issue of national allegiance and have moderated their attitudes towards the 
centrality of the nation state to their sense of identity. 
It is important to note the significant trend among those Catholics involved in a 
mixed marriage or with relatives from the other main community identifying as British. 
Indeed, the more intimate ties including marriage and kinship ties have a strong 
influence on Catholic's choice to identify as British. This suggests that when mixed 
social contacts are intimate it is members from the Catholic background who are more 
willing to take on the majority national identity of their spouse or relative. This trend 
was also evident among those living in mixed neighbourhoods and among some 
Catholics who had attended mixed schools. 
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Within Northern Ireland research has found that mixed marriage couples face 
particular challenges when deciding where to live (Wigfall-Williams and Robinson 
2001). Social class and econom ic status play a major part in determining housing choice 
as couples who can afford to buy a home have more choice than those dependent on 
public housing. As the majority of public housing estates in Northern Ireland are 
segregated this means that the mixed marriage couples wi ll be more susceptible to 
scrutiny by the community they are entering. 
Significantly, it is within the realm of social relations that government policy has 
the least influence. Indeed it is neither possible nor desirable to force people to become 
friends, marry or form other personal connections. While the Northern Ireland Mixed 
Marriage Association exists as a support and advocacy group for mixed marriage, its 
role is not to increase the rate of mixed marriages. This can onl y happen organically 
over time. However, there are a number of environments which can be promoted to 
increase the likelihood that members of the Catholics and Protestant communities will 
meet, get to know each other and form social relations. This is through the promotion of 
mixed housing, integrated education and shared leisure and shopping facilities. At the 
same time, the creation of such environments will provide those who have already 
chosen to look beyond gross divisions and form meaningful cross-community 
connections with safe and supportive environments. As demonstrated in previous 
chapters, efforts to increase contact between communities has been a central policy 
platform of successive governments, both during direct rule and since devolution. Given 
the strength of the relationships between mixed social networks and moderate identities 
the continued support and promotion of such environments should remain centra l to 
government efforts to improve community relations . 
While the research presented in thi s chapter has found important links between 
having mixed social networks and a preference to distance oneself from traditional 
identiti es, a number of important methodological limitations leave several questions 
unanswered. For instance, it is not possible to discern the nature and qua li ty of contact 
within heterogeneous social networks. It may be that those with in mixed religion 
partnersh ips, for example, are less inclined to seek out support from within their 
244 
community, or from extended family, for fear of becoming victims of prejudice and are 
thus more likely to associate with those with whom they share salient characteristics. 
Relatedly, we are once again faced with the question of causality. Given the nature of 
the data employed, we are unable to uncover the direction of the relationship between 
having diverse social networks and identifying as Northern Irish. While this remains an 
obstacle that is only likely to be overcome through the collection of time-series data, 
recent research by Hewstone et al. (2008) using a longitudinal research design have 
found that contact can be effective in reducing prejudice towards the other community, 
particularly when the contact takes place among friends and through family members. A 
similar conclusion into the direction of the relationship between contact and prejudice 
reduction was also reached by Tropp and Pettigrew (2005) who, through a meta-analytic 
study of research into effects of intergroup contact, found that contact, and especially 
contact among friends, can significantly affect attitudes and reduce prejudice (see Tropp 
and Pettigrew 2005: 951 ). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I sought to uncover whether the existence of mixed social networks 
among friends, family and intimate partnerships represent important arenas in which 
cross-community identities are expressed. I found that while for the most part social 
networks remain highly separated by community background, approximately one in ten 
people state they have a partner of a different religion, two in ten state they have a 
mixed religion family, and three in ten state they have a mixed religion friendship 
network. This suggests that despite some major obstacles, including the high levels of 
residential segregation and the nonn of separate-religion education, people from the 
Protestant and Catholic communities do form relationships across this divide. 
I argued that investigating these relationships and how they are associated with 
identity preferences is an: important line of inquiry because a substantial body of 
literature has found that mixed social networks have the potential to weaken group 
boundaries (Kalmijn and Flap 2001; Lloyd and Robinson 2011), reduce prejudice 
(Pettigrew 1997; Tropp and Pettigrew 2005; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) and are 
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associated with positive out-group attitudes (Paolini et al. 2004; Turner et al. 2008). 
Indeed, intergroup contact among friends has been found to be the most important 
predictor of decreases in prejudice and increases in positive attitudes towards the out-
group (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Tausch et al. 2011). The findings in this chapter 
support this previous research, and in particular the importance of mixed friendship 
networks for identity moderation. Indeed, more than any other predictor vari able 
analysed in this study, it is those with mixed friendship groups who are most likely to 
identify as Northern Irish and not as British or Irish. This social network was found to 
be of particular importance among Catholics and I argued that the relative group status 
and heightened levels of intergroup anxiety (Craig and Cairns 1999; Mac Ginty and du 
Toit 2007) experienced by Protestants in earlier research could offer plausible 
explanations for the differences in the strength of the associations between Catholics 
and Protestants. 
With regards to mixed marriage, significant associations were uncovered which 
reveal the importance of such partnerships for the realization of a middle ground 
position in Northern Irish politics. Yet, while the association between mixed marriage 
and Northern Irish identity was found to be stronger among Catholics, the bivariate 
analysis also revealed that Catholics in mixed marriage are also more likely to identify 
as British. While almost no Protestants claim an Irish identity, previous research 
(Coakley 2002; Hayes and McAllister 2009a) employing the NISA and NIL T survey 
data reveal a relatively stable minority of Catholics (around IO per cent) identify as 
British. As Coakley (2007) has found using the European Values Survey, unlike 
Protestants who have a strong tendency to identify as British citizens, half of Catholics 
see themselves as joint British-Irish citizens rather than simply as Irish. Thus, given the 
tendency among Catholics to claim a dual-allegiance, the British identity may override 
the Irish identity fo r those in mixed marriages. Finally, the data also show that having 
relatives from the other main religion is important for predicting more moderate fonns 
of identity. While this was not as evident in the bivariate analyses, multivariate analyses 
confirmed this observation for both Catholic and Protestant respondents. 
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Chapter I of this study pointed out that identity is much more complex that the 
simple Catholic/Irish Protestant/British dichotomy- as the results presented in this 
chapter, and throughout the study have consistently shown. In the concluding chapter, I 
deepen the analysis of identity patterns further by investigating other important 
predictors of Northern Irish identity that have surfaced from the multivariate analyses . I 
then place the main findings in the context of existing knowledge, theory and policy 
practice and discuss the implications of the findings within the broader context of 
peace-building in Northern Ireland. 
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Chapter 8: Evaluating the Evidence 
Division between identity groups is often expressed through high levels of 
physical and social separation . In chapter 1 I argued that persistent segregation 
entrenches and reinforces group identity. This in tum makes it very difficult for these 
groups to find a common ground that could serve as a bridge across the divide. Northern 
Ireland is a divided society characterised by distinct social cleavages with a high degree 
of overlap in religious, political and national identification. Scholars have suggested that 
these mutually reinforcing cleavages and persistent social separation have left little 
room for a society-wide loyalty to form (see McGarry and O'Leary 1995a). Yet almost 
two decades have passed since that assertion was made and a consensus has grown that 
identity patterns are much more complex than a simple Protestant/unionist/British and 
Catholic/nationalist/Irish dichotomy. 
Indeed social survey evidence points to the emergence of an identity to wh ich 
some members of both Catholic and Protestant communities ascribe. This is the 
Northern Irish identity. I have argued that this identity is best understood as a shared 
public identity that may transcend ethnic divisions. The potential for a shared public 
identity to gain strength in Northern Ireland has recently been the subject of a small but 
growing debate within the social science literature (see Dixon 1997a, 2012; Farry 2009; 
Nagle and Clancy 20 10, 2012a, 2012b; Nagle 2012). Some have argued that there is 
little evidence that points to the emergence of a shared identity that supersedes ethnic 
divisions (Nagle 2012), and that ' the construction of a shared ... public identity is an 
unrealistic aim for ethno-nationally divided societi es, at least for the short-to-medium 
tenn' (Nagle and Clancy 2012a: 80). Yet, others argue that 'as identities have been 
shaped by various influences in the past, they can be reshaped in the future ' (Farry 
2009: 171 ). Such changes in identity may be brought about by integrationist poli cies 
that aim to increase cross-community engagement (Dixon 2012). 
As I discussed at length in earlier chapters, there have been some efforts to reduce 
division between the two main communities in Northern Ireland through the 
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development of a range of community relations initiatives that provide opportunities for 
engagement across the traditional Catholic/Protestant divide. These initiatives constitute 
an important component, in both government and voluntary sector strategies, of 
attempts to address the conflict and division in Northern Ireland at the grass-roots. 
Accordingly, I have sought to determine if there is an evidential basis for the 
claim that increased mixing between groups is associated with a decrease in competing 
national identities and with the emergence of a shared public identity. I have argued that 
one plausible way to establish whether or not these associations exist is to examine the 
national identity preferences of NISA and NILT survey respondents who have 
experienced varying levels of intergroup contact. Following this line of inquiry I 
explored several social arenas in which intergroup contact is found to occur. These were 
mixed residential areas, integrated schools, and among friends and family with mixed 
social networks. My central finding has been that there is a significant degree of 
association between intergroup mixing and a decrease in the salience of competing 
national identities. That is, those who engage in intergroup contact are more likely to 
preference a shared Northern Irish identity over either a British or Irish identity. 
In this final chapter, I bring together the main findings from the study and present 
supplementary data analysis that helps to draw out some of the implications of the 
research for the future of community relations in Northern Ireland. I close by suggesting 
the kinds of further research that could help to further illuminate the relationships 
between intergroup contact and the formation of shared public identities. 
A final analysis 
Before synthesising the empirical results presented in the main body of the thesis , 
I will consider one important question that I have not yet addressed. Do relationships 
between intergroup contact in particular social arenas and identity preferences become 
more or less significant when all social arenas are controlled for? In other words, are 
there cross-over effects between the independent variables that could diminish the 
significance of any one variable? It could be argued, for example, that those who live in 
a mixed residential area will be more likely to attend an integrated school and also have 
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mixed friendship networks, making it di fficul t to di scern the individual effects of 
particular types of social mixing on identity preferences. To tackle thi s issue, in the fin al 
multivariate analyses, a ll arenas of social mixing are considered in fo ur separate logistic 
regression models. The purpose of this is to measure the association of each of these 
arenas of social mixing with identity preferences net of all other predictor variables. If 
there are indeed cross-over effects, then we would expect the strength of the association 
between individual independent variabl es and the dependent variable to decrease. If, 
however, the associations remain relatively stable, then we can in fer that the 
independent variable is robustly associated with particul ar identi ty preferences . 
Table 8. 1 shows the four model s estimated separately- two fo r Protestants and two 
fo r Catholics. Following the same method used in previous chapters, the pre-devolution 
and post-devo lution periods are compared. The independent vari ables included in each 
of these models are those used in chapters fi ve, six and seven and include living in a 
mixed residential area, attending an integrated or mixed school, having mixed 
friendship networks and having mixed kinship networks. 134 
134 I was unable to include the variable for mixed marriage in the anal yses because the measure is not 
present in the NISA/NILT 1989-20 IO poo led fil e. 
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Table 8.1 The relationship between intergroup contact and national identity, 1989-2010 
Protestant Catholic 
Pre-devolution Post-devolution Pre-devolution Post-devolution 
Socio-demographic controls 
Gender (female) -.230 (.147) .794 .063 (.088) 1.066 .219 (.146) 1.245 .424 (.103) 1.529** 
Age -. 006 (.005) .994 -009 (.003) .991** .001 (.005) 1.001 .002 (.003) 1.002 
Labour-force active .194 (.169) 1.214 .067 (.103) 1.069 .285 .161 1.330 .234 (.116) 1.264* 
Occupation (non-manual) .206 (.165) 1.229 -.239 (.218) .788 -.054 (.167) .948 -.144 (.259) .866 
Church attendance -.001 (.164) .999 .051 (.094) 1 053 -.145 (.271) .865 .240 (.125) 1.271 * 
Marital Status (married) -. 326 (. 149) .722* -.047 (.090) .954 .083 (.143) 1 087 .258 (.101) 1.294** 
Education 
(Tertiary) .773 (.205) 2.166** .78 1 (.121) 2.184** .288 (.232) 1.334 -.146 (.139) .846 
(Secondary) - 058 (.182) .944 .341 (.11 5) 1.407** .069 (.178) 1 072 .01 1 (.130) 1.011 
Residential area 
(Mixed ) -.034 (.166) .967 .432 (.098) 1.540** .675 (.153) 1.963** .451 (.109) 1.570** 
School type 
(Formally Integrated) - 006 (.281) .994 -.062 (.294) .940 
(Mixed) .202 (.171) 1.224 .174 (.133) 1.190 .208 (.181) 1.232 .307 (. 161) 1.359* 
Kinship network 
(Mixed re ligion) .487 (.210) 1.627* .260 (. 132) 1.297* .11 5 (. 187) 1.122 .226 (.131) 1.254 
Friendship network 
(Mixed religion) .206 (.154) 1.229 .141 (.099) 1.152 .425 (. 150) 1.530** .787 (.108) 2.197** 
Constant -1.511 (.364) .221** -.970 (.262) .379** -1 .836 (.306) .159** -2 .022 (.281) .1 32** 
Nagelkerke R square .060 .067 .081 .105 
(N) (1 ,629) (2 ,803) (1 ,165) (2,342) 
- - . -
*p<.05 **p<.01. -- Omitted category of comparison 
Notes: In each model, column one represents the log istic coefficients; column two represents the standard errors (in parentheses); and column three 
represents the Exponent B. Dichotomous dependent variable for Protestants is operationalised as 1 =Northern Irish 0=British; for Catholics 1 =Northern Irish 
0= Irish. Source: NISA and NIL T surveys, pooled file 1989-2010. 
251 
The data in Table 8.1 reveal moderate cross-over effects between independent variables. 
By comparing the results from Table 8.1 with results fro m the earlier analyses, we are 
able to see where these cross-over effects are taking place. Comparison of the 
di fferences in the predi ctive strength of the independent variables is shown in Table 8.2 
which presents the exponent (B) score fo r all of the logistic coefficients in the 
regress ion models. Recall that the exponent (B) indicates the change in the predi cted 
odds of the dependent variable fo r every unit increase in the independent variable net of 
other predictors in the model. Thus, if the exponent (B) score exceeds 1 then the odds of 
an outcome increase; if the fi gure is less than I, any unit increase in the independent 
variable leads to a drop in the odds of an outcome occurring. As evident in Table 8.2 all 
save one independent variable (kinship ties) remains a robust predictor of identity 
preferences among Catholics. And for Protestants, cross-over effects have reduced the 
strength of the association between the variables fri endship network and integrated 
education. 
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Table 8.2 Summary of logistic regression results (Exponent B Scores) 
--- -- ------
Protestants Catholics 
Pre- Cross-over Post- Cross-over Pre- Cross-over Post- Cross-over 
devolution effects devolution effects devolution effects devolution effects 
Social arena 
Residential 1.119** .967 1.677** 1.540** 2.323** 1.963** 2.139** 1.570** 
area 
Education 1.222** 1.224 1.277** 1.190 1.390** 1.232 1.622 1.359* 
(mixed) 
(formally 1.106** .994 1.210** .940 
integrated) 
Friendship 1.345** 1.229 1.378** 1.152 1.937** 1.530** 2.735** 2.197** 
networks 
Kinship ties 1.730** 1.627** 1.550** 1.297* 1.473** 1.122 1.867** 1.254 
Mixed marriage 1.552** 
' 
1.757** 
Source: NISA and NIL T surveys, pooled file, 1989-2010. 
253 
These findings are unsurprising. Indeed, we would expect some cross-over effect 
given that those who experience intergroup contact in one social arena are more 
predisposed to experience such contact in another. For example, cross-community 
friend ships are known to form through contact within integrated schools (Irwin 1991 ; 
McClenahan et al. 1996) and some mixed residential areas have links to local integrated 
schools (Murtagh et al. 2006). 135 
Yet while there is evidence of moderate cross-over effects, this was not sufficient 
to override the significance of intergroup contact as a predictor of identity preference. 
For example, living in a mixed area remains sign ificant for both Catholic and Protestant 
respondents who are 50 per cent more likely to identify as Northern Irish than as either 
Irish or British respectively. Separating the results for each groups reveals that Catholics 
with mixed friendship networks remain two times more likely to identify as Northern 
Irish than Irish and are 30 per cent more likely to do so if they attended a mixed school. 
And Protestants with mixed kinship ties remains two times more likely to identify 
Northern Irish identity than British. These results indicate that individual social arenas 
are important environments for the expression of a shared identity. In the section below 
I summarise the key research findings from the thesi s, offer explanations for the 
importance of particular social arenas and present supplementary data analysis to draw 
out some of the conclusions. 
Key research findings 
My basic research task has been to identify where and why a Northern Irish 
identity is present among Protestants and Catholics. I developed a theoretical 
framework for this inquiry from debates concerning the best way to address intergroup 
135 As discussed in chapter 3, a test for multicollinearity was conducted usi ng a correlation matri x of al l 
independent variables fo r each logisti c regression model reported. This was done to ensure that none of 
the independent variables are too highly correlated. Multicollinearity was not found to be a problem in 
any of the regression models. 
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conflict in divided societies. There I drew a distinction between what I called 
institutional and civil society approaches. 
I argued that institutional approaches consider intergroup conflict to be based on 
structural problems. They propose that settlement be achieved through elite level 
institutional engineering. They therefore seek to manage conflict by reforming the 
social system through the enactment of laws and constitutionally embedded provisions. 
Advocates of institutional approaches generally regard group identity as fixed and 
which needs to be worked around. The primary challenge, on this account, is to design 
institutions that can contain conflict between identity groups and channel group claims 
through the governance structure and social institution . Here, I focussed in particular on 
consociational power-sharing as one institutional approach that has heavily influenced 
the development of governance structures and the social system more generally in 
Northern Ireland (Lijphart 1975, 1996; O'Leary 1999; McGarry and O'Leary 2004, 
2009). 
Civil society approaches, by contrast, propose that societal transformation may be 
achieved through identifying and tackling systemic sectarianism and inequality and by 
improving relationships between divided communities. They emphasise the value of 
conflict transformation through civil society, arguing that such engagement serves to 
address the causes and consequences of division (see Dixon ·1997a, 2012; Taylor 2001 , 
2009; O 'Flynn 2007, 2009; Wilson 2009; Luskin et al. forthcoming). Advocates of civi l 
society approaches generally regard group identity as something that can be transfonned 
over time through a focus on relationship building between communities or through 
initiatives that promote social mixing between communities. 
While institutional approaches necessarily provide a platform from which peace 
settlements may be negotiated at the elite level, conflict between communities at the 
grass-roots level also needs to be addressed in order for peace to be sustainable. 
Although there may be disagreement between institutional and civil society approaches 
over conceptions of identity and the relative weight that should be given to actively 
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preserving communal identiti es, both of these approaches have been employed m 
tandem in Northern Ireland since the mid-19 80s . 
Much of the community relations work which can be described as cross-
community is predicated on the assumption that increasing cross-community contact 
wi ll reduce prejudice, tackle negative stereotypes and increase mutual awareness and 
understanding of the other community. I have demonstrated that these assumptions are 
based on intergroup contact theory, which has a long history of empirical and 
theoretical application in Northern Ireland (see Trew 1986; Pettigrew 1998; Hewstone 
et al. 2005 ; N iens and Cairns 2005; Donnell y and Hughes 2006; Hayes et al. 2007; 
Hughes et al. 2007; Hewstone et al. 2008). 
Contact and community relations policy 
Against this theoretical background, my first research question sought to 
investigate how problems associated with the separation of communities have been 
addressed and to what extent community relations initiatives have sought to promote 
contact between Protestant and Catholic communities. As noted, it is clear that the 
creation of greater cross-community contact between members of the Catholic and 
Protestant community with the aim of establishing a 'shared society' has been a well-
resourced policy objective. For example, I calculated that in 2010 a total of £136 
million was allocated for relevant community relations and rel ated programmes across 
government departments representing approximately 1.5 per cent of total Northern 
Ireland government expenditure. Moreover, since 1995, financial aid to Northern 
Ireland through the EU peace programmes has amounted to over of€1.9 billion with the 
aim of creating space for intergroup contact and encouraging greater levels of cross-
community integration (SEUPB 2011 ). Incorporating all maj or donors and their 
financial contributions fo r peace-building activities since 1987, Northern Ireland and the 
six border counties have received a total of almost £2.5 billion with an average of 
almost £ 100 million a year for a wide range of peace-building activities (Nolan 2012). 
A central concern of much of this community relations work has been on 
promoting cross-community contact. While not all financial aid has supported thi s, all 
256 
of the major donors have contributed funds to promote contact work between the 
Catholic and Protestant communities. The frequency with which contact work is 
mentioned as part of a community relations agenda highlights the centrality of 
intergroup contact to conceptions of peace-building in Northern Ireland. 
Identity patterns and intergroup contact 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 therefore explored cross-community contact in a number of 
social arenas. I asked whether individuals (from either a Catholic or Protestant 
background) who have intergroup contact within these social arenas differ from the rest 
of the adult population in relation to their national identity preferences and whether any 
such difference has varied over time. I operationalised national identity using a survey 
item that asked people to choose (out of five options) the group to which the felt they 
most belonged. This revealed that divisive identities are decreasing in salience and a 
preference for Northern Irish identity is growing among cohorts that have experienced 
contact. That is, those Protestants and Catholics who engage in cross-community 
contact are significantly more likely to identity first and foremost as Northern lrish 
rather than as British or Irish. The strength of these relationships, however, was found to 
vary against the type of social arena analysed. 
My findings revealed important differences betwee11 Catholic and Protestant 
respondents depending on the type of social arena in which the Northern Irish identity is 
most likely to be expressed. In all but one of the social arenas examined, the likelihood 
of someone identifying as Northern Irish was stronger among Catholic respondents 
compared to their Protestant counterparts. For example, net of all other variables, 
Catholic respondents are most likely to identify as Northern Irish if they professed to 
have a mixed friendship network. Th.is was found to be the case in both time periods 
analysed-before devolution and after devolution- and the significance of this 
relationship increased dramatically in the post-devolution era. Indeed, those with mixed 
friendship networks were more than twice as likely to identify as Northern Irish as 
opposed to Irish. 
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The findings add weight to the so-called ' direct cross-group friendship 
hypothesis' (Pettigrew 1997, 1998), which suggests that a reduction in group prejudice 
may be achieved by promoting direct friend ship between members of competing 
groups. In line with this, research has found that even knowing in-group members who 
have out-group friends through indirect cross-group fri endships (Wright et al. 1997) or 
extended contact (Turner et al. 2008; Christ et al. 20 I 0) can be important for improving 
attitudes towards the out-group. Granovetter's ( 1973 , 1982) influential thesis on the 
strength of weak ties, discussed in chapter 7, offers a simi lar explanation. This theory of 
weak ties is similar to the theoretical argument of the extended contact effect put 
forward by Turner et al. (2008) and Christ et al. (2010). Granovetter (1973) argues that 
weak social ties have bridging functions whereby information is transmitted to a greater 
number of people (with diverse social networks) when passed through weak ties rather 
than strong ones (1973: 1366). In this way, knowing someone who has a friend from 
the out-group may be sufficient to disconfirm negative stereotypes. 
As discussed in chapter 7, mixed friendship networks were found to be a strong 
predictor of identity preferences among Catholic respondents. I argued that a plausible 
explanation for this is that, historically, the Catholic community has been the minority 
community in Northern Ireland (Darby 1986; Ruane and Todd 1996). Following Blau 
(1977), I noted that patterns of networks are significantly affected by the relative size of 
groups in the pool of potential contacts such that members of the smaller group will 
have more out-group friends than members of the larger group. For many Catholics 
then, the nonnalisation of contact with members of the out-group (for example at work, 
within the neighbourhood and through social networks) may have increased 
opportunities for intergroup friendships to forn1 and decreased the likelihood of their 
experiencing anx iety in contact si tuations. 
There is research that indicates that having the opportunity to meet wi th members 
of the out-group in cross-community schemes increases the likelihood of having friends 
from other religious and community backgrounds (Schubotz and McCartan 2009). 
Thus, even weak ties between social groups can have the effect of linking different 
groups who would otherwise be insulated from one another (Grannovetter 1982). 
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While having mixed friendship networks was found to be an important predictor 
of national identity among members of the Catholic community, this was not the case 
for Protestants. Rather, the results point to a different set of social arenas linked to 
expressions of a Northern Irish identity. Living in a mixed neighbourhood as compared 
to a segregated one was found to be important with those Protestants being 50 per cent 
more likely to identify as Northern Irish as opposed to British. Added to this, the data 
revealed that Protestant respondents who have family from a different community 
background were significantly more likely to identify as Northern Irish than as British, 
although the strength of this relationship appears to have declined in the post-devolution 
period. 
Of all social arenas analysed, only mixed residential areas were found to be a 
significant predictor of Northern Irish identity for both Catholic and Protestant 
respondents. The strength of this variable as a predictor of choosing Northern Irish 
identity decreased for Protestants, however, once cross-over effects were controlled for. 
In chapter 5 I advanced a number of explanations for the importance of mixed areas. 
The first of these proposed that people who live in mixed areas most likely do so out of 
choice. A conscious decision on the part of the individual to live in such an area (as 
opposed to a segregated area) may indicate that factors other than communal 
background are more important when choosing a location _ to live. Second, previous 
research suggests that mixed areas have heightened potential for the formation of 
intergroup friendships (Murtagh and Carmichael 2005; Hewstone et al. 2008). Finally, I 
argued that mixed areas are often supported by strong local community organizations 
that foster and support cross-community relations and are more likely to have links with 
integrated schools. 
A surprising finding from the analyses is that integrated education has the weakest 
relationship with the Northern Irish identity for both Catholics and Protestants when 
compared to other social arenas. However, as shown in chapter 5, integrating children 
within schools has been arguably the most contentious area of social policy. For 
example, the integrated movement has met with fervent opposition by members of the 
Catholic Church who regard the education of Catholic children within Catholic schools 
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as paramount to the preservation of their community's culture (Darby 1976; Hannsson 
et al. 20 13). Sim ilarly, political representatives of the two main communities have, until 
very recently, been lukewann (at best) in their support fo r such schools (Hannsson et al. 
2013). 
Another explanation for the weakness of the relationship between identity 
moderation and integrated schooling is the limitations of the current measure for 
integrated education within the surveys. For example, the measure can only capture past 
intergroup contact rather than current intergroup contact in contrast to other survey 
measures. Therefore, it is harder to discern the possible effects of intergroup contact 
within integrated schools, since many other factors could have subsequently influenced 
respondent answers. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 6, we do not know how 
respondents perceived of the numerical balance of their school and whether they 
understand 'fairl y mixed ' as referring to an integrated school or to a school which was 
in the process of attracting students from the other main religion. Furthennore, the 
current measures do not allow us to assess the quality of contact (e.g. whether the 
experience of contact was positive or meaningful.) Unlike the categories 'among 
friends ', 'family ' and more intimate partnerships, we cannot assume that the contact an 
individual experienced at school was either meaningful or positive. Finally it may be 
that, at present, there are simply not enough people within the population who have 
attended an integrated school, such that the sample size within the survey is too small to 
produce meaningful , let alone statisticall y significant, results. 
As discussed in detail in chapter 3, the major limitation of this study is the issue of 
causality. Given the cross-sectional nature of the data employed, it was not possibl e to 
produce evidence that increased contact between communities causally contributes to 
identi ty change, or whether those who hold more moderate views are more predisposed 
to mixing across the traditional divi de. This remains a significant limitation that on ly 
the development and analysis of longitudinal data can resolve. 
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Socio-economic and demographic indicators of identity 
This matter aside for the moment, it is clear from the analysis that several socio-
economic indicators are associated with tendencies to identify as Northern Irish. For 
example, tertiary education is found to be strongly associated with Northern Irish 
identity. This is particularly the case among Protestants. In some ways, this may simply 
be a proxy for other influences on identity, such as opportuniti es for diverse fonns of 
work, travel and social mixing. Attendance at a university and travel away from home 
are likely to increase the probability of mixing with people from diverse backgrounds 
with diverse experiences. In many instances, such contact will present a challenge to 
negative stereotypes of the 'other' that individuals may previously have held. As 
Hewstone et al. (2005: 22) suggest, higher educational levels tend to be associated with 
' less virulent out-group attitudes'. 
This education effect on moderate identiti es is particularly strong among 
Protestants and it is noteworthy, therefore, that they are more likely to attend university 
overseas or within England than in Northern Ireland . 136 This may well influence the 
way that Protestants from Northern Ireland perceive of their identity as people of and 
from 'Northern Ireland', reflecting a sense of regionalism. The relationship between 
level of education and strength of attachment to traditional national identities has been 
noted in previous studies. For example, using the European Values Survey, Fahey et al. 
(2005: 67) found that both Catholics and Protestants with no educational quali fications 
are more supportive of the dominant communal identity, Irish and British respectively. 
The survey data also show that there are gender differences in relation to identity 
patterns. Women are significantly more likely to identify as Northern Irish than men 
are. In contrast to the education variable, this was most striking among Catholic 
136 See 'Just one-third of Northern Ireland students are Protestant' , BBC News Northern Ireland, 17 
October 2009. Accessed IO July 2010 at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northem-ireland-l 5341820>. 
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respondents. This finding lends support to the research of Fahey et al. (2005: 67) who, 
through analyses of data from the European Values Survey 1999-2000, found that men 
were significantly more likely to claim an Irish identity. It also supports earlier research 
showing that the more traditional political parties that ali gn with traditional identities, 
notab ly Sinn Fein, attract disproportionately more male than fema le supporters (see 
McAll ister 2004). 
An interesting finding evident throughout the analys is was that the probability of 
identifying as Northern Irish sh ifted over time, and that it differed for Catholics and 
Protestants. Successive multivariate analyses revealed that Northern Irish identity 
increased in the post-devolution era among Protestants, but decreased during this period 
among Catholics. One plausible explanation for this divergence relates to the specific 
context of the post-devolution era and the influence of socio-political conditions on 
particular cohorts within the population. 
Recent events within Northern Ireland suggest that extremism is resurgent among 
Catholic and Protestant youth . For example, the recent announcement by Belfast City 
Counci l to reduce the number of days on which the Union Flag will be flown from city 
hall has sparked violent protests from loyali sts who perceive the restrictions to be an 
attack on their Britishness. Many of those involved in the violence have been 
disaffected youth, the majority of which are young men and teenagers. 137 Moreover, the 
emergence of a number of dissident republican groups reforming under the banner of 
the IRA has been strongly associated with younger age groups. As Horgan and 
Morrison (2011: 654) have found, an older more experienced leadership is recruiting 
younger, inexperienced individuals. Other research also suggests that the young are 
increasingly more likely to favour traditional communal parti es over more moderate 
ones (Duffy and Evans 1997; McAuley 2004; Tilley and Evans 201 1) and to be more 
"
7 See 'Belfast un ion flag di spute is lightning rod for loyali st disaffection. ' The Guardian, 6 January 
20 13. Accessed 5 February 201 3 at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2 01 3/j an/06/belfast-union-flag-
dispute-loyali st> . 
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prejudiced towards people of a different religious background (Hayes and McAllister 
1999b). In addition, studies have provided evidence that religious and national 
identities, especially among younger cohorts, can be shaped by personal experiences of 
conflict (see Muldoon et al. 2007). 
Within the social science literature, there is much support for the contention that 
socio-political conditions in the formative years leave a lasting impression and affect 
future political behaviour and attitudes (see for example Converse 1969; Lyons and 
Alexander 2000; Putnam 2000; Blais et al. 2004; Franklin 2004). Furthermore, newly 
enfranchised individuals are known to be particularly susceptible to recruitment by new 
parties (Franklin 2004). This so-called 'generational effect' (Hayes and McAllister 
1999b) emphasizes the importance of critical historical events that leave an imprint on 
the views, attitudes and behaviour of those experiencing them that they then carry 
forward in time. Obviously, younger cohorts carry these attitudes the longest. As Hayes 
and McAllister (1999b) explain, such defining events have more of an impact on the 
young because they are less equipped to resist their influence, given their inexperience, 
than older generations are. Citing Mannheim (1954), they explain that generational 
effects are most likely to occur during periods of rapid social and cultural change 
(Hayes and McAllister 1999b ). In Northern Ireland, the legacy of the conflict, and the 
processes of socialization on attitudes and identities of the y5_>ung have received a great 
deal of attention in the social science literature. 138 As McCauley (2004: 543) notes, for 
many in Northern Ireland 'political socialization is restricted almost exclusively to a 
reproduction of the values of one's respective political community.' 
In a recent contribution to this literature, Tilley and Evans (2011) explore the 
influence of formative experiences on political generations and voting behaviour in 
Northern Ireland. They argue that the radical shift away from the more moderate and 
historically dominant parties within both communal blocs (namely the UUP and SDLP) 
138 See Cairns and Cairns 1995; Connolly and Maginn 1999; Hayes and McAllister 1999b, 2005; Hughes 
and Donnelly 2002; Gallagher 2004b; Muldoon 2004; Trew 2004. 
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towards the more traditional DUP and Sinn Fein can be explained by the changing 
political context in which younger cohorts have been socialised. In effect, the 
generations that came of age during the period in which the DUP and Sinn Fein became 
viable and popular parties are more likely to vote for these parties than older cohorts, 
and through generational replacement support for these parties will increase over time 
(Tilley and Evans 20 I I). 
Given these strong cohort links to political affiliation, the question arises as to 
whether they are also reflected in identity preferences. If there is indeed a relationship 
between socio-political conditions and identity patterns, then this could offer a plausible 
explanation for the shifting patterns in identity for Catholics and Protestants in the post-
devolution period. 
One methodological challenge that confronts any attempt to answer this concerns 
how to differentiate generational effects from Jifecycle effects. That is, do people 
become more prone to hold particular identities as they grow older (indicating a 
lifecycle effect) or are members of new generations more likely to hold particular 
identities than those of previous generations at the same age (indicating a generational 
effect)? However, by comparing identity preferences of different age cohorts at 
different points in time we are able to distinguish between life cycle and generation 
effects (see Blais et al. 2001 for a discussion on distinguishing between generational 
and life cycle effects) . Furthermore, given the weight of empirical evidence that points 
to generational differences in attitudes and behaviour, the assumption is that any change 
in identity preference is less likely to be caused by age than by generational differences. 
To group respondents into generations, I fo llowed Ti lley and Evans ' (2011: 590) 
classification of ' political generations ' as those who entered the electorate (assumed to 
be at age 18) during a sign ificant period in political history. 139 This produced six 
139 Hayes and McAlli ster (1999b) explain the different between a cohort and a politi cal generati on. A 
period in which there were no major criti cal events identifies a 'cohort ' rather than a ' poli tical 
generation ' . 
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cohorts within the data based on six important periods in contemporary Northern 
Ireland (as shown in Table 8.3.) 
Generation 1 (the oldest generation) came of age before the contemporary conflict 
began (pre 1965). Generation 2 reflects the civil rights movement and the escalation of 
violence in Northern Ireland ( I 966-1971 ). Generation 3 emerges around the time of the 
first attempt at power sharing known as the Sunningdale Agreement and the events of 
Bloody Sunday (1972-1982). Generation 4 came of age around the time of the signing 
of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Brook-Mayhew talks (1983-1993) . Generation 5 
represents the end of the peace process and the signing of the I 998 Agreement ( 1994-
1999) while Generation 6 (the youngest Generation) arises from the last period of Direct 
Rule during which time the government' s A Shared Future community relations 
strategy was developed (from 2000 onwards). 
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Table 8.3 Political Generations in Northern Ireland 
Political 
generation 
Pre 1965 
1966-1971 
1972-1982 
1983-1993 
1994-1999 
2000-20 10 
Age in 2010 
63 + 
57-62 
46-56 
35-45 
29-34 
18-28 
Major political events 
Post-war reconstruction , IRA border 
campaign 
Civil rights campaign , violence escalates 
Failure of Sunningdale Agreement , 
hunger strikes, Bloody Sunday 
Anglo-Irish Agreement , New Ireland 
Forum, Brooke-Mayhew talks 
Peace process, 1998 Agreement, Omagh 
bomb 
Devolution and power-sharing , return to 
direct rule , re- insta lment of power-
sharing , emphasis on 'sharing ' in 
government policy 
Source NISA and NILT surveys, pooled sample, 1989 -2010. 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 chart trends in Northern Irish identity for each political 
generation. What is most striking when comparing these is the contrast in directional 
sh ifts of Protestants and Catholics identifying as Northern Iri sh. For Protestants the data 
reveal a rising trend in favour of Northern Iri sh identity among all generations although 
this is most marked in the two youngest generations (that came of age during and after 
the signing of the 1998 Agreement.) 
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Figure 8.1 Trends in Northern Irish identity among Protestant generations 
over time 
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Source: NISA and NIL T surveys, pooled sample, 1989 -2010. 
By contrast, Figure 8.2 clearly shows a downward tr-end for the two youngest 
Catholi c generations (generation 5 and generation 6). Here, the data show that 
identification as Northern Irish has dropped from 30 per cent in 2005 to just below 20 
per cent in 20 I 0. Indeed, only the generation 3 curve (those who came of age around the 
time of the Sunningdale Agreement) indicates an increased preference for Northern 
Irish identity over time. 
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Figure 8.2 Trends in Northern Irish identity among Catholic generations 
over time 
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Source: NISA and NIL T surveys , pooled sample, 1989-2010 . 
These trends are consistent with the data analyses conducted in chapters five, six 
and seven which revealed that, overall, the likelihood of identifying as Northern Iri sh 
has increased over time fo r Protestants, but decreased for Catholics. Further 
endorsement of these findings is provided by Devine and Schubotz (2004) who found 
that younger Protestants were more likely than Catholics to prefer a Northern Irish 
identity while Hayes and McAllister (2009a) observe that among Protestants, it is the 
younger and better educated who identi fy as such . 
One possible explanation for the different trajectories in identity preferences 
between young Catholics and Protestants especially, is the way in wh ich post-
Agreement institutional arrangements have been interpreted by the two communities. 
As discussed in chapter 4, recent literature suggests there has been a di spari ty in 
Protestant and Catho lic attitudes towards the Agreement (see for example Hayes and 
268 
McAllister 1999, 2004; Hayes, McAllister and Dowds 2005; Mac Ginty and Du Toit 
2007). This has been apparent through the growing sense of disaffection and alienation 
within the Protestant community in its interpretation of the pluralist arrangements of 
government. For example, many Protestants view the Agreement as undermining their 
British identity through the establishment of constitutional links with the Republic of 
Ireland and making their position within the UK more insecure (see Dixon 2001; 
Aughey 2001 , 2005 ; Obershcall and Kendall-Palmer 2005; Mac Ginty and Du Toit 
2007). 
Protestant disaffection with the Agreement (and subsequently with the British 
government for their perceived betrayal and for 'selling out' to Nationalist demands) 
could impact on the way Protestants perceive of their relationship with, and status 
within, Britain. If Protestants view their position within Britain as being inferior, then 
they may seek other avenues of identification and therefore look to the region of 
Northern Ireland as a lodestar. In line with this , previous research has pointed to the 
perceived ambiguity surrounding traditional British allegiances, particularly among 
young Protestants (see Hayes and McAllister 2009a). This is a result of ongoing debate 
over the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and, since the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
in 1985 and the Agreement in 1998, the role of the Republic of Ireland in Northern 
Ireland affairs. 
Conversely, the consolidation of Irish identity among the younger Catholic 
generations could reflect a greater sense of ease in expressing this identity in the post-
Agreement era. For example, several recent studies (Mitchell 2003; Muldoon et al. 
2007) have indicated a renewed sense of confidence among Catholics in expressing 
their Irishness. This is likely due to the strong egalitarian emphasis within the 
Agreement which, argues Todd (2005) newly certified Irish identity. 
The data presented here show that reproduction of divided national identities is 
apparent among younger Catholic cohorts. This finding may have important 
implications for the trajectory of change in Northern Ireland. It is consistent with other 
research that has found that the reproduction of divided political identities has continued 
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among young voters, not least because of the high percentage of separate schools and 
levels of residential segregation. This suggests that, as children and adolescents, young 
people have less social contact with members of other groups than adults (see McAuley 
2004; Tilley and Evans 201 1). 
Yet, as the data also show, this pattern of division among the young is not evident 
among Protestant cohorts who came of age after the signing of the 1998 Agreement. 
They have displayed an increasing propensity to identify not as British, but as Northern 
Irish. This is an encouraging sign . As Coakley (2008: 780) foreshadowed, ' We might 
expect the advent of peace ... to have a significant impact on attitudes, especially among 
younger voters.' Indeed, it may be that what we are seeing here is a tendency among 
younger Protestants to re-align their conception of belonging, first and foremost, to the 
region of Northern Ireland. 
Implications of the research for theory and practice 
The impact of community relations initiatives on a wide range of social indicators 
has received substantial attention in the social scientific literature. I have sought to 
contribute to this literature by determining whether the emergence of a shared public 
identity, namely the Northern Irish identity, can be plausibly associated with policies 
that aim to promote contact between members of Protestant and Catholic communities. 
It is clear that there are no lack of agencies and programmes aimed at improving 
community relations in Northern Ireland and that much of the effort has aimed to 
increase the amount of intergroup contact between people of the two main communities. 
I have argued that fundamental assumptions of intergroup contact theory underpin much 
of this cross-community contact work, and while intergroup contact theory was not 
intended as a panacea (see Allport 1954: 261; Hewstone 2003), this is the way 
practitioners have tended to interpret it (Cairns and Hewstone 2000: 225). The contact 
approach to community relations has received significant criticism (see Hughes and 
Donnelly 2002; McVeigh 2002) from the perspective of those who regard the contact 
agenda as being ' symptom driven'---diverting attention away from tackling persistent 
socio-economic inequal ities within society. It is true that a holistic approach to building 
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a stable society is necessary, and this will require much more than the contact approach 
can offer on its own. However, this is not to suggest that such an approach is 
unwarranted or undesirable. Indeed, as Frazer and Fitzduff (1995: 9) noted in their 
report Improving Community Relations, '(w]hile it is not inevitable that people who live 
and work closely and interdependently together will respect and understand one 
another, it is often true that segregated communities facilitate fears and suspicions.' 
This is a view held among scholars and practitioners from other divided societies 
such as South Africa (Gibson 2004; Gibson and Classen 2010) and the United States 
(Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1975; Cook 1978; Zirkel and Cantor 2004; Holme, Wells, and 
Revilla 2005). For example, within the United States since the early 1950s arguments in 
favour of an end to the racial segregation of schools were based not only on the 
argument that such segregation leads to socio-economic inequality, but that increasing 
interracial contact would ultimately lead to further integration and mutual understanding 
among the wider community (see Allport 1954; Brown vs Board of Education 1954; 
Pettigrew 1975; Cook I 978). Later survey-based research in the United States has found 
support for this argument (Zirkel and Cantor 2004; Holme, Wells, and Revilla 2005). 
These studies show that attending a desegregated school reduced fear of intergroup 
encounters and increased students' ability to operate effectively in interracial settings. 
Within South Africa, research conducted by Gibson and Classen (2010) found 
that interracial contact, and in particular intimate contact in the fonn of friendships, was 
a significant predictor in reduced prejudicial attitudes. Importantly, all of the studies 
mentioned here do not regard intergroup contact as for the sole means of resolving 
intergroup conflict. Rather, intergroup contact can be thought of as one of many 
measures for improving intergroup relations, one that has a solid evidential basis and a 
long history in cross-national social scientific research. 
The overall conclusion of my research thus points in favour of an approach that 
seeks to promote contact between members of the Catholic and Protestant communities. 
That is, through analysis of time-series data stretching over a 21 year period the 
evidence suggests that increasing numbers of people engaged in cross-community 
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contact are demonstrating that identities other than British and Irish national identities 
are important to them when defining themselves in a public way. The growth of a 
shared public identity may have important implications for the fu ture of communi ty 
relations as well as for the institutional arrangements of government. For example 
national identity has historicall y assumed importance in Northern Ireland and has, more 
recently, been acknowledged as such under the terms of the Agreement in 1998 (NIO 
1998: Annex A l (vi)). The 'two traditi ons' model is influenced by the view underlying 
the Agreement that Northern Ireland is divided into two distinct and irreconcilable 
communities : one Protestant/unionist/British and the other Catholic/nationalist/Irish. 
The growth in the salience of an alternative identity, the Northern Irish identity, 
suggests the possibi lity of someday moving beyond this model. Indeed, if the Northern 
Irish identity continues to gain salience, then acknowledgement of this identity, as a 
viable public identity, wi thin social instituti ons and the structures of government may 
be promoted. 
Yet, changes in society are unlikely to be sustainable without the engagement and 
leadership of politicians at the institutional level. In recent years Sinn Fein and the DUP 
have triumphed in electoral tenns. These two traditional parties now dominate the 
political scene, and are seen to be more able to meet the demands of their respective 
communities than their more moderate counterparts (McAlli ster 2004; Tilley and Evans 
201 1). Indeed as I argued in chapter 2, although they share power, political leaders from 
both parties continue to engage in bonding rhetoric, playing up perceived differences 
between groups, and thus further exacerbating intergroup competition. 
Indeed, while the Northern Irish identity is popular among those who transcend 
group boundaries, this is certainly not the only determinant of identity patterns. Rather, 
the degree to which such policy initiatives can have an impact is not independent of the 
broader political context. Th is was evident by the finding that the political process has 
influenced patterns of identity. Here, the impact of the Agreement on identi ty change 
also appeared to be significant, albeit with different effects for Catholics and 
Protestants. For Protestant respondents , identification as Northern Irish has increased in 
the post-devolution era whi le for Catholic respondents identifying as Northern Irish as 
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opposed to Irish has decreased in the ten years since the implementation of the 
Agreement. These trends suggest that political developments do have some bearing on 
identity, especially among the youngest cohorts (Protestants becoming more moderate 
in their stance and Catholics moving towards the traditional Irish identity.) 
To counter this potential polarisation among the young, continuing efforts need to 
be made to provide momentum for a strong community relations agenda. My research 
suggests that a strong community relations agenda is a worthwhile venture. This is 
because cross-community contact, promoted within such an agenda, is associated with 
less divisive identities and conceptions of place. While many policymakers 
understandably approach peace-building as a structural process, it is also a 
psychological process that requires members of society to change the way in which they 
conceive of their relation to one another. In particular, members of these societies need 
to move beyond conceiving of themselves as members of groups that stand in essential 
opposition to other groups. 
While for the most part leadership in the peace process in Northern Ireland has 
been viewed as primarily political, at other times political change has lagged behind the 
choices being made in society and change has required the leadership of others within 
the community (Morrow 2005). For instance, for many years now successive surveys 
have found that an overwhelming majority of people in Northern Ireland are in favour 
of integrated education (ARK 1989-2010). However, this sector still only accounts for a 
very small minority of the school-aged population. The continued support of, and 
advocacy by, non-government actors such as the NICIE and the CRC, to name just two, 
will be of fundamental importance to the continued engagement of those wishing to 
move beyond the two traditions model. 
Directions for future research 
This study has contributed to a growing body of survey-based analysis of identity 
patterns in Northern Ireland. Its focus has been on measuring the relationship between 
varying levels of intergroup contact and national identity preferences using statistical 
modelling of a range of social indicators from the NISA and NIL T surveys. The use of 
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quality extensive time-series data made it possible to establish statistically significant 
inferences wh ich could then be tran sferred to general statements about the broader 
Northern Irish population. Due to the large sample size and time series nature of the 
survey data, it has been possible to establish society-wide relationships between 
national identity and cross-community contact that would not have been apparent using 
more focused qualitative methods. 
However, while I have been able to establish significant relationships between 
intergroup contact and a range of social indicators, the causal processes underlying them 
remain unclear. There are a number of reasons for this. For one, the data used are cross-
sectional, thus limiting our ability to infer causality. To complement the present analysis 
and to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of statistical 
relationships, future research might apply methodologies that more adequately capture 
the direction of causality between measures. This can only be achieved through a more 
qualitative approach (involving in-depth interviews with participants involved in contact 
schemes) and, in the long-tenn, through the development of a longitudinal survey to 
track and measure patterns of identity among the same individuals over a number of 
years. Second, it is possible that those who engage in intergroup contact are predisposed 
to this type of contact in the first place. At present, there are no measures available that 
can determine this. 
Future research might also consider the development of more sophisticated 
measures for capturing the complexity of identity that encompasses the meaning of 
identities for the individuals who are being surveyed. indeed, there is an inescapable 
ambi guity in the meaning of particular social identities because they are measured as the 
degree to which a person identifies with various social groups. And there are a several, 
albeit related, ways in which a 'Northern Irish ' identity might be interpreted that are not 
captured by the current measures. For some, identifying as Northern Irish may be a 
rejection of the 'two traditions' model and an attempt to find a neutral position. For 
others it may represent a passive or a-political position to the status quo (Ruane 1999) . 
And again, to identify as Northern Irish may reflect genuine senti ments of belonging 
first and foremost to the region of Northern Ireland. Future research would therefore 
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examine more closely what it means to identify as Northern Irish among the cohorts 
identified in this study. 
Another important question to be explored is whether the trend in popularity of 
the Northern Irish identity is likely to continue among future generations. Research has 
found that exposure to violence is not only correlated with sectarian sentiments (Hayes 
and McAllister 2005) but also that personal experiences of conflict have also influenced 
the strength of religious and national identities (see Muldoon et al. 2007). Recent events 
in Northern Ireland provide a sobering reminder of how easily conflict can erupt into 
violence. Efforts to improve community relations through cross-community contact 
schemes may be undermined by outbreaks in violence. Given the apparent shift towards 
more traditional forms of identity among younger generations of Catholics, future 
research should continue to monitor this trend and attempt to uncover the reasons for it. 
To conclude, major social change cannot occur without real structural change. As 
Hamber and Kelly (2005) have argued, although increasing intergroup contact is an 
essential component of improving community relations it is not the sole remedy for 
building positive relationships between communities. This will only be possible through 
the establi shment of appropriate structures, political support, and a political 
environment that encourages such relationship building. While the relationship between 
cross-community engagement and the breaking down of tr-aditional barriers remains 
disputed, a decrease in the prominence of national identities seems at least a step in the 
direction towards a more inclusive and shared society-even if this decrease is only 
found within some sections of society. 
My research finds some merit in approaches that promote peace through cross-
community engagement and social mixing. The results show that, for the most part, it is 
withio the integrated sector that divisive identities are being challenged and more 
moder~te expressions of identity are being realised. Insofar as the number of people 
who identify as Northern Irish increases, this may help to break down territorial 
allegiances and create space for the development of a shared sense of belonging in a 
territory that is historically contested. 
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Appendix 1. Data sources 
Northern Ireland Loyalty Survey (1968) The Survey was conducted between 
March and August 1968. The loyalty survey is based on a random sample of the adult 
population in Northern Ireland. The survey used questionnaire design and was based on 
a series of face-to-face interviews with 1,291 respondents aged 20 years and over. The 
survey was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. The principal 
investigator of the survey was Richard Rose and the data are available from the Un ited 
Kingdom Data Archive (UKDA) at the University of Essex <http://www.data-
archive.ac.uk/>. 
Northern Ireland Attitude Survey (1978). The Survey was conducted between Ju ly 
and October 1978. Funded by the Nuffiel d Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the 
Comm ittee for Social Science Research in lreland and the Economic and the Social 
Research Institute, it used a questionnaire design based on a random, representative 
sample of the adult population in Northern Ireland. The survey invo lved personal 
interviews of 1,277 respondents aged 18 years and over. The principal investigators of 
the survey were Edward Maxon-Browne in Northern Ireland and Earl E. David and 
Richard Sinnott in the Republic of Ireland . The data from the survey are available from 
the UKDA at the University of Essex <http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/>. 
Northern Ireland Social Attitudes (NISA) Survey (1989-1996). The Survey was 
funded by the Nuffield Foundation and the Northern Ireland CCRU. The NISA surveys 
were based on a random sample of the adult population (aged 18 years and over). The 
surveys have been carried out annually between I 989 and I 996 except in the years 
when a general election was held, such as in 1992. The NISA Survey was run in 
conjunction with the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey and provided cross-sectional 
data on social attitudes in Northern Ireland allowing for easy comparison with the rest 
of Britain. Data is available from the UKDA <http://www.data-archive.co.uk>. 
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Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) Survey (1998-2010). The NILT Survey 
was launched in October 1998 and follows on from the NISA Survey. The surveys are 
based on a nationally representative sample of the Northern Ireland population using 
based on a random sample of the adult population (aged 18 years and over). Following 
the implementation of devolution in Northern Ireland, the new NILT survey now has a 
more specific focus on Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, every year includes a substantial 
component that is directly comparable to the earlier NISA surveys. The survey is run on 
a modular format with two modules repeated every year (political attitudes and 
community relations) as well as a number of background questions. Other modules 
included in the remainder of the survey vary annually. The data is available for 
download from the Northern Ireland Social and Political Archive (ARK) at 
<http://www.ark.ac.uk>. 
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Table 1A Northern Ireland Data Sources 
Survey Field-work Sample Average Available at 
size response 
rate% 
Loyalty survey 1968, Mar-Aug 1,291 87 UKDA, no . 1040 
Attitudes survey 1978, Jul-Oct 1,277 64 UKDA, no. 1347 
NISA survey 1989, Mar-Apr 866 68 UKDA, no. 2792 
NISA survey 1990, Feb-Apr 896 68 UKDA, no. 2841 
NISA survey 1991 , Feb- Apr 906 68 UKDA, no. 2953 
NISA survey 1993, Feb-Apr 842 68 UKDA, no. 3440 
NISA survey 1994 , Mar- Aug 1,519 68 UKDA, no. 3590 
NISA survey 1995, May-Aug 1,510 68 UKDA, no . 3797 
NISA survey 1996, May- Jul 786 68 UKDA, no. 4130 
NIL T survey 1998, Oct-Dec 1,800 68 ARK 
NIL T survey 1999, Oct-Jan 2000 2,200 63 ARK 
NIL T survey 2000 , Oct-Dec 1,800 63 ARK 
NIL T survey 2001, Oct-Dec 1,800 63 ARK 
NIL T survey 2002, Oct-Jan 2003 1,800 63 ARK 
NIL T survey 2003 , Oct-Feb 2003 1,800 63 ARK 
NIL T survey 2004 , Oct-Feb 2005 1,800 63 ARK 
NIL T survey 2005, Oct-Jan 2006 1,200 63 ARK 
NIL T survey 2006 , Oct-March 2007 1,230 63 ARK 
NIL T survey 2007 , Oct-Jan 2008 1,179 63 ARK 
NIL T survey 2008 , Oct-Feb 2009 1,215 63 ARK 
NIL T survey 2009 , Oct-Dec 1,228 63 ARK 
NIL T survey 2010 , Oct-Dec 1,205 63 ARK 
Pooled NISA and 31 ,417 n/a ARK 
NILT surveys 1989-
2010 
278 
Appendix 2. Modules and survey questions 
Table 2A Module: Community relations 
Variable NINATID recoded NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Which of these best describes the way you think of yourself? 
British 
Irish 
Ulster 
Northern Irish 
Other 
Don 't know 
(asked in NISA and NILT surveys 1989 to 2010) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(8) 
279 
Table 2B Module: Background 
Variable (RELIGION) 
Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion? If yes, which? 
No religion (1) 
Catholic (2) 
Church of Ireland/Anglican/Episcopal (3) 
Baptist (4) 
Methodist (5) 
Presbyterian (6) 
Free Presbyterian (7) 
Brethren (8) 
Reform Church (URC)/Congregational (9) 
Pentecostal (10) 
Church of Scotland (11) 
Elim Pentecostal (12) 
Reformed Presbyterian (13) 
Non-subscribing Presbyterian (14) 
Salvation Army (15) 
Church of Nazarene (16) 
Jehovah's Witness (17) 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day (18) 
Other Protestant - please say which (19) 
Other Christian - please say which (20) 
Hindu (21) 
Jewish (22) 
Islam/Muslim (23) 
Sikh (24) 
Buddhist (25) 
Other (26) 
Don't know (98) 
(asked in NISA and NILT surveys 1989 to 2010) 
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Table 2C Module: Community relations 
Variable SRELNGH recoded RESIDENTIAL AREA 
What about your neighbours? About how many are the 
same religion as you? 
All 
Most 
Half 
Less than half 
None 
Don 't have a religion 
Not Protestant or Catholic 
Don't know 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(asked in NISA surveys 1989, 1991 , 1993, 1995 and NIL T surveys 2005 , 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010) 
Table 2D Module: Community relations 
Variable SLFMXSCH recoded TYPE OF EDUCATION (A) 
Did you ever attend a mixed or integrated school in Northern 
Ireland, that is, a school with fairly large numbers of both 
Catholic and Protestant children? -
Yes 
No 
(Don't know) 
(asked in NISA/NIL T surveys 1989 to 2010) 
(1) 
(2) 
(8) 
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Table 2E Module: Community relations 
Variable FORMINT recoded TYPE OF EDUCATION (B) 
Was this a formally integrated school or was it a school that 
was just fairly mixed? 
Formally integrated school 
School that was just fairly mixed 
(Don 't know) 
(asked in NILT surveys 1998 to 2010) 
Table 2F Module: Community relations 
(1) 
(2) 
(8) 
Variable SRELFRND recoded FRIENDSHIP NETWORK 
About how many of your friends would you say are the same 
religion as you? 
All 
Most 
Half 
Less than half 
None 
(Don 't have a religion) 
(Not Protestant or Catholic) 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(asked in NISA surveys 1989, 1991 , 1993, 1995 and NIL T surveys 2000 , 2005, 2006 , 2007 , 
2008 , 2009, 2010) 
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Table 2G Module: Community relations 
Variable SRELREL recoded KINSHIP 
What about your relatives, including relatives by marriage? 
About how many are the same religion as you? 
All 
Most 
Half 
Less than half 
None 
(Don 't have a religion) 
(Not Protestant or Catholic) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(asked in NISA surveys 1989, 1991 , 1993, 1995 and NIL T surveys 2000 , 2005 , 2006 , 2007, 
2008 , 2009, 2010) 
Table 2H Module: Background 
Variable RELIGSAM recoded MARRIAGE 
Is your husband/wife/partner the same religion as 
Yes, same religion 
No religion at all 
(asked in NIL T surveys 1998 to 2005) 
(1) 
_{2) 
(3) 
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Appendix 3. Coding 
Table 3A Coding of dependent and independent variables 
Variable 
National identity 
(Catholics) 
(Protestants) 
Residential area 
Type of Education 
(mixed) 
(formally integrated) 
Kinship ties 
Friendship network 
Mixed marriage 
Coding 
Catholic respondents identifying as Northern Irish coded as 
1. Catholic respondents identifying as Irish coded as 0. 
Protestant respondents identifying as Northern Irish coded 
as 1. Protestant respondents identifying as British coded 
as 0. 
Respondents with half/ less than half of same religion 
neighbours defined as 'mixed' and coded as 1. 
Respondents with all or most of same religion neighbours 
defined as 'segregated ' and coded as 0. 
Respondents who attended a mixed or integrated school 
coded as 1 . Those who stated to have not attended a 
mixed or integrated school coded as 0. 
Respondents who stated to have attended a formally 
integrated school coded as 1. Those who stated to have 
attended a fairly mixed school coded as 0. 
Respondents with half/ less than half of same religion kin 
defined as 'mixed kinship' and coded as 1. Respondents 
with all or most of same religion kin defined as 
'homogenous' and coded as 0. 
Respondents with half/ less than half of same religion 
friends defined as 'mixed friendship and coded as 1. 
Respondents with all or most of same religion friends 
defined as 'homogenous' and coded as 0. 
Respondents who stated that their husband/wife/partner is 
not the same religion defined as 'mixed ' and coded as 1. 
Respondents who stated th at their husband/wife/partner is 
the same religion defined as 'endogamous' and coded as 
0. 
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